Syria’s future in Russia’s hands
Syria’s internal armed conflict has lasted almost 11 years – roughly twice as long as World War II
And despite the localisation of fighting following decisive victories by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in 2016-2017 with the support of Russia, Iran and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement, 17 rounds of talks between the Syrian authorities and the opposition in the Astana format and six meetings of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva, there is no light at the end of the tunnel. Where to look for the key to a settlement and how else could Russia help?
The stalling of the Syrian peace process is due to a number of reasons. First of all, the continued destructive interference of some external actors – the military presence of Turkey and the US without the consent of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic. Second, there are the inflated political ambitions of the opposition, which aspires to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary republic in the framework of constitutional reform. Nor should we forget the “winner’s syndrome” of the authorities, where any concessions to opponents are seen as unacceptable expressions of weakness.
Meanwhile, amid Damascus’ resounding assurances of the liberation of 90% of the territory, it is reportedly about 63.4%: 27% remains with the Kurdish “Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria” (Hasakeh province, parts of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor), 4.78% in the zone of the so-called So-called “Provisional Government of Syria” and actually a Turkish protectorate (north of Aleppo), 1.62% – in the “stung-out” after operations of the SAA “Small Idlib” (north-west), 2.57% – in the 55-kilometer “security zone” around the checkpoint of Al-Tanf on the border with Iraq (Homs province), 0.65% – in the Israeli-occupied part of Golan Heights (El-Kuneitra province).
In spite of Moscow’s attempts to friendly encourage Damascus to take a more positive part in the negotiation process, the Syrian authorities’ attitude towards the opposition is still the same. This is unlikely to change if the Syrians once again receive donor aid from Tehran if the Iranians reach a compromise with Washington on the “nuclear dossier” and, as a consequence, if anti-Iranian sanctions are eased.
Hence, the likely way out of the stalemate is seen not in terms of politics, but in terms of economics. Over the years of conflict, the genesis of three parallel economies under Kurdish, Turkish and Idlib control has become a reality. While they are more tied to external actors (the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq in the case of ASWJ, Turkey in the other two cases), business contacts with the government zone persist. All parties are affected by the disruption of economic ties and especially infrastructure (oil pipelines, transport collapse). Post-conflict reconstruction is clearly a matter of consolidating inter-Syrian efforts, taking into account the interests of local economic elites, the same Kurds or the “shadow” authorities of Idlib and the south (the provinces of Dar’a, al-Quneitra and al-Suweida), who have become used to “living without Assad” and not sharing revenues with the centres over the years of conflict.
It seems that in a situation where there is a lack of trust between the authorities and the people who have local influence, it is impossible to do without guarantees from Russia, which has built up a “security matrix” through the presence of military police in various parts of the country and the organisation of local reconciliations (Musalahat). The aim is to create zones of stability with micro-national dialogues with Sunni Muslims and minority ethnic and religious groups in patrol areas, aid delivery zones and humanitarian aid distribution zones. Thus, Moscow can help both in reanimating the unity of economic ties and in incorporating local Syrian elites into the national hierarchy on the basis of the principle of decentralisation (which Syrians themselves call “la marcaizia”), using its established contacts with Kurdish business circles and the experience of relations between the federal centre and the RF subjects, such as Tatarstan and Chechnya.
As well as helping to restore Syria’s economic and then territorial unity, Russia can make a constructive contribution to international efforts in the context of the country’s reconstruction.
Since the summer of 2021, there have been active consultations between Damascus and GCC countries, especially the UAE and Oman, to launch an “open door” (infitah) policy, which would involve the Arabian monarchies financing the Syrian reconstruction. According to expert estimates, despite secondary US sanctions (“Caesar’s Act”), this scenario is likely in line with Saudi Arabia’s and UAE’s policy of containment of Iran. For its part, Russia would provide technology and technical support for the Infitah, but most importantly, guarantees for the implementation of GCC projects in the SAR on the basis of the “security matrix”.
Russia, along with its arsenal of military and diplomatic capabilities, has acquired the leverage and additional potential to promote the economic reintegration and reconstruction of Syria in order to successfully reach a broad inter-Syrian dialogue and a political settlement of the Syrian conflict.
Igor Matveev, VZGLYAD