Explaining Brazil #302: Why hasn’t Brazilian democracy died?

Jair Bolsonaro took Brazilian institutions to the brink, but they resisted. A political scientist explains why he believes that happened

The post Explaining Brazil #302: Why hasn’t Brazilian democracy died? appeared first on The Brazilian Report.

Jair Bolsonaro used the Armed Forces to coerce institutions that are tenets of democracy, fueled violence against the professional press, issued decrees to change policies without Congress’ approval, and worked hard to undermine the credibility of the electoral system — besides taking several other pages out of the typical autocratization manual. 

The Federal Police are investigating evidence that he may have even captured the Brazilian Intelligence Agency to intimidate political opponents and protect his family from investigations.

But, at the end of the day, why hasn’t Brazilian democracy died? This is the question asked by political science professors Carlos Pereira and Marcus André Melo in their new book, recently published by Companhia das Letras.

Author Carlos Pereira analyzes the reasons for that, highlighting how the Brazilian multiparty system was crucial to containing the chief of the Executive branch.

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Background reading:

• Already in 2021, The Brazilian Report showed how multiple cabinet members, Supreme Court justices, and members of Congress feared that Jair Bolsonaro would hardly accept defeat if he lost the 2022 election.
• Indeed, Mr. Bolsonaro never formally accepted defeat, and his party formally challenged the runoff results based on unbacked claims about the voting machines.
• The election was followed by calls from Bolsonaro supporters for a military coup, which the then-president never put off.
• Then, in January 2023 (just one week into Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s term), hordes of far-right radicals stormed and ransacked government offices in Brasília in a desperate attempt to create the conditions for a military coup that would place Mr. Bolsonaro back to power.
• In episode #286 of Explaining Brazil, we analyzed how Brazil’s far right operates. A new report mapped and detailed the activities and ideologies of more than 20 far-right extremist groups operating in the country.

Do you have a suggestion for our next Explaining Brazil podcast? Drop us a line at podcast@brazilian.report

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Transcript by Cockatoo

Hello, this is To Be Read, in which we interview authors about their books on Brazilian themes. Today we’re going to talk to political scientist Carlos Pereira about his new book Why Hasn’t Brazilian Democracy Died?, which he wrote with Marcos Andremelo. Both are college professors and columnists at major Brazilian newspapers. paper. Before we go any further, I would like to remind you that you can watch this full conversation on video on the Brazilian Report’s Patreon page for free. The link will be in

the episode description. I hope to see you there. Throughout the four years of Jair Bolsonaro’s government from 2019 to 2022, Carlos Pereira and Marcos Melo were swimming against the tide, supporting an idea that the majority of political scientists present in the Brazilian public debate strongly contested. According to Pereira e Melo, Brazil’s democracy was not as threatened as their colleagues claimed, arguing that it was strong enough to resist the attacks of any authoritarian

ruler.

Indeed, Brazil didn’t suffer a coup, though international studies pointed toward the decline in the quality of Brazilian democracy and public policies during the Bolsonaro administration. Understanding whether the country was in fact on the brink of the abyss, it’s important to know what parts of Brazil’s democratic regime work and what needs to improve. And without a doubt, why hasn’t Brazilian democracy guide greatly enriches this discussion. Your book goes into great depth on a number of episodes of Brazilian political life over the last decade,

analyzing how Brazil’s multi-party presidential system works. For this interview in particular, I chose to focus questions on the Bolsonaro government as as the impact of the rise of far-right populists remains a hot topic for democracies around the world. So, first, to clarify for those watching us, why didn’t Brazilian democracy die? Evaluate the strength of the Brazilian political system to resist attack,

considering its constitutional roles and the historical characteristics of its institutions. But looking at the other side of this story, how serious was Jair Bolsonaro’s attack on democracy? How do you compare him to other Brazilian presidents? let’s try to address it carefully. And the book, and starting from the book title, is a direct response to a literature

on democratic backsliding, particularly Levitsky and Ziblatt, and who wrote a war bestseller and how democracies die. And according to this literature, not only them, but the entire literature, because there are hundreds of scholars nowadays addressing this issue, and the most important variable or the erosion of democracy around the globe is the election of autocrats.

And according to them, democracy no longer dies via military coups, but rather, and paradoxically, it dies via the election, the free election, competitive election of extreme populist autocrats who, once in power, take advantage of this position in order to strengthen his or her power and to weaken the checks and balances institutions. But my criticism to this literature, not only mine, but Marcos Melo, who is my co-author, and I criticize this literature, is that they only observe this phenomenon from the perspective

of the aggressor, from the perspective of the populist, from the perspective of the who would act and societies and institutions in many different countries would be defenseless victims of those populists. And we, Marcos and I, we are not happy with that explanation. we take into account the other side of the coin. We take into account the quality of that society

and also the political institutions themselves to see the extent to which the institutional design of the country helps or makes the life of populists difficult. So in the particular case of Brazil, this specific combination of presidentialism with multiparties forces the president to build a coalition.

He was forced by those institutions to look for a coalition in Congress and by building that coalition, he had to moderate his illiberal discourse, his illiberal narratives, because in order to govern, he had to make concessions, he had to make concessions with other political forces. In addition to building a coalition that decreases the illiberal power of a Brazil also has a very complex system of institutions that also makes the life of populists

like Bolsonaro more difficult. Not only the life of a populist, but the life of any elected government, because there is too many vetoes in Brazil, not only vetoes in the political party dimension, but also in the institutional dimension.

We are a federal country with 27 states, 27 constitutions, 27 governors, and we have a bicameral system. We have a very independent judiciary, very independent public prosecutors, audit courts. So all those institutions are extremely independent,

autonomous from the executive, and with the capacity to say no to initiatives by this populist. So the institutional design itself creates a shield that makes it difficult for the populist to put forward one illiberal agenda.

Perfect, perfect. But just to set the basis for our conversation, can we agree that Bolsonaro, in spite of the strengths of our institutions, can we agree that Bolsonaro established an unprecedented attack on democracy since our return to democracy?

Yeah, he stressed Brazilian democracy a lot, with many confrontations with institutions, and also understanding that those institutions would be adversaries of his administration. And he not only developed an autocratic rhetoric, but also he took concrete actions to undermine a fertile terrain for his illiberal intentions because institutions were ready to say no to him.

So for instance, when Bolsonaro organized a meeting with the generals and proposed to the generals for them to sign a new bill, a new petition that would increase his power vis-a-vis Congress and the judiciary and the representative of the army forces. And they said no to Bolsonaro. And they said no, not because they were in an institutional setup that would increase the cost of deviation from the democratic path. Also, Bolsonaro himself sent a motion to Congress requesting the impeachment of justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court, but Congress immediately react and refused that motion, that petition.

So it’s very common among populists, they try to decrease the power of the judiciary. And Bolsonaro followed the same path, but those initiatives have been refused. So we had very strong reactions. Marcus and I claim in the book that the most important

and variable, the most important indication of the health of democracy is not the lack of threats, but the appropriate reaction to threats that makes those threats not credible enough to undermine democratic institutions. I don’t know if I made myself clear. Sure, sure. So that said, you already mentioned, but to sum up,

compared to countries where democracy has crumbled, what are the strengths of Brazil’s political system

that you would highlight?

Yeah, that’s a very good question. For instance, our neighbor here, Venezuela, right? So we had an extreme left and president-elected, Hugo Chavez. And in a very similar situation, a corruption crisis, political parties over there were very fragile.

They had no competitive candidate, Hugo Chavez, and won with a landslide victory. However, once in power, Hugo Chavez managed to approve a plebiscite to reform the constitution, because the Venezuelan constitution did not allow the executive to be strong. So, constitutionally speaking, the chief of the executive in Venezuela was very weak. So, Hugo Chavez realized that he could not govern in a minority situation without constitutional prerogatives and by taking these initiatives of organizing a plebiscite and he used his popularity to get the green light from the society to change the constitution with a new, with the election of a congress in which the opposition a Congress in which the opposition refuses to play the game.

So in the case of Brazil, Bolsonaro would never have this opportunity to organize a plebiscite or to get the majority of Congress, you know, because we have a multi-party system. And Bolsonaro’s party itself was kind of a tiny party, and less than 10% of seats in Congress. So and whereas in the case of Hugo Chavez, his own party achieved alone the qualified majority to approve constitutional reforms,

and the party of Bolsonaro less than 10% in Congress. So institutionally speaking, and this fragmentation creates lots of trouble for governability on the one hand, but on the other hand, it also, it’s a natural protection against radical reforms that would and somehow not fulfill the aggregate preference of the Congress. So the president, in order to govern or to approve reforms in Brazil, it has to pay attention to what Congress wants.

So the process is not efficient, and people complain a lot. But on the other hand, it’s very safe that we are not under the risk of radical changes abruptly. So change when happening in Brazil, it’s kind of slow, protracted, extremely negotiated. And by doing this negotiated and bargaining process,

and radical initiatives somehow moderates toward to the center. So that’s a big difference. So in one word, as you requested, in one word I would say that a bunch of parties that are not ideologically driven in the Brazilian Congress usually occupies the center of the extreme right and the extreme left helps to avoid radical transformation of the country and at the same time to avoid that democracy would be under risk, under credible risks.

I see. And professor, how does the individual performance of certain actors influence the functioning of these systemic sectors of these institutions that you mentioned. For example, after the 2022 elections, many said that Justice Alexandre de Moraes, as head of the electoral courts, was the right person at the right time to save Brazil’s democracy.

had to deal with the antics of the Central Highway Police on the day of the runoff vote, for instance, which threatened to suppress voting in pro-Rula regions. Do you agree with that analysis focused on individual performances?

You know, as you know me, Isabel, I am an institutionalist. I believe in rules of the game. Having said that, I don’t neglect the role played by individuals, right? But it’s important to take into account that individuals are within an institutional setup. So Alexandre de Moraes only played that important role

because he had the institutional capacity to do so, right? So of course then someone with a different style, personality, and could have a different approach to many different issues. However, at the end of the day, I don’t believe that we would have too much differences

in terms of the outcome. I think that he was in the right position, luckily. But if someone else would be there, I believe that the Supreme Court would behave similarly as it did during the Bolsonaro’s administration. And people who study the Supreme Court here in Brazil,

they claim that the Supreme Court usually they act as 11 isolated islands, right? Because we have 11 justice members of the Supreme Court. But when the democracy was under threat, those isolated islands, isolated islands, they work as a unified continent. Right? So despite the fact that we have Alexandre de Moraes as the main leader of this process, by the rest of the justice members and giving him the political support for him to act as their representatives.

So that’s the way I see it.

And continuing with the Supreme Court, the book highlights that the court was fruitful to containing Bolsonaro. but faced with an inoperative prosecutor-general, much of what was done was done using unorthodox methods, such as the court itself opening inquiries. Therefore, instead of a show of strength, wasn’t that an example of a flaw in our constitutional design

in which the decisions of the prosecutor general responsible for imposing checks and balances on the president are not subject to any kind of review?

Yeah, strictly speaking, it was not a fault because according to the Brazilian constitution the president has a complete discretion to appoint a general public prosecutor. And he has not to choose one that has been chosen by prosecutors themselves, or a particular list, or so on and so forth. So the Constitution says that the president has the authority to choose someone and submit this name to the Senate. So it is the Senate who ultimately

and choose the general public prosecutor. So it is true that Augusto Suarez, the one that has been appointed by Bolsonaro and reappointed again because he was appointed by two years service and reappointed. But at the end of the day, it was the plenary of the Senate who gave him the authority to work like this. And in fact, he was a very strong ally of Bolsonaro’s initiatives.

And given this situation, the Supreme Court had to make a decision of trying to bypass this potential obstacle. And that’s how it worked. But again, it was not illegal, it was not unconstitutional, because the constitution provides a great leeway for the Supreme Court to make those kinds of actions in certain circumstances. suppression, right? And the Supreme Court had to choose what fight to fight, what issue to fight.

Remember that very recently the main issue became democracy. So the fight in favor of democracy. And the court acted in that direction, despite the fact that the general public prosecutor somehow filed many cases or did not act promptly and was a kind of a very inefficient process of decision making. When the Supreme Court realized that the general public prosecutor would not act, so the Supreme Court decided to act unilaterally. And especially during the pandemic, I don’t know if you remember, but that was a very crucial moment in which Bolsonaro

started losing sequentially within the Supreme Court, because Bolsonaro would like to have the complete authority to decide about how to deal with the pandemic, especially regarding the social distance policy. And he would like, he, Bolsonaro himself, would like to concentrate in the national executive, the authority to decide and social distance in the entire country.

But the Supreme Court acknowledged the power of subnational level to make the final decision and the best strategy to deal with the pandemic. So this kind of decision undermined dramatically the capacity of imposing his agenda to states and municipalities. So talking about the pandemic. And also related to acquiring, to buying vaccine. So as you may remember, and Bolsonaro and refused to put chains and vaccines and the Supreme Court allow states to do so and without the necessity that the national government to be the responsible

of purchasing those vaccines.

So, yeah, exactly, talking about the pandemic, the book recognized that the management of the pandemic and the corruption scandals undermined Bolsonaro’s popularity and forced the then-president to submit to Congress to avoid facing impeachment. How is it possible to prove that it wasn’t these unpredictable factors that prevented Bolsonaro from consolidating his authoritarian project as opposed to structural aspects of the Brazilian political system?

It’s interesting your question because many people were afraid that in special circumstances would increase their power even further. Because, you know, and during a pandemic, everybody’s afraid to die, everybody’s afraid to get sick and to go to a hospital and so on and so forth. So everybody would say, no, Bolsonaro, please do whatever you want in order to help me. the opposite of what you said. Because of this structure in which he did not allow him to make unilateral decisions that protect democracy during the pandemic. So the pandemic could be one window

of opportunity for autocrats to increase their own power. But in the case of Brazil, the pandemic was one window of opportunity for checks and balances to decrease the power of Bolsonaro. Exactly in the opposite

direction. I see, I see. And you also state in the book that democracy did not die once once and for all, because the rules of the game defined by the Constitution are preserved. And in fact, these rules remain in force. But I’d say that Bolsonaro was able to be authoritarian without having to change the Constitution. His government captured institutions such as the Brazilian Intelligence Agency to intimidate a political opponent, he used the armed forces to coerce democratic institutions,

he fueled violence against journalists, and he issued decrees to change policies without congressional approval. So is it possible to say that the Bolsonaro government represented a democratic setback, albeit momentary, at least.

I don’t believe so, Isabela, because all those actions, as I said before, have received the appropriate reactions, right? So it is too much to expect from a political system and institutions are exposed after the aggression. So if those aggressions did not have received the appropriate reaction, I would agree with you. However, what we had in Brazil was counter-reaction, time Bolsonaro would try to use institutions in his own favor, we would have a reaction. Of course, this process is not linear, right? Nothing is linear, right? There are here and there discontinuities. However, what we

claim in the book is that we have to observe the general trend. And you have to observe this phenomenon with certain distance, and rather than to be too much involved, otherwise you’re going to be deceived by the trees and you’re going to lose the big picture, the picture of the forest, right? And at the end of the day, all those actions have received good and appropriate reactions, And democracy did not erode and we did not face a backsliding and he was defeated in the election. He also was punished by the National Electoral Court.

He was banned for eight years to be out of politics. and inquiries, judicial inquiries, and he probably will face judicial decisions as well. So the process, the game has been played. I would agree that it’s not linear, but the general trend is positive. The general trend is very positive indeed. You criticize excessive alarmism, but you also recognize the importance of actors from civil society, in particular the press, in containing Bolsonaro.

How can that kind of mobilization be maintained without a certain degree of alarmism?

Did the alarmists play a role in guaranteeing Brazilian democracy?

It’s a very, very good question because our position can be, and some people mistakenly understanding that our position would be a kind of demobilizing position. It’s quite the opposite, right? We believe that societies, a vigilant society, as the Brazilian society, plays a very, very important role in this process.

There were many examples in which the society as a whole, the law bar association, the several law schools in Brazil organized a mobilization in support of the electronic ballot in Brazil because, as you know, Bolsonaro created lots of fake news related to the electronic ballot and he himself, the executive himself, was the authorship of a new constitution reform to allow the comeback of written vote, which was defeated by the Brazilian Congress. So all these kinds of mobilizations were fundamental to this process, but we should not make the

wrong diagnosis, right? So it’s important not to be fragile, society to look fragile or victimized, but there is a kind of substitute effect between the role of institutions and the act of the society. Because when you go out, when you go out to protest, it’s risky, and you don’t know if it’s going to have violence or so on and so forth. feel that institutions are no longer capable of dealing with those problems. So there is a kind of substitute effect. If institutions are already handling well and, you know, have an autocrat,

why should I bother to go to the street if he is already contained, right? So, there were some moments in which, and especially just after the celebration of Brazilian independence in 2021, in which Bolsonaro rallied in Brasilia with tanks and so on and so forth, and people felt like afraid that he was going to take advantage of this and that. And a few weeks later, we had protests in favor of the democracy. But, you know, at the end of the day, I would say that we had a nice balance between a very vigilant, the media, the media in Brazil, the official media, and also the alternative media in Brazil,

they played a crucial role. Let me give you an example, and that came to my mind right now. During the pandemic again, Bolsonaro’s Minister of Health refused to provide the the number of people that have died by COVID or have been hospitalized and their level and how many days. You know what happened in Brazil? And the four main media outlets, Jornal, O Globo, Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São

and UOL, they organized a consortium and they collect this data despite the fact that the government did not release any information, this consortium released information every day. So, that was a very important sign of how alive and vigilant the Brazilian society was during this process. And, and, and…

It became the official data, right?

Became the official data because the data provided by the government was no longer reliable. You know, nobody knew if it was, you know, the right or the wrong data. So everybody, the society started believing more in the information provided by the consortium

than the information provided by the government.

So let’s read the book as a stimulus to mobilization and not the opposite, of course. And at the end of the day, regardless of points of view, I think we all hope that you are correct about the strength and the stability of Brazilian democracy.

I hope so. I hope so.

Yeah. So we came to the end. Professor, please feel free to add anything you want,

if you do.

Yeah, and it’s interesting, Isabela, because you know me for quite a while. And some people could say that the title of our book and our claim is a kind of an export rationalization because democracy did not die and those professors would write exactly a book that confirms this.

I can say that it isn’t because I’ve read your texts and you’ve been arguing this for a long time since 2018 for sure.

Yeah, that’s right. Marcos Melo, who writes weekly at the Folha de São Paulo and myself, and I write weekly at the Estado de São Paulo for more than six years. So we have been claiming and arguing with this kind of understanding even before Bolsonaro was elected. And so that’s important to say that we had an institutional understanding. Our book does not have the ambition to have the right understanding or the right answer, to provide a debate, to provide a public debate offering counterintuitive explanation to many issues that Brazil and Brazilian democracy have faced during these ten last years.

And it does, it does for sure. So congratulations to you and to Professor Marcos Merlot too. And thanks very much for your time, Professor. It was a pleasure speaking with you.

Thanks a lot, Isabela. Hope to see you again soon.

I hope so. And thanks to everyone who stayed with us. See you next time.

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Transcribed with Cockatoo

The post Explaining Brazil #302: Why hasn’t Brazilian democracy died? appeared first on The Brazilian Report.