A Walk Down Reading Transfer Departure Memory Lane: Lessons Learned

Alex found while writing his transfer departure mini-series that Reading were repeating the same mistakes over and over.

As the title suggested, the purpose of last week’s mini-series was to take a leisurely stroll down memory lane and refamiliarise ourselves with those who we used to call part of our club, have a few blasts from the past and find out what they are up to now. And, for me at least, it was great to revisit some of these names from academy heroes, to the unsung superstars and even the pantomime villains.

Read every entry here: 2019/20, 2020/21, 2021/22, 2022/23, 2023/24

However, I’ll admit that it took longer to write than I expected because I just simply was not prepared for the amount of churn that our club has gone through over the last few seasons. We’ve seen so many players join and leave – 91 in total were covered during almost five full seasons. As well as that, we’ve seen quite the turnover in managers, coaching staff and those at boardroom level too, to some extent.

During the time writing this – and I hope you had similar epiphanies while reading the series – some patterns began to emerge around our activities. It became clear that some mistakes were getting repeated far too often while some clear quick-wins featured some remarkable consistencies and could/should be a building block for how we approach future recruitment strategies and contract negotiations.

And so here it is: a summary article to tie it all together and present lessons learned from this review of (almost) five seasons’ worth of departures.

Recruitment strategy is key to success on the pitch

Alright, look, fair enough. It doesn’t take Gary Neville and a touch-screen tactics analysis board to know this. However, what is clear is that we largely haven’t really had a recruitment strategy in place for the duration of Dai Yongge’s ownership. In fact, since Nicky Hammond left the club in 2016, we pretty much didn’t have any direction in our strategy for recruitment at all. Other (infamous) people were involved, but I’ll discuss those names later.

Why is a recruitment strategy key? First and foremost, it starts with the first-team head coach and his coaching staff, not the players on the pitch. Picking a manager who suits the style of play that the current players are used to, or able to perform, is vital to success.

Bouncing around from manager to manager who have different styles of play, different tactical set-ups, different ideas for what positions certain players should be utilised in, will eventually create a mess where you have confused and/or unmotivated players, players not fit for purpose as they no longer have relevant roles within the team and a culture where people are all pulling in different directions, as opposed to being unified and working together toward a single, joined-up aim. A team, in other words.

Having identified the right manager, then you need to have a clear idea of how that manager intends to set up his team and utilise the players available, and what gaps there are in the squad that don’t meet that requirement. From there, it is critical to identify what characteristics you require from a team perspective and on a role-by-role basis to identify the right players to bring into the team that can not only continue their development, but also add value and be successful.

Examples we can see of this during the series are Danzell Gravenberch being brought in to play a more direct version of the Dutch “Total Football” model deployed by Jaap Stam, but having no defined role during his time with the club; Ovie Ejaria, who favours playing as a 10 but had no place in a high-pressing 4-2-2-2 model or deep-lying 3-5-2; Anssi Jaakkola coming in to play direct football but then being unable to play out from the back; Sam Baldock, who favoured playing as part of a two up top, but then struggling to adapt as a lone striker; and Adrian Popa, who was a winger with no defensive instinct and had no role in a system with a back three when that change in formation came around; to name but a few.

Recruitment strategy off the pitch is key too

Leading on from the previous lesson learned, this is again a “no brainer” and yet we ran no discernible model between 2016 (when Nick Hammond left) and 2022 (when Mark Bowen returned). Oddly enough, this is when our recruitment was a total car crash.

If we cast our minds back to the Reading of old, by which I mean the early 00s, we had a clear recruitment model where we scoured the market for bargains, bought cheap, developed them and sold high. It worked so well that it helped us put together the 106 team for less than £3 million. Of course, the market has changed since those times, but even considering that, there is always value to be found in any day and age.

It’s also not clear how we ever decided on the recruitment of our managers. If you look at Brian McDermott, Jaap Stam, José Gomes, Paul Clement, Mark Bowen, Veljko Paunović and Paul Ince, do you see any trend or consistency in philosophy or playing style? Or even any real thought process behind the appointment, save perhaps Jaap Stam due to a desire to play a certain style of football?

I’m still of the opinion that Paul Ince was only ever hired because we asked Tom Ince for his dad’s number when he arrived on loan for us. This is no criticism of the Inces: they’re not going to turn down the opportunity. And the crazy thing about that is that, if it was true, we wouldn’t even bat an eyelid because it seems so on brand for us.

What can we do to change this then? Well, ironically, Paul Ince was the man to create this spark for the catalyst of change. Originally joining the club in early 2022 until the end of the season, he said the club needed a structure behind the scenes, starting with a director of football, and surprisingly, the board agreed.

Dayong Pang agreeing to this was the real lever for change behind the scenes, at a football level, that we needed. Somewhat surprisingly, in came Mark Bowen as head of football operations. I honestly didn’t expect him to return, given the unfortunate nature of how he left in the first place, but he did and almost immediately starting putting out fires.

The changes swiftly happened in the summer of 2022. Firstly, Eddie Niedzwiecki arrived as director of player development because where Mark shall go, Eddie shall follow. And not to mention that he’s supremely qualified for the role.

Next came Brian Carey as director of recruitment, having previously performed the role at Premier League side Tottenham Hotspur. Lastly, in 2023, Jared Dublin joined as head of scouting. He has since departed for Stoke City, who snapped him up after the work he’s done with us. It since seems Carey has picked up the workload after Dublin left.

Not only this, but the hard work to get the academy back to Category One status was a huge win for the club. All of this resulted in an excellent summer recruitment drive for 2023 ahead of this season, despite no funds and two bans in place.

If you look at the names often spoken about as the top performers for the side this season being Femi Azeez, Harvey Knibbs, Lewis Wing, Sam Smith and Tyler Bindon, it is worth noting that four of those five arrived in the summer. They didn’t cost a single penny in transfer fees. That’s what smart recruitment does for you.

But it’s not just the player recruitment where we saw the benefit of not only having a structure, but also a structure that is geared up with a clear direction and aim. Prior to all of this we had to identify a manager, and that’s where Bowen and his team step in as well.

In what seems like an alternate universe, the summer began with Chris Wilder being the leading candidate for the role of manager. And on face value, it made sense. Wilder has previously had great success at League One level with Sheffield United, has a clear style of play and coaching method and also primarily favours a back three, which was a system that we had built during the previous summer’s recruitment drive. And key for us, he was already available and wouldn’t cost us any compensation money to poach from another team.

Talks broke down but it didn’t stop us. Reading identified Ruben Selles – we recognised that he was inexperienced as a manager, we recognised the challenge for him to begin work because of the work permit and we recognised that his preferred style of play, the 4-2-2-2 high-pressing, vertical football model, was totally different to what we had set up before and what the team were used to.

But we also recognised what he could offer: a CV with coaching at the highest level, vast knowledge of football culture and a history of working with, developing and trusting young players and working with available resources to make the best of it. With the clear philosophy and a clear plan, we had a clear vision for what we needed, where we needed it and how to utilise it when we got it. Now contrast that to the previous appointment of Paul Ince. Totally different and absolutely what we needed to do. Long may it continue.

Independent recruitment strategy is required

And by this, I am referring to Kia Joorabchian and the need to permanently rid ourselves of our connection with him. Joorabchian, for those who don’t know, is seen as a “super agent” within the football world. This essentially means he is involved with many, many players and takes it upon himself to actively find better employment opportunities or contract terms for his clients and make himself a small fortune in the process.

Super agents have been prevalent in football for the last 20 years or so, and generally are perceived as money-hoovers. Some argue that a club can develop a relationship with a super agent for their betterment, and actively cite Wolverhampton Wanderers as an example due to their relationship with fellow super agent Jorge Mendes.

But there’s a reason for this: because they really are the only club who have benefitted from this model, with acquisitions such as Joao Moutinho and Ruben Neves, among others, driving them from the Championship to the top half of the Premier League table.

However, the relationship has soured in recent years, with the club at risk of breaching FFP protocols and actively having to sell players in the summer to maintain balance, while a number of their recent signings from Portugal, where Jorge Mendes is particularly prevalent for representing players, have been expensive flops.

Joorabchian’s role was never confirmed within Reading – the club insisted he was only ever a “friend” of the owner, having been seen attending a number of games in person. However, previous manager Veljko Paunović cited publicly that he was an “advisor” to Dai Yongge, while Pang and Paunović were at pains to say they were limited in what could be discussed with regard to the nature of the relationship.

Rumours state that, at one stage, Joorabchian’s influence was so keenly felt at Reading that nine out of 10 transfers involved him, and other agents who were working with negotiating deals for their clients were shut out when the club found out the deal would not involve Joorabchian. Already sounding crazy?

Having an impartial, data-driven approach to identifying suitable players who fit the coaching staff’s philosophy is much easier to do when you’re not obligated to work with one agent, who is supposedly pushing deals onto your club and making commission each time a player signs or departs. If money is lining your pockets, you cannot be impartial.

As an aside, two Reading players remain represented by Joorabchian: Tyler Bindon (fair enough, but let’s hope that he can be encouraged to sign a reasonable contract extension) and Mamadi Camará. It should also be noted that defender Zane Monlouis, who we seem to not have found any use for after he arrived on loan on deadline day, is one of his clients too, as is former Royal Nelson Abbey.

Talent is important, but not the only requirement

Director of recruitment Brian Carey said it best last year: the club needs to act on a “no d*ckheads” policy when bringing people into the club. Talent is one thing, but if you are going to bring in a player or manager who will upset those around them, not pull their weight or has no interest or motivation in Reading other than collecting a sizeable pay cheque, then there’s the door, close it on your way out please. Due diligence is the name of the game here, getting background checks and references done on their personality, lifestyle and injury record are crucial.

And, for the most part, it seems that over the last two summers we have rectified this with the personalities we are bringing through to the club, while shifting some of the aforementioned... let’s call them “unsuitable”... personalities out of the door, one way or the other. Now, we have a team that seems to be fighting for each other, facing up to adversity on an alarmingly regular basis and has the buy-in of the fans that we trust in this group to deliver for us, or at the very least, do their level best to deliver against the odds.

There are many examples of this that I could choose from, but the one that stands out is Charlie Savage. He’s a good player and comes from a very high-level footballing background. It could be easy for him to see Reading as a step down, or that he’s better than the club. Earlier this season, he was reportedly not able to start games because of a clause in his contract that meant he would get a £2,000-per-week pay rise if he started a certain number of games in the season, and we simply could not afford to pay it.

However, he reportedly waived this clause until the end of the season as he wanted to play and help the team. This is money he was absolutely entitled to, and yet he passed up on it. How many players would do that? I know I’d struggle to waive a pay rise in my work.

It’s commendable and, while I never want the club to ever be in a position where we put players or staff in that predicament again, this is the mentality of the kind of player we want around our team. Thanks, Charlie – we appreciate it and we will not forget this.

Trust the academy

During the review of the transfer departures, it’s been so hard to see so many talented youngsters from our academy leave us when, if we had better long-term planning, we could have either kept them and developed them further into the first team or tied them down to longer-term contracts to at least get better money for them, rather than continually lose valuable players for either nothing or next to nothing.

Players such as Danny Namaso, Gabriel Osho and Sam Smith left the club because we blocked the pathway for them to reach the first team and be properly integrated and develop.

Players such as Omar Richards, Andy Rinomhota and Jordan Obita, who had reached the first team, had to be let go because we spent so much money on transfers and contracts for players that meant we couldn’t extend their terms to tie down key players to key positions and, at the very least, sell them on our terms and make money if a bigger club came calling.

Players such as Tom Holmes, Tom McIntyre, Caylan Vickers and Nelson Abbey (especially Nelson Abbey) had to be sold for peanuts because not only did we not have the foresight or finance to tie them down to longer-term contracts, but because of the precarious financial we put ourselves in leading up to this point, we had to accept low-ball offers for valuable assets in order to just be able to fund the day-to-day running of the club.

In the case of Michael Olise, it’s criminal that we set only an £8 million release clause in his contract when you see players like Alex Scott departing Bristol City for the Premier League for a reported £25 million fee. If we had accepted double the release clause for Olise, we could still feel hard done by. We just made it too easy for everyone else and so much more difficult for ourselves.

There’s a reason we have such a good academy – we should utilise it more to develop the talents we have under our own roof. It seems that we have finally started to learn this lesson during this season, though that is also partly because our hand has been forced due to a lack of squad depth.

And that’s no bad thing – arguably, the people in the team who have been most inconsistent have been the elder statesmen (Davie Button and Sam Hutchinson) as opposed to the younger players. We’ve thrown them into the deep end and they are beginning to thrive.

Imagine how they could be performing this time next year if they remain. Imagine if, instead of throwing money at players who weren’t right for us, we had brought through those from the academy instead. Not only could we have saved so much money and aggravation, we could have even become profitable by making money when it came time for them to depart to bigger teams.

And this is true of the moment we are in now, with the risk that players may leave in the summer for bigger teams. We can reinvest that money into the squad where it is required. But let’s negotiate on our terms. As the selling club, we shouldn’t be forced to accept low-ball offers. Most teams understand their place in the food chain – they exist to buy cheap and sell high to a bigger club, and even at Premier League level, this is the rule for all but a few.

Money isn’t always the answer

This article is littered with countless examples of how spending money doesn’t work. Maybe this is the key takeaway from all the lessons learned, the common thread that links it all together. Take Chelsea for example: over £1 billion spent since Todd Boehly acquired the club, and they are somehow worse for it.

Having money helps, without a doubt. But we have shown that, even if we haven’t been able to buy a player for money since 2020 and won’t be able to until 2025, it hasn’t hindered us. Perhaps it has maybe even realigned our focus, made us more streamlined and effective working within such strict parameters.

Big signings don’t guarantee big success for Reading – they rarely ever have, in our history. Just to give you some perspective, our top three goal scorers (at least in modern times) are Nicky Forster, Dave Kitson and Kevin Doyle. They cost £650,000, £150,000 and £78,000 respectively. By comparison, Pușcaș cost £375,000 for every goal he scored for Reading.

With contracts, let’s start tying down young talents on longer-term deals, so we are not continually picked off by the vultures doing their bargain-bin shopping. Let’s incentivise those deals to encourage them to perform rather than just give them the big money, hoping and praying they will do it week in, week out for us.

Because history tells us that, most of the time, they won’t. For more valued assets, let’s assess the structure of the contract: instead of offering five-year contracts, why not two to three years with an option to extend by one to two years if we decide they are worth it? If not, we can more quickly cut our losses.

If we can protect the deals, and they are performing well for us, then we give ourselves breathing space for negotiating better sales. It’s been embarrassing to see the money we have wasted on buying the wrong players, but even worse that we cannot seem to sell a player to save our lives. It’s time we change the narrative.

Final thoughts

It’s a small sample size but, based on the last summer transfer window, we are starting to right the ship. Imagine what this club could be capable of with the right owner and the current coaching staff, academy personnel and first-team squad Bowen has assembled.

Maybe we are starting to finally learn from our many mistakes. We’ve certainly made enough of them in the past. It’s time to get back to doing what we do best.