There has been a plethora of elections in recent weeks, but perhaps the most surprising result was from the usually managed polls in Iran. The country’s reformist faction, relegated to near-irrelevance in parliament, won the presidency for the first time since 2001.

In the middle of May, such a change was unthinkable. The hardliners, or principlists as they refer to themselves, had the presidency and had just secured a dominant 199 seats out of 290 in parliament, up from 177 in 2020. But a helicopter crash that claimed the life of President Ebrahim Raisi triggered new elections. Hardliners won a majority in the first round but failed to coalesce around a candidate in the second, handing the presidency to the reformist candidate, 69-year-old cardiac surgeon, Masoud Pezeshkian.

Reformists won’t be breaking out the non-alcoholic champagne just yet. The new president faces major challenges in pursuing anything akin to a reformist agenda. He inherits a country on the edge, roiled by nearly a decade of unprecedented unrest and the fallout from the regime’s brutal repression that followed. While he made the case for serious reform to Iranian voters, Pezeshkian’s ambitions will have to overcome a legislature filled with his opponents and, most importantly, a Supreme Leader whose word is final.

Pezeshkian had spent much of the past decade effectively in political exile as leader of the legislature’s reformist movement. His faction held 121 seats in 2014, a number that plummeted to 45 this year.

Pezeshkian had mounted a presidential campaign in 2021, only to face a ban from the Guardian Council, the slate of jurists charged with approving candidates. In many ways his isolation proved a blessing, distancing the candidate from the failures of the past decade.

This time, it seems, the ban was lifted after an intervention by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. That should be enough to convince even the most optimistic that Pezeshkian is no threat to the regime.

He supports the clerical authorities and is an Iran-Iraq war veteran. But on the three issues that have sparked the most unrest — economic failure, ethno-religious tension, and women’s rights — Pezeshkian has consistently been opposed to the hardliner position.

He campaigned on reconciliation with the West to achieve sanctions relief. He also lobbied for an accommodation with Sunni minorities like the Kurds, whose language he speaks fluently and who compose a large portion of the province he once governed. He was highly critical of the regime’s mistreatment of the Women, Freedom, and Life movement.

For many voters — who are disproportionately hardliners following boycotts by democratic activists — all this made Pezeshkian a nonstarter.

He very well may have won approval to run because the Guardian Council believed he couldn’t win the election. That seemed like a reasonable bet after the first round, when hardliners took 54% of the vote. But Pezehskian finished first, encouraging reform-minded voters to flock to the polls. Turnout surged by 26% in the second round, giving him victory.

But he will operate in a country where the hardliners, who maintain near-total control of both media and the education system, still command significant popular backing and near-hegemonic institutional support. His plans for reconciliation with the West must acknowledge this reality. His early overtures to international leaders included Hezbollah’s Hasan Nasrallah, the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, and a public letter of support to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Vladimir Putin was also high on his list and the two promised to continue to deepen relations.

Iran is ultimately ruled by Ayatollah Khamenei, but Pezeshkian may have some opportunities to convince Iranians that reform and reconciliation can bear fruit.

Should the new president prove that his policies can put an end to the chaos of the hardliner era, the Ayatollah may see further steps in his own interests. Only then might we see the beginning of the end of Iran’s role as an agent of chaos.

Just don’t bet on it.

Ben Dubow is a Non-resident Fellow at CEPA and the founder of Omelas, which tracks authoritarian influence online. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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