As Province edges towards demolition of Science Centre, documents point to a manufactured crisis
The documents issued by the government on July 11 point to known issues and minor problems that can be easily resolved, providing further evidence of a manufactured crisis surrounding the closure.
The post As Province edges towards demolition of Science Centre, documents point to a manufactured crisis appeared first on Canadian Architect.
On Thursday, July 11, Infrastructure Ontario doubled down on its unfounded claims that closing the Ontario Science Centre was necessary, and that repairs to the Science Centre will cost $478 million dollars. In documents released that day, and in the Premier’s remarks earlier in the week, the Province suggests that besides the roof, there is a series of urgent, cost-prohibitive repair issues with the building.
But once again, the actual documents it offers to support these claims tell a different story: one that, like the falsely urgent roof repairs, constitutes a manufactured crisis.
The specific problems the government pointed to in its presentation on Thursday are, for the most part, either known issues or relatively minor issues that can be easily and cost-effectively resolved.
The documents issued on Thursday continue to indicate that full closure was unnecessary, and that the cost of repairs is around $200 million over 20 years—less than half what the government claims.
The government provided three key documents on July 11, only one of which provided truly new information.
The first document, a peer review of the Rimkus engineering report, was conducted by VanBoxmeer & Stranges. It agreed with Rimkus’ assessment of the roof, including its suggested approach to immediately addressing the handful of RAAC roof panels designated as being in Critical and High risk categories, and incrementally replacing the other roof areas containing this panel types. As I’ve noted before, the six Critical risk panels were identified and repaired during the inspections earlier this year; and the vast majority of permanent exhibition areas are not under this roof type at all.
The second document is a re-issue of the Province’s business case for relocating the Ontario Science Centre to Ontario Place, a document that I have analyzed in two previous articles: one which focuses on how the actual costs of repairs to the Science Centre were more than doubled in the document; and another article that also examines how the costs to build a new Science Centre at Ontario Place were minimized in the document. The actual cost of repairs, using industry-standard markup figures rather than the Province’s inflated numbers, is around $211 million over 20 years.
The final document, shown during the media briefing, is a Powerpoint presentation that summarizes the government’s argument that closing the building was urgent and necessary. It is these slides that I will focus on analyzing in detail in the current article.
The first slide, a summary of the peer review of the Rimkus report by VanBoxmeer & Stranges, merely affirms what the Rimkus report found: that some repairs are needed to a handful of roof panels before November, and that the replacement of the remaining RAAC roof panels should happen with scheduled re-roofing over the next 10 years.
The following slide expands on some technical details related to the RAAC roof panels. The statement that “the risk [of individual panels failing] is further compounded by the distribution of the panels and the condition of the entire roof assembly” was taken into account in the Rimkus report, and its recommendations for prioritizing roof replacements in certain areas over others.
VanBoxmeer & Stranges does not dispute the Rimkus recommendation that, in the event that repair of the high-risk panels is not possible by October 31, the health and safety of visitors and staff can also be completely assured by restricting access to the areas directly beneath the panels.
Perhaps in an attempt to create a false sense of the severity of the roof problem, the presentation includes a photo of the type of structural overhead hoarding that it states “would be required throughout the buildings to mitigate high-risk panels prior to October 31, 2024.”
In fact, the image shows a hoarding type that is particular to maintaining circulation under a portion of critical-risk RAAC roof that could not be reinforced, due to mechanical systems running under the panels. Many of the high-risk RAAC panels (which, again, account for just 2.3% of the Science Centre’s overall roofs, and are not over key exhibition areas) presumably do not have mechanical services running directly underneath. According to both the Rimkus and Van Boxmeer & Stranges reports, these panels can be more cleanly replaced with steel deck—exactly what has been already done in several areas of the building over the years—or shored-up above the ceilings to allow for safe, unencumbered circulation below. Alternatively, if they are not over essential circulation corridors, the areas directly beneath the panels can be even more simply cordoned off to prevent people from walking directly below the at-risk panels.
Another slide in the deck seems meant to show something that looks scary. (It’s easy to take unflattering flash photos of roof structural conditions.) But looking more closely, it demonstrates how straightforward the temporary repairs of the high- and critical-condition RAAC panels can be. A simple bracing system, made of wood and metal piping, is all that is required to ensure that the damaged roof panel is secured, ensuring complete safety until such time as a full panel replacement (or replacement of the entire roof) is done. The shadow of the photographer indicates that the space is tall enough to work easily within it. Depending on the location and size of the individual panels, the Rimkus report estimates the cost of this reinforcement work at about $2,500 – $5,000 per panel, with work required at 50 locations, none of which are over key exhibition areas.
The presentation goes into some detail about what a continued investigation would entail for the un-inspected areas in Buildings A and B. It falsely states that investigation would “require closure to complete” when in reality, small areas below the ceilings could be cordoned off and made safe.
As a whole, the information on this slide contradicts the recommendations in the actual reports. In the case of Building A, the Rimkus report suggests that the panels could be inspected not through intrusive cuts into reinforced concrete, but by accessing “the interstitial space between the ceiling/soffit panels”—similar to the space visible in the previous slide above. It noted this area “was not accessible at the time of our site visits.” It went on to suggest that “It is recommended that these areas undergo investigations when timing and site conditions permit.”
In the case of Building B, the engineering reports did not specify that follow-up investigation was required. But, in the accompanying white paper, it suggested that if such investigations were needed, they could be done by making a small hole in the finished ceiling, and using a robotic camera (such as a drone) to complete the inspection.
The VanBoxmeer & Stranges report affirms the validity of Rimkus’s alternative approach to assessing the uninvestigated areas in both Building A and B: which was to make an educated assumption about their condition, based on existing records, visible information, and observed conditions on adjacent roof areas.
As it turns out, all of the key areas identified in this slide—the Great Hall, Auditorium, and front Concourse—are identified as priority items for roof replacement in the coming year. Practically, assessment would occur concurrently with planned repairs, rather than as a project requiring separate preparation and closure—ie. the same scaffolding could be used for inspection and then repairs. The feasibility of completing repairs from the exterior of the structure, so as to minimize disruption to the interior, might also be evaluated.
The next slide is at the crux of the argument that the Province is making that the repairs will be unfeasibly expensive and onerous. There are several falsehoods to unpack here.
First, I’d like to debunk the statement that there is a “minimum investment of $478 million” plus significant issues “not include in the estimated cost above.” The actual estimate for repairs from the 2022 Pinchin report was $228 million. This includes $32 million towards a full roof replacement covering both RAAC and non-RAAC roof areas, $11 million towards the pedestrian bridge, $33 million towards HVAC, and $25 million towards interior finishes. This also includes a generous 185% markup factor for consultants and to account for added complexity. (Pinchin’s base construction cost for an extensive suite of repairs that will keep the building in good repair for decades to come is $142 million.)
Next, there is the bolded statement that “all three buildings would need to be vacant to undertake critical repairs.” There is nothing in either the Pinchin, Rimkus, or VanBoxmeer & Stranges consultant reports that suggests that full closure—let alone vacancy (which implies removal of everything inside the building)—is necessary or recommended.
The closest the reports come to this is Rimkus’s note that particular areas of the Science Centre may need to be closed for three-month-plus stretches for roof repairs. It singles out the workshop area in particular, saying that its functions would need to be paused, since the roof repairs would take place over bulky equipment that is not easily moved. The implication is that in all other areas of the Science Centre, repairs could be staged and managed so as to minimize disruptions to staff and visitors.
In the case of HVAC repairs, I spoke to a mechanical engineer who said that such repairs could be staged, and that it is not uncommon to rent temporary equipment to keep a building fully functional while repairs are being performed on a portion of it.
We need only look to a plethora of other recent projects in the city to see how Ontario’s world-class architects and engineers have managed major work on complex buildings, while keeping them open and operational. The 900-foot-long galleria skylight of Toronto’s Eaton’s Centre was fully replaced, without closing the mall, in a project led by Zeidler Architecture. Every inch of the Toronto Reference Library was renovated by Moriyama Teshima Architects without closing the facility. Union Station’s extensive revamp, led by NORR, included excavating and constructing a full new underground level of station space—while maintaining a 24-7 schedule of active rail traffic on the train tracks running directly above the construction.
This slide focuses on a known issue—the closed pedestrian bridge connecting the main entrance to the exhibition halls—and a new issue—the absence of heat in Building B, which the text links to a “malfunction” of heating pipes built into this currently-not-accessible bridge. There seems to have been no issue with heating or cooling when the Science Centre was still open, just under a month ago.
A structural issue was first identified with the pedestrian bridge in 2021, and the cost of repairs at that time was estimated at $11 million in the Pinchin report (a number that includes, as mentioned before, a generous 185% markup for consultants). Instead of undertaking the repairs, a choice was made to close the bridge and implement a shuttle bus that takes visitors to a temporary entrance at the back of the building, at a cost of $2.5 million yearly, plus lost ticketing and membership revenue—a steep price that would have paid for the bridge repair in a few years. Ontario’s auditor general criticized this decision in its value-for-money audit, since it is expensive and yields a poor visitor experience. Infrastructure Ontario has seemingly done little towards actually repairing the bridge in the intervening three years, hiring a series of consultants but only installing scaffolding—a first step to investigating the problem—earlier this summer.
Further, according to the Auditor General, Infrastructure Ontario says that the cost “to provide a temporary solution to stabilize the bridge” is now $16 million—with permanent repair costs following that stabilization unknown. A structural engineer I spoke with noted that $16 million indicates a cost-per-square-foot that seems very high, and that would be more consistent with the complete repair of a large vehicular bridge, rather than the structural stabilization alone of an enclosed pedestrian bridge.
As for the heating issue? I spoke with a mechanical engineer who said that “malfunction” is a bizarre term, but seems to point to either a leak or a clog in the heating pipes, both of which are easily fixable. If it’s a leak, it could be fixed from the inside of the pipes using an inflating instrument or patch, and if it’s a clog, it could be cleared from the ends, with a tool akin to a long plumbing snake. There would be no need for workers to be in the pedestrian bridge to fix a mechanical issue, unless there was mechanical equipment that required servicing within the bridge portion—and the standard design would be to place such equipment at the ends of the bridge, not inside the bridge itself.
In this slide, Infrastructure Ontario claims that the boilers, chiller and electrical systems are out of date, and that new wiring would be destructive to the building.
The detailed analysis in the Pinchin report says that, on the contrary, the chiller had 9 years left in its expected service life, and the two boilers in Building A had 7 and 22 years left, respectively. The mechanical engineer I spoke with noted that no professional engineer ever “guarantees” that equipment will remain operational, because there are always circumstances beyond their control. In the same way, there may be no “guarantee” that your home’s new heat pump functions beyond its 1-year warranty period. The Infrastructure Ontario report is using wordplay to make a claim that is not supported by its consultants’ reports.
Replacing the electrical systems is a cost covered by the Pinchin estimates, and the wiring does not have to go inside the concrete walls—it could be otherwise coordinated in the building.
The slides then discuss the concrete overhangs in two of the three buildings. It implies that the removal of these overhangs, in order to repair the roof, will be cost prohibitive.
The Rimkus report does not include a recommendation to remove the decorative concrete overhangs in order to replace the RAAC panels in this area. I spoke with two architects who both confirmed that it was unlikely that the panels would need to be removed to perform roof repairs. Looking at the Rimkus roof drawings, it is clear that RAAC panels in the overhang areas have, indeed, already been replaced with steel deck in the past, without removing the decorative concrete. RAAC was a preferred construction type in its time precisely because the panels were easy to remove and replace, and there is no connection between the roof panels and hanging concrete overhangs below. Roof repairs would be performed from above the roof.
Even if there was need to remove the panels, the task would likely not be as complicated as this slide implies. The usual way to construct such overhangs would be to create a steel superstructure, and to attach the concrete elements as panels to it. This is affirmed by an earlier photo in the government’s slide deck, showing the underside of a reinforced RAAC panel in the roof assembly in building A. To the left and right sides of this photo, bolted connections are visible that appear to be the connections for the pre-cast decorative panels in Building A. If so, the panels would be relatively straightforward to detach, remove, and then re-attach later.
Two slides remain in the deck presented by Infrastructure Ontario on July 11.
While Infrastructure Ontario has repeatedly claimed that the building is at the end of its useful life, this is simply not the case. Major public buildings are built to a lifespan measured in centuries, not decades—but of course, this means they have to be periodically maintained, including replacing certain systems that do have a limited lifespan (such as, for instance, mechanical items) on a regular schedule. If it is true that the Ontario Science Centre is at the end of its useful life, then many buildings older than it—the ROM, the AGO, and even Queen’s Park—are much further beyond their useful life, and by the same logic, should have been torn down decades ago. It is known that Queen’s Park is due for a major upgrade that is expected to cost at least a billion dollars: should we tear it down, or vacate its occupants?
There are some indications that the Science Centre may be in much better condition, in fact, than some buildings of the same era. No major damage was reported during a historic rainstorm on Tuesday, July 16, with almost 100 mm of rainfall that caused significant flood damage to both private and public buildings throughout Toronto. The Pinchin report concludes, in one section, that “the facility and its components are performing as intended; for most infrastructure assets, this would infer that no repairs anticipated within the next five years,” an evaluation consistent with a Facility Condition Index of “B”.
In the back-and-forth that is normal between consultants and clients, Pinchin may have been asked to shift more of the needed repairs into a shorter timeframe to create a false sense of urgency, and to effect a change in the Facility Condition Index to a “C”—a FCI evaluation that also, confusingly, appears in its report. Even this is not dire—the accompanying evaluation is that “the Facility and its components are functioning as intended; normal deterioration and minor distress observed; repairs will be required within the next five years to maintain functionality.” Architect Raymond Moriyama said the Science Centre was designed to last 250 years with regular maintenance; Pinchin’s report affirms that with its recommended repairs, the building will be in good repair for decades to come.
This slide also mentions the need for temporary access roads. These are a normal part of most construction sites. While some trees may need to be removed for this to occur, they can be replanted. The demolition of the Science Centre would carry an immensely larger environmental impact: not only involving the destruction of much more of the natural landscape, but also entailing the landfilling of an extremely large building that could have endured for decades longer.
A final slide in the set focuses on the trillium-shaped Building B, and mostly reiterates claims from before. To again answer these concerns: The lack of heat is a problem that is likely easily fixable from the ends of the affected pipe(s), without requiring access to the pedestrian bridge or exterior access. For eventual larger repairs, creating a temporary access road is a normal part of construction. The Rimkus report has recommended replacing Building B’s roof in its entirety as a priority repair, and has made an educated evaluation of the areas unavailable for inspection using methodology accepted in a peer review.
Asbestos is a serious issue, but it is a material that our construction industry has extensive experience with handling and abating safely. Curiously, asbestos is mentioned four times in Infrastructure Ontario’s business case for relocating the Science Centre, but not once in the 333-page appendix accompanying this business case, the Pinchin report, the Rimkus report, or the Van Boxmeer & Stranges peer review. This makes it unclear whether asbestos is widespread in the facility, or is perhaps confined to a small area. Its lack of mention in all of the consultant reports made available by Infrastructure Ontario suggests that the latter may be true.
An architect I spoke with indicated that given the age of the building, the likely location of any asbestos in the Great Hall is as a coating to the HVAC heating and cooling ducts as a fireproofing measure. The manufacturing process for these components would have involved spraying on the asbestos with a glue base mix, and overwrapping it with a fibreglass wrap that would hold everything in place. The removal of this type of asbestos can be performed with more ease and control than many other types of asbestos.
Disturbingly, the issue of the lack of heat to Building B may be a veiled threat. It indicates that the Province may be unwilling to perform even minor repairs to restore heat, willfully allowing a major part of the complex to degrade over the winter. Its business case to relocate the Science Centre to Ontario Place budgets for the legacy building’s demolition (at $25 million) rather than its repair; and one of the appendices to this business case plays out a scenario of demolishing the complex in 2026.
Such a demolition would be willfully destructive and wholly unjustified. It cannot be allowed.
Related:
Cost of Ontario Science Centre temporary location exceeds cost of roof repairs
Ontario Science Centre doesn’t require full closure: A close reading of the engineers’ report
Closing science centre unnecessary, says firm of architect who designed building
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The post As Province edges towards demolition of Science Centre, documents point to a manufactured crisis appeared first on Canadian Architect.