A late design change confused 737 Max decision makers

A new report from The New York Times reveals Boeing's construction of its 737 Max airplanes was even more head-scratching than initially thought.

The design flaw in the planes which led to two fatal crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia in recent months, can reportedly be traced to a breakdown late in the plane's development, which was rushed to begin with as the company sought to compete with a new model of planes from its main competitor, Airbus. Test pilots, engineers, and regulators told the Times they were not aware of a late-stage "fundamental overhaul" to an automated anti-stall system that is believed to have played a role in both crashes.

Those who spoke with the Times said they did not understand the changes, which reportedly removed some of the data from the first iteration of the software and removed a critical safeguard, leading them to make critical decisions under misguided assumptions. They said the malfunctions could have been avoided if the changes were made clear. They also reportedly worked on the plane under a "compartmentalized approach" with individuals working separately on smaller parts, rather than as a cohesive unite, leaving them without a complete view of the software. Read more at The New York Times.