CREATING AN ARMY GUERRILLA COMMAND

CREATING AN ARMY 
GUERRILLA COMMAND

Part 1: The First Six Months

A partisan strength of 25,000, well-led and properly trained, could be expected to divert from 375,000 to 500,000 regular troops from other duties necessary to a successful prosecution of the war.”1

About 2000 hours on 29 March 1953, a small flotilla of fishing vessels emerged out of a hazy, moonless night and scraped over a cold gravel beach on Chop-to, a tiny island a few hundred meters off the west coast of North Korea. A hundred shadowy figures disembarked and moved silently into the scrub and trees above the beach. Seventeen guerrillas guarding the beach landing site (BLS) pushed the boats back out to sea to await the return of the raiding party. The main party quickly moved to their target, a North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) battalion command post. The raiders, guided by friendly agents who had reconnoitered the area, slipped across a rocky sand spit connecting Chop-to to the mainland and moved inland. By the time the sun rose, the partisans were hidden in thick brush observing their target in the distance.2

When darkness fell again, the guerrillas moved silently into designated assault positions. They remained undetected. On signal the partisans rushed forward to quickly overwhelm the enemy. They inflicted numerous casualties and captured an NKPA major and a sergeant. Dragging their prisoners along, the partisans melted into the night and withdrew. At the BLS they recalled their boats and got aboard. As the mixed flotilla of fishing boats departed for their base camp on Cho-do, five miles away, pre-arranged Allied aircraft missions and naval gunfire covered their withdrawal by disrupting enemy counterattacks. In this successful action the guerrillas lost five men and had two wounded, yet inflicted many more casualties on the enemy and reinforced the constant threat of attack. Moreover, the raid demonstrated to the populace that resistance to Communist rule continued.3

Few modern military campaigns have been as misunderstood and misrepresented as the U.S. Army’s first deliberate attempt to create an ad hoc guerrilla command to support and coordinate the actions of North Korean anti-Communist guerrillas in support of the United Nations (UN) in Korea. Much mythology has cloaked this effort and historical inaccuracies, misidentifications, and unsubstantiated accounts predominate to the point of becoming ‘facts.’ Why and how did this happen? Long-standing security classification of activities; numerous name changes and structural reorganizations; little documentation to substantiate activities and results; and constant evolution of operations peripheral to the main UN effort are all contributing factors. And to compound matters, other services, agencies, the Republic of Korea (ROK) military, and some UN allies simultaneously worked with North Korean irregulars. Partisan warfare was also complicated by language barriers and the establishment of separate reporting chains that encouraged embellishment of accomplishments and discouraged independent verification and analysis of results.

This study tackles the confusion of guerrilla warfare in Korea and presents the difficulties of advising, training, assisting, and commanding North Korean partisans. The evolving organizational history reveals the growth, functional changes, and command direction during its critical first six months of operation. But why are the activities of this guerrilla command relevant to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) soldiers today? It is the Army’s first attempt to deliberately create a command to conduct guerrilla warfare. Toward the end of the conflict this wartime effort will be supported by Army Special Forces trained soldiers. Reviewing how the guerrilla command came to be formed, how its missions evolved, the operational difficulties encountered, and its accomplishments and failures will allow the reader to assess the validity and value of the organization. Because there was so much mythology associated with guerrilla warfare in Korea, the U.S. Army stumbled through Vietnam as well. 

Resistance to Communism in North Korea prompted the formation of anti-Communist paramilitary organizations. It began with the advance of UN forces into North Korea. The ousting of Communist officials ended in late 1950 when hundreds of thousands of Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) forced the withdrawal of UN units. Left unsupported, the anti-Communists fled their villages for remote areas and offshore islands that provided them with a degree of security to continue their fight. By early 1951, reports filtered in that several thousand lightly-armed guerrillas were conducting small-scale raids against North Korean targets. As the UN prepared to counter the CCF offensive, some military leaders suggested that the guerrillas be incorporated in that allied effort. They posited that combat power of the partisans behind the enemy lines, properly led, would reduce pressure on the main battle lines. Suddenly, “a number of remote little islands in the Yellow Sea, unnoticed . . . last-stand strongholds of North Korean antagonists to the Communist regime,” had potential value.4

To verify that conclusion, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) headquarters dispatched Major (MAJ) William A. Burke, a decorated WWII armor officer, to the islands. Burke reported, “These volunteers have organized themselves, appointed leaders and, by virtue of their own initiative, have overcome numerous hardships while effectively combating [the enemy] and securing intelligence.” He believed that “these groups possess the will to resist, and if supplied, organized, and properly employed, would form the nucleus of an ever-growing liability to the Communist Forces.”5

This field grade officer’s assessment convinced EUSA planners to add the guerrillas to the UN effort. The necessity to impose some command and control over the scattered, independent partisan groups was realized. Otherwise, their operations might prove counterproductive to the major war effort. The crux of “the problem was how to convert these untrained and [largely] unarmed volunteers into an effective fighting force and adapt their capabilities to missions advantageous to the over-all operations against the enemy.”6 It became obvious that a guerrilla command had to be formed to provide logistical support, coordinate training, and to integrate the partisans’ activities into the UN campaign. 

How should this guerrilla command be organized, led and directed? A guerrilla war was a new challenge for the U.S. Army. That type of warfare and the environment were totally different than that encountered in Europe during WWII. The ROK government demonstrated no interest in North Korean anti-Communist guerrillas because they considered them politically unreliable. The Far East Command (FEC) in Japan focused on bigger issues. By default, the EUSA staff got the guerrilla warfare mission. Fortuitously, Colonel (COL) John H. McGee, a WWII Philippine veteran with guerrilla experience, was the EUSA G-3 “Miscellaneous Duties” officer. He had been assigned to every ‘special’ or unconventional project since August 1950.7 McGee had created, organized, and fielded the GHQ Raider Company and the Eighth Army Ranger Company, and established and commanded a new Ranger Training Center near Pusan for the ROK Army on 15 August 1950. McGee also formed and commanded the UN Reception Center at Taegu to “clothe, equip, and provide familiarization training with U.S. Army weapons and equipment” to foreign contingents assigned to the UN.

COL McGee’s original proposal for the Table of Organization for the Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, 13 January 1951.

TCOL McGee first studied the North Korean guerrilla problem in September 1950 when he helped develop anti-guerrilla operations to neutralize pockets of North Korean soldiers and bandits inside the Pusan Perimeter. Later, after the breakout from the Perimeter, McGee focused on the elimination of enemy ‘leakers’ (deliberate stay behinds, infiltrators, and stragglers) bypassed during the UN charge into North Korea.8 These experiences taught McGee how guerrilla units operated. Although his initial mission involved destroying guerrillas, solving that problem enabled him to understand how guerrillas operated and what their strengths and weaknesses were. 

Not surprisingly, the EUSA commander gave COL McGee, the most qualified officer on his staff, the guerrilla command. By 13 January 1951, the WWII vet had submitted a plan to conduct “attrition warfare,” his term to describe the desired effects of guerrilla operations. He recommended forming “a combined headquarters consisting of United States Army, Navy and Air Force and ROK Army and Navy liaison personnel” to accomplish this mission. Thus, McGee’s “attrition” plan became the guide for command and control of guerrilla operations.9

Since McGee’s proposal had a lasting impact on the conduct of guerrilla operations in Korea, it is important to place his organization in context. There were certain factors that McGee had to consider. First, personnel, supplies, and transportation were constrained; all units competed for them. Second, there were very few Army personnel in the Far East Command (FEC) trained or experienced in guerrilla warfare. McGee had to work with these constraints. Therefore, he chose to stay within the EUSA staff to get the command formed as quickly as possible. The more he had to coordinate with external commands, the more complicated it would be, reducing the chance of success. McGee hoped to streamline the decision-making process by accessing only those assets controlled by EUSA. 

Miscellaneous Division, Eighth U.S. Army

Guerrilla Command

(Attrition Section, 15 January to 4 May 1951; 8086th AU, 5 May to 9 December 1951; then becomes 8240th AU under FEC) Created to advise, train, assist, and command North Korean guerrillas.

Eighth Army Ranger Company

(8213th AU) Created 25 August 1950 at Camp Drake, Japan. Assigned missions to infiltrate enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks, and key communications centers or facilities.

Eighth Army Ranger Training Center

Created 15 August 1950 at Kijang, near Pusan, South Korea, to train Ranger units in the skills of infiltration, raids, reconnaissance and combat patrolling, and ambushes. After training the Eighth Army Ranger Company, the Ranger school trained South Korean units in Ranger tactics.

United Nations Reception Center

(8212th AU) F ormed 2 3 S eptember 1 950 at Taegu, ROK, to “clothe, equip, and provide familiarization training with U.S. Army weapons and equipment” for international troops arriving in Korea.

Organization of Attrition Section
January 1951

General Headquarters
Far East CommandG3G2Eighth
ArmyFar East
Command/
Liaison GroupG3Miscellaneous
DivisionAttrition
Section

Initial command relationships of the Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, as formed on 23 January 1951.

For the sake of expediency, COL McGee put his command under the staff supervision of the EUSA G-3. To enhance joint coordination he built a table of organization that had officers from all services. There was an Army commander (himself) and a Navy executive officer/staff coordinator with four staff sections: Intelligence, Operations, Supply, and Communications. Army officers headed the Operations and Supply sections and naval officers directed the Intelligence and Communications sections. Air Force officers were assistant section leaders in Intelligence and Communications sections because those sections would plan and supervise “all [guerrilla unit] operations to include the air dropping or placing ashore [in North Korea] of sabotage teams.” Supply had to flexibly support “widely separated and varied operations by means of water and air,” just as Communications ensured radio connectivity with the widely scattered elements.10SIDEBAR: Guerrilla Command Field Radios and Communication

McGee divided his Operations Section into three elements: Guerrilla, Penetration, and Liaison. Led by a naval officer with an Army assistant, the Guerrilla Element planned partisan operations in support of the EUSA at the Corps level. Penetration, led by an Army officer with an Air Force assistant, planned insertions because air delivery was the preferred method. The Liaison Element had the largest contingent of officers (eighteen) in the command, reflecting the importance of coordination to conduct successful guerrilla operations. And since combined operations were envisioned, McGee planned for ten ROK Navy, Army and Marine officers to ensure proper “coordination of partisan effort when [they are] employed in support of an Eighth Army tactical unit.”11 His rationale was that “Landings, pickups, airdrops, air support and allied operations [demand] the highest cooperation and coordination at planning and operational levels.” Furthermore, “Combined ground, naval and air [support] from a central integrated headquarters are necessary” for successful operations.12Unfortunately, McGee never got enough officers to fill all the liaison billets. 

The impressive level of preparation and planning detail verified that McGee was the best-qualified person to lead the guerrilla command. Two days after McGee made his proposal, the Attrition Section of Miscellaneous Division was formed (15 January 1951). It was the first Army unit specifically created to conduct guerrilla operations.13

With authority in hand, COL McGee then identified and recruited soldiers to lead, train, and advise the ‘Gs,’ vigorously working his connections in the EUSA G-1. Since the talent pool of guerrilla warfare experts was very shallow, McGee sought out paratroopers, Rangers, and WWII Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veterans in EUSA. He judiciously screened cadre personnel at his UN Reception Center in Taegu and the Korean Ranger Training Center at Kijang, as well as the EUSA Signals Office.14 With EUSA G-1 support, McGee began filling his staff and advising positions.

Continued on PAGE 2