A Case For School Armed Security?

PROTECTING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS/ANALYSIS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE/ 2019

OUTSIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT: In just over one-third of the attacks (n = 16, 39%), outside law enforcement were notified within one minute of the start of the attack, and in just under one-third (n = 12, 29%), outside police were notified between one and five minutes after the start of the attack. In nine cases, it took longer than five minutes for someone to notify outside law enforcement, and in four cases the timing could not be determined from
information available.

In nearly one-third of the cases (n = 13, 32%), it took external first responders between one and five minutes to arrive on scene after the attack was initiated, and in about a quarter of the cases (n = 11, 27%) first responders arrived between five and ten minutes after the attack began. In only one case, outside law enforcement responded in one minute or less, because officers were already at the school conducting K-9 drug sweeps at the time of the attack.

Response Times in school shootings or stabbings.

SCHOOL OFFICERS: In 27 cases (66%), a security officer or SRO was assigned to the school on either a full- or part- time basis. During 20 of the attacks (49%), the officer was on duty at the school. In over one-quarter of the cases (n = 12, 29%), the officer or SRO was able to make it to the scene of the attack within one minute. In three of the attacks (7%), it took between one and five minutes for the officer to respond, and for two attacks (5%), it took between five and ten minutes. Of note, in two cases the officers themselves were the targets of the attacks, and in the remaining, it was not possible to determine the response time based on available information.

Resolution & Harm
ATTACK RESOLUTION: Half of the attackers (n = 21, 51%) ended the attack without any external intervention. Seven attackers (17%) committed suicide, six (15%) left the scene, three (7%) surrendered to school officials, three (7%) dropped their weapons and waited to be arrested, one (2%) stopped and called family, and one attacker (2%) left the scene before calling family.

Non-law enforcement adult school staff brought nine attacks (22%) to an end. This included teachers, guidance counselors an assistant principal a sports coach a campus supervisor and a janitor. Six of the attacks (15%) ended with law enforcement intervention, either by SROs (n = 5, 12%) or by local police who were already on campus (n = 1, 2%).

Two of the attackers were killed by the law enforcement response. No attacks were ended by outside law enforcement agencies responding to the scene from off-campus. Other attacks ended due to student bystander intervention (n = 4, 10%) or a weapon malfunction (n = 1, 2%).

HARM: Ninety-eight victims were harmed in the 41 attacks, including 79 injured and 19 killed. The victims included students, school staff, and law enforcement.10 One stabbing incident accounted for 20 of the 98 victims, all of whom were injured but survived. In just over half of the attacks (n = 22, 54%), only one individual was harmed. In the remaining attacks, two persons were harmed (n = 9, 22%), or three or more were harmed (n = 10, 24%).

TWENTY VICTIMS: A 16-year-old student randomly slashed and stabbed people at his high school using two kitchen knives he had brought from home. Nineteen students and one staff member were injured, but all survived. The attack ended after about five minutes when the assistant principal tackled the assailant.

Weapons

61% firearms; 39% bladed; 7% had additional weapons

Firearm Acquisition
The primary weapons used in the 41 attacks were firearms (n = 25, 61%) and knives (n = 16, 39%). In most of the incidents involving knives, the weapons were taken by the attackers from their kitchens or other areas of their homes. Because knives are commonly available with little restriction, this section focuses on how the attackers acquired the firearms used in the attacks. All percentages provided in this section are based on the 25 attackers who used firearms.

FROM THE HOME: Nineteen attackers (76%) acquired a firearm from the home of a parent or another close relative. In half of the firearms cases (n = 12, 48%), evidence indicates the firearm was either readily accessible, or it was not secured in a meaningful way. For example, some firearms had been kept locked in accessible wooden or glass cabinets, locked in vehicles, or hidden in closets. In four cases (16%), the firearms were kept in more secured locations, but the attacker was still able to gain access to them. In these instances, the firearms were secured in a locked gun safe or case, but the attackers were able to gain access to them because they knew the combination or where the keys were kept, or they were able to guess the password or combination. In three cases, it is unknown if the firearm had been secured.

A 15-year-old student fatally shot one classmate and injured three others at his high school. The attacker knew the combination to his father’s gun safe, from which he was able to obtain a .32 caliber semiautomatic pistol and a semiautomatic .223 caliber AR-15 rifle with a 30-round magazine. The attacker transported the weapons on the school bus by concealing the rifle and seven extra boxes of ammunition in a golf bag. He kept the handgun in his pocket.

TIMING OF THE ACQUISITION: Eight of the attackers (32%) acquired a firearm on the day of the attack. Five additional attackers (20%) acquired a firearm the day before the attack, and four attackers (16%) acquired a firearm between two and seven days prior. This finding reinforces the importance of a swift response to situations involving students who may pose a risk of harm to themselves or others, especially those who have access to weapons in the home.

Juvenile Access to Weapons
Under federal law, individuals under the age of 18 may not legally possess a handgun, except in limited circumstances. Federal law does not restrict the age of individuals who may possess long guns (e.g., shotguns and rifles). Some states have implemented additional restrictions on juvenile possession of firearms, for example, prohibiting minors from possessing any firearm, except for certain activities and with parental consent.14
If a child poses a risk of harm to him/herself or others, it is the responsibility of parents, law enforcement, and schools to collaboratively determine the most appropriate avenue for ensuring that the child does not have access to weapons.

WEAPONS TRANSPORT: Half of the attackers (n = 12, 48%) who used a firearm in their attack transported the weapon into the school building while concealing it in their backpacks. Three attackers (12%) transported their firearms into the school in another type of bag, including a guitar case, a golf bag, and a gym bag. One attacker transported a firearm into the school concealed in his waistband. Two attackers did not conceal their firearms, carrying them openly into the school building after the start of the school day.

Additionally, two attackers transported firearms from home to school but perpetrated the attack on school property without entering the building. One of those attackers carried his weapon out in the open, while the other concealed the firearm in a guitar case as he rode his bike to the school grounds.

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