Antidemocratic ParticipationRevisited

Mila Ghorayeb

pTwo years ago, at the end of a democratic theory seminar, I read Alexander Kirshner’s book emA Theory of Militant Democracy /em(2014) and decided to continue his discussion about the paradox of democracy. The paradox asks: can a democratic society, in a non-contradictory way, restrict political participation if said participation is a threat to democracy?a href=#_ftn2 name=_ftnref2 id=_ftnref2spanspan[2]/span/span/a For the purposes of my essay, “antidemocrat” is taken to mean a political actor that wishes to exclude a socially salient group of participants from thenbsp;demos./p

pKirshner’s book is illuminating, though not the first to bring the concern to the table. Karl Loewenstein, writing in the time of Nazi Germany, coined the term “militant democracy” to argue that it is permissible to violate “fundamental principles” of democracy such as the right to participate as an electoral candidate.a href=#_ftn3 name=_ftnref3 id=_ftnref3spanspan lang=EN-CA lang=EN-CAspanspan lang=EN-CA lang=EN-CA[3]/span/span/span/span/a Loewenstein argued that antidemocrats – like the Nazi party – can exploit the tolerance of democracies and thus, must be met with intolerance.a href=#_ftn4 name=_ftnref4 id=_ftnref4spanspan lang=EN-CA lang=EN-CAspanspan lang=EN-CA lang=EN-CA[4]/span/span/span/span/a Indeed, Joseph Goebbels himself taunted democrats by claiming that their own system lets antidemocrats like himself annihilate it.”a href=#_ftn5 name=_ftnref5 id=_ftnref5spanspan lang=EN-CA lang=EN-CAspanspan lang=EN-CA lang=EN-CA[5]/span/span/span/span/a/p

pemA Theory of Militant Democracy/em takes a softer position than Loewenstein’s, and Kirshner calls us to take seriously the participatory rights of antidemocrats. If one holds morally relevant interests at stake during democratic deliberation, Kirshner argues, we cannot lighthandedly suppress their participation. Instead, he offers limited and extenuating circumstances under which we can suppress democratic participation. For instance, he favorably cites how the British Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) legally sanctioned the British National Party (BNP) for refusing to permit non-white membership in their party. The EHRC’s rationale, in this case, was that non-white constituents would be unable to depend on the BNP to fulfill their political duties towards them should they be elected.a href=#_ftn6 name=_ftnref6 id=_ftnref6spanspan[6]/span/span/a While the EHRC was successfully emable/em to influence the BNP’s direction, the question remains: did their act contradict the democratic values theynbsp;espoused?/p

pI have argued under the assumption that democracy contains these relevant features: first, democracy is a system wherein citizens have an equal opportunity to influence political outcomes. Second, democracy as a system is motivated toward equal opportunity of political influence because of the way citizens are legally bound, equally, by the decisions made in the political sphere.a href=#_ftn7 name=_ftnref7 id=_ftnref7spanspan[7]/span/span/a These are somewhat abstract conceptions of democracy; understandably so, as my paper was initially for a political philosophy seminar. Realistically, there is an imbalance in the way citizens are legally bound by political decisions. Your sentencing prospects on a drug arrest will be bleaker if you cannot afford a good lawyer, and your financial status will also determine your access to the political arena. Democracy, in this case, is an ideal rather than something fully realized in practice. The assumption of this paper, however, is that it is a desirable ideal worth influencing what we strivenbsp;for./p

pIt is also worth noting after a href=https://www.liberalcurrents.com/antidemocratic-candidates-and-democracy/my last visitation of this issue in 2018/a that concerns about antidemocratic threats do not always come to fruition. Many had concern about President Donald Trump’s elected presidency turning into fascist rule; it has now fizzled out as a term less authoritarian and fascistic than the presidency of George W. Bush when accounting for surveillance and suppression of citizenry, war, bigotry, and general CIA activity.a href=#_ftn8 name=_ftnref8 id=_ftnref8spanspan[8]/span/span/a In reflecting on the two years between my piece and now, I have concluded that campaign rhetoric is not as sufficiently indicative of what one’s presidency will be like; more important is whether a nation’s sites of power choose to align with that president’s goals.a href=#_ftn9 name=_ftnref9 id=_ftnref9spanspan[9]/span/span/a/p

pMy answer to the initial question is still that it is not paradoxical or contradictory under a non-minimalist understanding of democracy to restrict who can run for office under an equal-political influence model ofnbsp;democracy./p

pWhether it is emdesirable/em and emfeasible/em on the other hand, is a separate question. As such, I would still recommend exercising caution, for two reasons: first, as in Trump’s case, someone who appears to be an antidemocratic threat may not substantiate this fear once in office. Second, we risk casting the net of what constitutes “antidemocratic” far too widely. Because I had defined an antidemocrat as someone that wishes to restrict the democratic participation of a socially salient group, what counts as “socially salient” can be easily manipulated. For instance, some governments have attempted to justify restricting speech using anti-discrimination laws, creating another democratic paradox to be contended with.a href=#_ftn10 name=_ftnref10 id=_ftnref10spanspan[10]/span/span/a For the sake of space, I will only deal with the former in this essay, though find it necessary to acknowledge thenbsp;latter./p

pstrongspanIs Restrictionnbsp;Contradictory? /span/strong/p

pI had based part of my argument on Ronald Dworkin’s argument that democracies can legitimately regulate democratic participation if such a regulation improves the democracy at large. Dworkin cites the emBuckley v Valeo /emcase from 1976, where the Court ruled that campaign expenditure ceilings violated the First Amendment right to use one’s finances to express political convictions.a href=#_ftn11 name=_ftnref11 id=_ftnref11spanspan[11]/span/span/a The outcome of this case, to Dworkin, is unacceptable: he argues—rightfully, in my opinion—that the concentration of wealth inhibits the likelihood of equal opportunity of influence. As such, it is antidemocratic. Campaign expenditure ceilings, according to Dworkin, limit participation in the right way; they improve democracy by facilitating an equal opportunity among citizenry to influence the laws that will bindnbsp;them./p

pMy framework, like Dworkin’s, took the view that we can improve democracy by allowing limited restrictions on participation. I also borrowed from Claudio López-Guerra, who conceptualizes the “effective choice set”: a group of candidates that potentially have the power to hold office.a href=#_ftn12 name=_ftnref12 id=_ftnref12spanspan[12]/span/span/a López-Guerra argues that allowing antidemocrats to be a legally valid option disrespects the people they wish to exclude; it expresses to those people that the community is unwilling to “stand by them” and conveys a potential acceptance of an antidemocratic administration.a href=#_ftn13 name=_ftnref13 id=_ftnref13spanspan[13]/span/span/a/p

pTo build on López-Guerra’s argument, I argued that disrespectful and exclusionary rhetoric on the part of antidemocratic candidates can constitute discriminatory behavior. I took this route from speech act theory, which explains how speech from a certain place of authority can constitute norms for others, for example by authorizing discriminatory treatment against them. If a boss of a workplace fires you for an immutable characteristic protected by discrimination law, their speech act that indicates they are firing you constitutes a legally discriminatory act.a href=#_ftn14 name=_ftnref14 id=_ftnref14spanspan[14]/span/span/a The antidemocrat’s campaign rhetoric can also constitute an act: it places what may be thought of as choice-insensitive issues (e.g., guaranteed political equality) as potentially choice-sensitive issues.a href=#_ftn15 name=_ftnref15 id=_ftnref15spanspan[15]/span/span/a What does this look like innbsp;practice?/p

pstrongThe Antidemocrat innbsp;Practice/strong/p

pThe memory of Meier Kahane came to the forefront in political discourse last year when the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, worked to get some of his followers elected into the Knesset.a href=#_ftn16 name=_ftnref16 id=_ftnref16spanspan[16]/span/span/a Kahane’s party, Kach, promoted not only excluding non-Jewish citizens of Israel from the demos, but proclaimed the inferiority of Palestinians and promoted forcibly transferring them.a href=#_ftn17 name=_ftnref17 id=_ftnref17spanspan[17]/span/span/a Kahane’s party was seen to be so contrary to the aims of democracy—and inciteful of extremism—that it was banned in Israel.a href=#_ftn18 name=_ftnref18 id=_ftnref18spanspan[18]/span/span/a As such, Netanyahu’s support for Kahane’s followers understandably drewnbsp;controversy./p

pKahane’s campaign and party is cited by theorist Nancy Rosenblum as an example of conduct that is “corrosive” for democracy.a href=#_ftn19 name=_ftnref19 id=_ftnref19spanspan[19]/span/span/a If Kahane were to remain in the political race, a new assumption takes place among citizens: forcibly transferring an entire ethnic group is on the table. Voters may choose it as a legitimate option. As such, people do not come to the polls and participate in the election as equals. For the ethnic Palestinians that even emcan /emvote, they come to the polls with the possibility of their exclusion in the future while others donbsp;not./p

pRestricting the participation of someone like Kahane is not as contradictory as one may initially believe because we must not, as Harry Brighouse says, “violate the principle that justifies the process.”a href=#_ftn20 name=_ftnref20 id=_ftnref20spanspan[20]/span/span/a The coherence of a political right rests on the ability to place duties and responsibilities on others; these inevitably constrain some forms of expression, such as voter intimidation or uttering threats. As such, restricting the participation of a candidate who wishes to undermine others’ democratic rights is rejecting that this kind of participation is emwithin the scope/em of participatory rights, rather than restricting participatory rights themselves.a href=#_ftn21 name=_ftnref21 id=_ftnref21spanspan[21]/span/span/a The electoral process can validly make ground rules for itself that limit the way certain citizens are disrespected as fellow democraticnbsp;participants./p

pstrongspanIs Restrictionnbsp;Desirable?/span/strong/p

pIt is one thing to grapple with the paradox of democracy and another to determine its relevance. Establishing a political action as non-contradictory does not make it a desirable politicalnbsp;action./p

pAs Joseph Raz argues, it is wise to avoid creating grand principles for government interference across the map. Instead, Raz argues we should attune ourselves to a state’s surrounding realities and incline ourselves “…toward a position which is informed by moral concerns but regards their application as a thoroughly nuanced and pragmatic matter.”a href=#_ftn22 name=_ftnref22 id=_ftnref22spanspan[22]/span/span/a My argument thus arrives at this: threats to democracy differ based on a country’s governance and political culture. The usefulness in restricting participation could be minimal or non-existent, which should be taken into consideration by democraticnbsp;theorists./p

pstrongUnsubstantiated Threats: Is It the Campaign Thatnbsp;Matters?/strong/p

pNotable about campaigns that put forward exclusionary goals is the shocking rhetoric. Kahane’s campaign promise, for instance, claimed that Arabs were “cancer” and that he would rid his country of these “cockroaches”.a href=#_ftn23 name=_ftnref23 id=_ftnref23spanspan[23]/span/span/a In a 2015 campaign rally, Trump proposed to kick out all Syrian refugees of the United States, claiming that “they could be ISIS.”a href=#_ftn24 name=_ftnref24 id=_ftnref24spanspan[24]/span/span/a Trump, though less explicitly antidemocratic than Kahane, espoused rhetoric that initially shocked even his own party.a href=#_ftn25 name=_ftnref25 id=_ftnref25spanspan[25]/span/span/a/p

pOf course, if racism is the concern, presidencies before Trump and after Kahane’s campaign wouldn’t exactly pass the test. The War on Terror in America, which led to the death and torture of American and non-American citizens alike, had no problem rationalizing itself through racist rhetoric.a href=#_ftn26 name=_ftnref26 id=_ftnref26spanspan[26]/span/span/a Racism not unlike Kahane’s still has a place in Israeli parliament.a href=#_ftn27 name=_ftnref27 id=_ftnref27spanspan[27]/span/span/a As such, we might wonder: what exactly are we preventingnbsp;here?/p

pMy initial argument considered the campaigns themselves as a form of antidemocratic harm; as I claimed before, it is potentially corrosive to a political society to deem admissible a platform that will potentially undercut others’ democratic rights. aOf course, a campaign has numerous proposals; as in the case of the BNP, such a restriction may simply involve removing antidemocratic clauses from a party’s platform/a while still permitting theirnbsp;participation./p

pTaking Raz’s suggestions, we should be looking to specific features of a political society when assessing what an antidemocratic threat looks like and what measures would be appropriate in response. This brings us out of the realm of the ideal, that is, “democracy is emx/em, and emy /emis an ethical violation of emx/em.” Political societies that contain antidemocratic political candidates are, in real life, not democratic in the ways I have described. As such, we cannot stop at an observation that a candidate is violating a democratic ideal if that ideal has not been fully realized. We may say, however, that that ideal is something to strive for, and that we should avoid actions that take us further fromnbsp;it./p

pAs such, what an antidemocratic candidate can do will depend on what their institutions, including their opposition, will permit them to do. If Trump’s opposition votes with his party to consolidate national surveillance powers,a href=#_ftn28 name=_ftnref28 id=_ftnref28spanspan[28]/span/span/a it is difficult to conceive of Trump’s administration itself as the unique authoritarian threat. Rather, there is an institutional norm and apparatus in place that permits those with authoritarian fantasies to actually realize them should they make it in. Trump’s presidency lacked an opposition willing to oppose his more authoritarian measures; not because he suppressed them, but because America’s political realities include a bipartisan consensus that is fundamentally undemocratic to begin with.a href=#_ftn29 name=_ftnref29 id=_ftnref29spanspan[29]/span/span/a/p

pIn Israel, Palestinians are fundamentally unconcerned with campaign rhetoric and which candidate will win. This is partly because many cannot vote while still remaining legally bound by the Israeli government in relevant ways.a href=#_ftn30 name=_ftnref30 id=_ftnref30spanspan[30]/span/span/a Whether Kahanists make it into parliament is likely immaterial. For Palestinians who can vote, the difference between having someone like Netanyahu and Kahane—both of whom have expressed contempt towards them—is likely immaterial asnbsp;well./p

pAs such, I have concluded that while it is not contradictory for a democracy to restrict electoral candidates’ participation, it may not be the most effective strategy of curtailing antidemocratic threats. It is up to different political societies to decide whether regulating political participation is worth theirnbsp;time./p

pIt is common at this point in our political timeline to think of rhetoric as a more primary mover than I now find necessary; this is something that has occurred to me and subsequently changed some of my stances as Trump’s presidency progressed. In reality, rhetoric is often a reflection of material political conditions, as is susceptibility to certain forms of rhetoric. In the end, striving for democracy will involve not fixating on restricting antidemocratic campaigns per se, but simply taking away their teeth through improvements in institutions, political culture, and in oppositionnbsp;parties./p

/p

pstrongNotes/strong/p

hr /

pa href=#_ftnref1 name=_ftn1 id=_ftn1spanspan[1]/span/span/a I initially wrote this for a Democratic Theory seminar at McGill University (Winter 2018), which was taught by Professor Arash Abizadeh. I would like to credit him for guiding me on these concepts and on this paper. I would also like to credit Professor Jacob T. Levy, whose “Political Theory in and As Political Science” seminar (Fall 2018) inspired numerous ideas for this piece. A version of my argument was published in October 2018: Mila Ghorayeb, “Antidemocratic Candidates and Democracy,” emLiberal Currents, /em(October 29, 2018), lt;a href=https://www.liberalcurrents.com/antidemocratic-candidates-and-democracy/https://www.liberalcurrents.com/antidemocratic-candidates-and-democracy//agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref2 name=_ftn2 id=_ftn2spanspan[2]/span/span/a See: Alexander S. Kirshner, “Self-Limiting Theory of Militant Democracyem,/em”em A Theory of Militant Democracy: The Ethics of Combatting Political Extremism/em, (New Haven amp; London: Yale University Press, 2014),nbsp;27./p

pa href=#_ftnref3 name=_ftn3 id=_ftn3spanspan[3]/span/span/a Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I,” emThe American Political Science Review/em, Vol 31, No. 3 (June 1937):nbsp;432./p

pa href=#_ftnref4 name=_ftn4 id=_ftn4spanspan[4]/span/span/a Loewenstein,nbsp;428./p

pspanspana href=#_ftnref5 name=_ftn5 id=_ftn5spanspan[5]/span/span/a /span/spanJan-Werner Ma href=https://www.google.ca/url?sa=tamp;rct=jamp;q=amp;esrc=samp;source=webamp;cd=1amp;ved=0ahUKEwj8nrWRgf_bAhXTLX0KHeKuD2QQFggpMAAamp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.princeton.edu%2Fpolitics%2Fpeople%2Fdisplay_person.xml%3Fnetid%3Djmuelleramp;usg=AOvVaw0ZeplgWOqCRU5LohLLMucDü/aller, “Militant Democracy and Constitutional Identity,” emComparative Constitutional Theory/em, ed. Gary Jacobsohn amp; Miguel Schor, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 418; Nancy Rosenblum, “Banning Parties,” Lemaw amp; Ethics of Human Rights/em 1, no. 1, (2007),nbsp;20./p

pa href=#_ftnref6 name=_ftn6 id=_ftn6spanspan[6]/span/span/a Kirshner, “Political Regulation in Defense of Democracy,”nbsp;61./p

pa href=#_ftnref7 name=_ftn7 id=_ftn7spanspan[7]/span/span/a See Robert Dahl, “Procedural Democracy,” emPhilosophy, Politics, amp; Society/em (5th Series). Ed. P. Laslett and J. Fishkin. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 101-108, 128; Harry Brighouse, “Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence,” emJournal of Political Philosophy/em 4(2) (1996): 140; Kolodny, 308-310; Dworkin, “What is Equality 4,”nbsp;22./p

pa href=#_ftnref8 name=_ftn8 id=_ftn8spanspan[8]/span/span/a For a comprehensive overview of these policies, see: Glenn Greenwald, “No Matter the Liberal Metric Chosen, the Bush/Cheney Administration Was Far Worse Than Trump,” emGlenn Greenwald Substack,/em (November 7, 2020) lt;a href=https://greenwald.substack.com/p/no-matter-the-liberal-metric-chosenhttps://greenwald.substack.com/p/no-matter-the-liberal-metric-chosen/agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref9 name=_ftn9 id=_ftn9spanspan[9]/span/span/a For instance, it is difficult to deem Trump uniquely fascist if his opposition grants him further power to spy on citizens without a warrant. See e.g. Glenn Greenwald, “The Same Democrats Who Denounce Donald Trump as a Lawless, Treasonous Authoritarian Just Voted to Give Him Vast Warrantless Spying Powers,” emThe Intercept/em, (January 12, 2018) lt;a href=https://theintercept.com/2018/01/12/the-same-democrats-who-denounce-trump-as-a-lawless-treasonous-authoritarian-just-voted-to-give-him-vast-warrantless-spying-powers/https://theintercept.com/2018/01/12/the-same-democrats-who-denounce-trump-as-a-lawless-treasonous-authoritarian-just-voted-to-give-him-vast-warrantless-spying-powers//agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref10 name=_ftn10 id=_ftn10spanspan[10]/span/span/a See, for instance, anti-BDS laws: Human Rights Watch, “US: States Use Anti-Boycott Laws to Punish Responsible Businesses,” emHRW, /em(April 23, 2019) lt;a href=https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/23/us-states-use-anti-boycott-laws-punish-responsible-businesseshttps://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/23/us-states-use-anti-boycott-laws-punish-responsible-businesses/agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref11 name=_ftn11 id=_ftn11spanspan[11]/span/span/a Dworkin, “Free Speech…” emLaw’s Empire/em (Cambridge amp; London: Harvard University Press, 1986),nbsp;352./p

pa href=#_ftnref12 name=_ftn12 id=_ftn12spanspan[12]/span/span/a Claudio López-Guerra, “Disenfranchisement and the Limits of Democratic Theory,” emDemocracy and Disenfranchisement: The Morality of Electoral Exclusions,/em (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),nbsp;152./p

pa href=#_ftnref13 name=_ftn13 id=_ftn13spanspan[13]/span/span/a Ibid.,nbsp;157./p

pa href=#_ftnref14 name=_ftn14 id=_ftn14spanspan[14]/span/span/a See: Ishani Maitra, “Subordinating Speech 1,” emSpeech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech/em, (Oxford University Press, 2012),nbsp;109./p

pa href=#_ftnref15 name=_ftn15 id=_ftn15spanspan[15]/span/span/a See: Dworkin, “What is Equality 4,”nbsp;25./p

pa href=#_ftnref16 name=_ftn16 id=_ftn16spanspan[16]/span/span/a Haviv Rettig Gur, “Netanyahu and the Kahanists: A moral compromise that may ruin his legacy,” emThe Times of Israel/em, (February 25, 2019), lt;a href=https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-and-the-kahanists-a-moral-compromise-that-may-ruin-his-legacy/https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-and-the-kahanists-a-moral-compromise-that-may-ruin-his-legacy//agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref17 name=_ftn17 id=_ftn17spanspan[17]/span/span/a Nancy Rosenblum, “Banning Parties,” emLaw amp; Ethics of Human Rights/em, 1, no. 1, (2007),nbsp;53./p

pa href=#_ftnref18 name=_ftn18 id=_ftn18spanspan[18]/span/span/a Ibid.,nbsp;54./p

pa href=#_ftnref19 name=_ftn19 id=_ftn19spanspan[19]/span/span/a Ibid./p

pa href=#_ftnref20 name=_ftn20 id=_ftn20spanspan[20]/span/span/a Brighouse,nbsp;139./p

pa href=#_ftnref21 name=_ftn21 id=_ftn21spanspan[21]/span/span/a For a more expanded version of this argument, see my emLiberal Currents/em piece./p

pa href=#_ftnref22 name=_ftn22 id=_ftn22spanspan[22]/span/span/a Joseph Raz, “Disagreement in Politics,” emAmerican Journal of Jurisprudence/em 43 (1998):nbsp;52./p

pa href=#_ftnref23 name=_ftn23 id=_ftn23spanspan[23]/span/span/a Rosenblum,nbsp;53./p

pa href=#_ftnref24 name=_ftn24 id=_ftn24spanspan[24]/span/span/a Jenna Johnson, “Donald Trump: Syrian refugees might be a terrorist army in disguise,” emThe Washington Post, /em(September 30, 2015), lt;a href=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/09/30/donald-trump-syrian-refugees-might-be-a-terrorist-army-in-disguise/?utm_term=.0bc579e3faa7https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/09/30/donald-trump-syrian-refugees-might-be-a-terrorist-army-in-disguise/?utm_term=.0bc579e3faa7/agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref25 name=_ftn25 id=_ftn25spanspan[25]/span/span/a Snopes Fact Check, “Mike Pence Said Calls to Ban Muslims are ‘Offensive and Unconstitutional’?” emSnopes.com/em (January 28, 2017), lt; a href=https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/mike-pence-muslim-ban-offensive/https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/mike-pence-muslim-ban-offensive//agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref26 name=_ftn26 id=_ftn26spanspan[26]/span/span/a Glenn Greenwald, “The racism that fuels the ‘war on terror,’” emThe Guardian, /em(March 25, 2013), lt;a href=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/25/racism-war-on-terror-awlakihttps://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/25/racism-war-on-terror-awlaki/agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref27 name=_ftn27 id=_ftn27spanspan[27]/span/span/a Haaretz editorial, “Netanyahu#8217;s racist mudslinging against Arabs,” emHaaretz, /em(2016) lt;a href=https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/israeli-all-the-way-1.5385419https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/israeli-all-the-way-1.5385419/agt;/p

pa href=#_ftnref28 name=_ftn28 id=_ftn28spanspan[28]/span/span/a Alex Emmons, “With support from Nancy Pelosi, House gives Trump administration broad latitude to spy on Americans,” emThe Intercept, /em(January 11, 2018), lt;a href=https://theintercept.com/2018/01/11/nsa-pelosi-democrats-spy-american-section-702/https://theintercept.com/2018/01/11/nsa-pelosi-democrats-spy-american-section-702//agt;./p

pa href=#_ftnref29 name=_ftn29 id=_ftn29spanspan[29]/span/span/a The anticipated response: “IT’S A REPUBLIC, NOT Anbsp;DEMOCRACY!”/p

pa href=#_ftnref30 name=_ftn30 id=_ftn30spanspan[30]/span/span/a Joseph Krauss and Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Unable to vote, Palestinians shrug off Israel’s elections,” emAP News/em, (September 13, 2019), lt;a href=https://apnews.com/article/5bd073882ef148a4be098b8e3754c0d1https://apnews.com/article/5bd073882ef148a4be098b8e3754c0d1/agt;./p