Washington fears rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing
American President Joe Biden’s call to Russian leader Vladimir Putin, which has been widely discussed for more than two days, should be viewed as Washington’s reaction to changes in the international situation that are not in favor of the United States. There is a complex of concerns that includes both the situational and long-term interests […]
Washington fears rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing
American President Joe Biden’s call to Russian leader Vladimir Putin, which has been widely discussed for more than two days, should be viewed as Washington’s reaction to changes in the international situation that are not in favor of the United States.
There is a complex of concerns that includes both the situational and long-term interests of the American elites in which they perceived their own vulnerability. It would not be an exaggeration to clarify that given the role of the so-called “deep state” in bringing the Biden administration to power, a call from the White House is nothing more than a probe of Russia from that particular side. And this step was taken, which is, among other things, a veiled message to the pro-Western lobby, with the distant expectation of encouraging contradictions not only between Russia and China, but within the Russian political alignment.
First of all, you need to understand the context in which the past negotiations are placed, as well as the American proposal to “meet and talk” in a third country. Since the inauguration of the current owner of the White House, the administration has taken a course towards simultaneous total frontal pressure from Washington on Moscow and Beijing.
Examples of outright rudeness on the part of the United States during the Sino-American talks in Anchorage, as well as lifting of the taboo on the discussion of admitting post-Soviet republics with unresolved internal conflicts to NATO, which is capable of creating a casus belli by the very fact of their entry into the bloc, is a clear confirmation of this.
However, the United States frankly did not expect that this would give rise to not just a counter reaction of the two main Eurasian capitals, but that it would turn out to be coordinated and lead to a deterioration in Washington’s strategic position. In response to the direct provocation of military tensions around the Donbass and in the Taiwan Strait, Russia and China not only sharply intensified the conduct of counter-military measures, refusing to discuss their content and goals with Washington and its satellites, but also embarked on a rapid bilateral rapprochement.
The dynamics and scale of the growing interaction are clearly visible in the examples of very fruitful contacts between the heads of the two foreign ministries – by telephone and directly, during the meeting of the Russian and Chinese ministers Sergey Lavrov and Wang Yi in Guilin. Washington, of course, could not help but strain over the prospect of an “expanded” prolongation of the Russian-Chinese Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation with the inclusion of security issues. In the Chinese interpretation, this expansion was presented in a very significant way.
If earlier in China it was said that in bilateral relations with Moscow one should not “enter into an alliance, arrange confrontation and act against third countries”, now the configuration of “three nots” has transformed into “three nos”: relations “there is no end”, they have “no exclusion zones” and “no restrictions”. The hint is more than transparent. If we add to this Washington’s “bummer” in the rapid construction of an “Indo-Pacific” analogue of NATO – the persistence of contradictions between Seoul and Tokyo, India’s unwillingness to put all its eggs in the American “basket”, the successive failures of all American attempts to flirt with the ASEAN countries – then there is enough the rapid loss of the strategic initiative by the American side.
At the end of March, the “upper spheres” of the American establishment signaled that the United States abandoned its straightforward approach in favor of greater flexibility, but at the same time did not abandon its attempts to separate Moscow and Beijing from each other. At that time, Foreign Affairs published an article by CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) President Richard Haas proposing a “global concert” in which Russia and China were invited to participate. On the one hand, it is clear that this is primarily about the erosion of the key role of the UN, the only international institution, in the Security Council of which Russia and China are endowed with the right of veto. Nobody removed Biden’s enthusiasm for the “forum” or the “league of democracies” from the agenda, but the replication of new institutions without the actual defeat of the UN in its rights will lead nowhere. On the other hand, however, the very fact that Washington began to scratch its head about offering Moscow and Beijing something joint, albeit in the form of a Trojan horse, showed that the American position is being adjusted from pressure to maneuvers, which indicates its weakening. And in fact: why “concert”, if, it would seem, the world has already been presented with the project of a global digital concentration camp “great reset” and “inclusive capitalism”? Only an ambiguity to produce, giving the allies the impression that in Washington one hand does not know what the other is doing, which, among other things, works for the version of Biden’s limited legal capacity? In fact, everything turned out to be more complicated.
Why is it about “wiring”? The answer to this question is a list of topics that Biden proposed to Putin; each of them, along with unconditional relevance, contains nuances that make it possible to see, to one degree or another, an attempt to at least “look for contradictions” between Moscow and Beijing.
The first and foremost question, interpreted as the White House, which was the first to release information about the conversation, is strategic stability and arms control. On the one hand, the very formulation of this issue by the American side, which for two decades has only been engaged in consistently destroying the system of bilateral agreements, withdrawing from them unilaterally, be it ABM, INF or “open skies”, is already commendable. And Biden’s prolongation of the last of the major START-3 treaties met with a positive response in Beijing, where they thanked Russia for its consistency and firmness.
Let us recall, it was about the failure of the US attempts to induce China to participate in this agreement. And with this “trick” in the hope of gaining unilateral advantages, neither Beijing nor Moscow stubbornly agreed. On the other hand, it is possible that in the transition from general conversations to specifics, Washington, as usual, will again try to involve China. What for? To search for a strategic balance not in the bilateral Russian-American format, but to unite the potentials of the Russian Federation and the PRC, while maintaining their parity with their own, not individually, but in total. Even if this is unattainable for it, the stake is undoubtedly made on the fact that the very fact of discussing this topic creates an atmosphere of mistrust and tension in Moscow and Beijing, like any controversial situation. Well, the Americans cannot affirm themselves in the idea that the level of trust between our countries has long outweighed such “strains”, and no one has yet canceled the thinking along the lines of the Cold War in Washington.
Biden also clearly wants, catching on to the topic, against the background of negotiations, to try to implement the plans for deploying his INFRMs in the Asia-Pacific region, and possibly in Europe, which were announced under Donald Trump. One gets the impression that the American side, seriously frightened by the rapid rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, including in the military sphere, is trying to slow it down with a pretense of “readiness for negotiations.” But he does this to divert his eyes, so, in particular, to use the forthcoming negotiation process, again, to search for contradictions between our countries. And since the balance, on the contrary, is achieved precisely by the format of the Russian-Chinese partnership, which creates a counterbalance to the power of the United States, respectively, in the military-strategic and economic spheres, Washington is clearly interested in undermining and destroying it. The deep state does not need such a balance that does not provide dominance and unilateral advantages. But they cover this aspiration with diplomatic maneuvers, which are calculated, among other things, for the naivete of international public opinion.
The second issue raised by Biden is the JCPOA on the Iranian nuclear program. How can we not recall the very recent visit to Tehran of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who, together with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif, unequivocally spoke in favor of the immediate return of the United States to the JCPOA, without which Iran’s consent to comply with all its obligations in the previous regime is impossible?
A little earlier, China entered into a strategic agreement with Iran, which includes a number of important points, including those related to investments. And what about the cyber attack against the Iranian facility in Natanz, which S. Lavrov and M. Zarif also discussed? In a word, in conditions when a Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance is literally forming in the region, and Tehran even declares its readiness to join the EAEU, it is not very clear what exactly Biden is counting on, raising the subject of the JCPOA, but his return. Does he want to bring Moscow to some kind of “separate” agreements? But this is again a position, filled to the brim with the conjuncture of the restoration of American leadership, not by washing, but by rolling.
A little earlier, China entered into a strategic agreement with Iran, which includes a number of important points, naming those related to investments. And what about the cyber attack against the Iranian facility in Natanz, which S. Lavrov and M. Zarif also discussed? In a word, in conditions when a Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance is literally forming in the region, and Tehran even declares its readiness to join the EAEU, it is not very clear what exactly Biden is counting on, raising the subject of the JCPOA, but his return. Does he want to bring Moscow to some kind of “separate” agreements? But this is again a position, filled to the brim with the conjuncture of the restoration of American leadership, not by washing, but by rolling.
The third question is Afghanistan. As you know, just a few days ago, Biden, in fact, having violated previous agreements with the Afghan opposition represented by the Taliban (an organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation), postponed and postponed the withdrawal of the American military contingent from the country from May to September; The Taliban (an organization whose activities are banned in the Russian Federation), for obvious reasons, did not approve of this, breaking the previously reached agreement with the United States and demanding that the deadlines be observed. That is, the conflict situation was caused by the American fault, while the Russian side also invited the Taliban (an organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation) to the March meeting on Afghanistan in Moscow. On the one hand, Biden’s proposal again underscores Russia’s deep involvement in the peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict, as well as the fact that the Moscow joint statement on Afghanistan is also signed by the United States, along with the signatures of the Russian, Chinese and Pakistani sides. On the other hand, the discussion of this topic against the background of the American break with the Afghan opposition is not calculated to “substitute” our country in the eyes of other participants in the negotiation process, including the Afghan parties themselves? Again, a certain ambiguity.
Finally, a similar ambiguity literally comes through from the fourth topic related to the invitation of Moscow to the virtual climate summit, which will be held on April 22-23. First, having not had time to return to the Paris climate agreement, Washington is already clearly claiming to be almost a leader in it. Second, once again, if you like, the topic of the “specialness” of Russian participation is being hushed up, which is stubbornly not recognized by the “green” climate lobby.
Neither international nor Russian liberal. And this topic is dictated by the still unregulated size of the absorbing resource of Russian natural environments, which in reality neutralize and process much more anthropogenic dirt than the entire Russian industry produces. As one of the few countries that are environmental donors of humanity, Russia has the right to claim an exclusive status, which, by the way, is enshrined in the Rio Declaration (1992), which is basic for the climate process. Third, there is again a hidden attempt to push Moscow and Beijing against each other, since the latter is essentially the only large greenhouse issuer keeping records in specific units per capita. Moscow counts in absolute figures, and some people dream of transforming this discrepancy into contradictions in order to further remove opportunistic “rent” from them.
There is no doubt that Biden’s proposed “normalization” of Russian-American relations is long overdue, and not only Moscow and Washington are really interested in it, but the world community as a whole, which is increasingly afraid of the ongoing rampant military hysteria and militaristic psychosis. Let’s use here these clichés of the Soviet media during the Cold War, because they reflect what is happening in the best possible way.
But how to understand if yesterday there was a conversation with a proposal for a meeting, and today – a new portion of sanctions, coupled with the expulsion of diplomats? Doesn’t this episode fully show that American telephone initiatives have at least a “double” or even a “triple bottom”? Whatever one may say, in the analysis of US actions, no matter how the Washington leadership insisted on its “pragmatism”, the phenomenological approach is much more applicable, in which you need to look at specific facts rather than statements, and above all insignificant details behind which certain important attitudes are hidden… Russia needs two things in this “big game”, which the US now entering “from the other side” is trying to impose on it. First, do not under any circumstances doubt the absolute correctness of the choice made in favor of strategic interaction with China. Secondly, given the continuing positions of the pro-Western internal lobby in the media, roughly speaking, one way or another to limit and minimize the consequences of this lobby’s propaganda of its line, which, to call a spade a spade, consists in surrender to the West. Such a restriction is not an end in itself, but a consequence of the understanding that Biden and the “conceptuals” of the “deep state” behind him place a certain stake on these pro-Western Russian circles, counting on them to process Russian public opinion. Russia does not have the right to allow this rate to work, given the milestone, critical nature of the events we are experiencing.
Vladimir Pavlenko, IA Regnum