How Qatar’s Mediation Diplomacy Elevated The Taliban To The Seat At Kabul – Analysis

By Anant Mishra and Prof. Dr. Christian Kaunert

As the Taliban celebrated three years of its reign in power, many scholars still ponder on how the group rose to take the seat at Kabul; some still jittered from the memories of evacuation on the dawn of 15 August 2021. The group undoubtedly had favourable factors behind their successful takeover, but the significance of Qatar cannot simply be ignored or limited to the state’s role as an honest mediator.

Right from the days of the insurgency, the state stood firmly behind the Taliban, accompanying the group (some scholars even consider it to have laid the foundation for Hibatullah Akhundzada’s rise within the Rahbari Shura) to the corridors of Kabul, a relationship which appears to have strengthened today. It was not a meagre coincidence that Al Jazeera (Qatar-owned/financially supported) was the first news agency to relay live coverage of Taliban fighters entering the Presidential Palace on August 15. It is also not a coincidence that Mullah Baradar the Acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, watched his motivated mujahids enter the palace on Al Jazeera, from the comforts of a luxurious hotel in Doha.

Qatar did not end or potentially limit its support to the Taliban after the fall of the erstwhile Islamic republic. It has instead undertaken exhaustive measures, over the past three years, to mediate with potential private entities in Europe, lobbying entry of private enterprises into Kabul, host government enterprises/business houses, and US/European government representatives for bilateral/multilateral engagements with the Taliban leadership. It would not be incorrect to state that instead of deliberating over the current socio-political/economic crisis in Afghanistan or seeking/hosting discussions over inclusivity in government representations, Doha prefers to employ mediation diplomacy with the Taliban, with an intent to promote the group’s legitimacy at vivid multiple platforms, which began as a complex experiment (host negotiations between Taliban and Washington at Doha, sealing the fate of Ghani’s government) could have served as a lesson for the state on not mediating with the group again, perhaps even sending a message of a temporary (to say at the least) cessation of all communications (to European/Washington sponsored lobby groups) with the group, until return of domestic stability.

On the contrary, since August 2021, Doha not only assumed greater cooperation with the Taliban but portrayed the group (post-U.S.-Taliban negotiations) as the sheer wish of the people. To put it, Doha started by engaging in greater cooperation between the group and Washington (between 2020-21), elevating to hosting the group’s engagements with global power nations, including dedicated negotiations under the United Nations. Taking the pattern of recent talks, the sheer absence of humanitarian aid institutional representation and the systematic negation of discussions (even mention) of human rights abuses conducted by the group, Doha aims to put forth the wishes of the Taliban. With Doha-led negotiations now being termed the ‘Doha Accords’, it remains unclear whether Qatar’s commitment towards the Taliban would elevate Afghanistan from a deplorable humanitarian and socio-economic crisis or dip the country into a new one. Taking the aforementioned hypothesis into account, the authors aim to predict the trajectory of Qatar’s sustained commitment to the group, keeping the results of the three previous Doha accords in the background and potential competition (within Afghanistan), motivating Qatar to play.

A mediator in disguise? 

It would not be incorrect to state that Qatar enjoys a more significant relationship (one scholar termed this a strategic partnership) with the Taliban, even beyond the group’s regional allies, including Pakistan. Taking note of Kabul-based scholars' argument, who, during their discussion with the authors, continued to favour Pakistan’s strategic depth inside Afghanistan over Qatar’s sustained support to the Taliban, painted Islamabad as the ‘preferred’ ally. This hypothesis is reflected in the fact that: 

a) Pakistan (primarily the Inter-services Intelligence, aka the ISI) is responsible for uniting the Mujahideen, provided arms and training to fight against the Russians till 1989, and supported the unification of the Taliban under Mullah Omar (somewhere between 1996 and 2001), whereas Qatar not.

b) Pakistan was one of the few countries to recognise the first Taliban government, which Qatar did not.

c) Pakistan has been involved in Afghanistan since its inception as an immediate neighbour and regional stakeholder. In contrast, Qatar only posted its nominee (Ambassador Saeed Mubarak al Khayarin al Hajri) in May 2019.

d) Pakistan has supported the Taliban both covertly and through overt means, whereas Doha expanded its support primarily through mediation, which remains flexible (can be withdrawn at any moment).

Considering the arguments above, Qatar may have reflected its position as a mediator. Still, it aligned to a singular entity during the conflict, the Taliban, instead promoting peaceful means to put an end to the conflict or, at best, put the needs of local Afghans or regional stakeholders to achieve stability, albeit temporarily. Qatar’s sustained alignment with the Taliban (in the past three years) reflects the need for greater cooperation, overshadowing its commitment to bring regional stability at best, even moving away from its responsibility to put a check on the Taliban’s commitment to the U.S. as part of the peace negotiation. Taking note of Qatar’s engagement with the Taliban in the past three years, Doha appears to accommodate requests from the Taliban (for greater engagement with the West), even sidelining the deadlock emanating from the previous three talks. This means Doha undermined Washington's requests to remove the deadlock and ignored requests from humanitarian aid institutions to put local Afghans’ representation on the larger table. This reflects some hostility towards entities speaking out against the Taliban. This is a similar practice that Qatar exercised by prohibiting the representation of the erstwhile Islamic Republic from the first Doha talks, which resulted in its capitulation. Even today, Doha continues to decline requests from entities vocal against the Taliban from participating in the ongoing ‘Doha accords’.

Beyond strategic partnership?

Reflecting on the authors’ discussion with scholars from Kabul University, Qatar’s sustained involvement with the Taliban has elevated into local academic discussions, intriguing even common masses since it shares no boundaries nor contributes to Afghanistan’s prosperity. Even then, one scholar puts the role of Qatar as a stronger player invested in Afghan politics than regional neighbours, engaging frequently with the Taliban leadership on all state matters. It is all the more surprising since Qatar only nominated its first Ambassador to Afghanistan in May 2019.

According to one scholar, Qatar has made a mark in mediation diplomacy by becoming the first state to engage with the Taliban leadership so exhaustively, without hosting an embassy or a formal political/diplomatic nominee until recently. It would not be incorrect to state that Doha has been engrossed in Afghan affairs much more effectively (with more enthusiasm) than regional allies. Citing a senior political leader from the first Islamic Republic government, one scholar pointed out erstwhile President Karzai’s serious apprehension for Qatar, making his preferred choice to engage with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye more meaningful. On further enquiring about erstwhile President Karzai’s apprehension towards Qatar, he argued that despite lacking a formal diplomatic presence in Kabul, Doha had engaged in countless discussions with senior Taliban leadership under Washington’s influence.

However, it is crucial to distinguish Qatar’s commitment towards the Taliban from its commitment towards Afghanistan’s prosperity. Doha appears to strengthen its commitment to the Taliban, but this does not necessarily reflect its commitment to Afghanistan’s prosperity or to regional peace and stability. This could have been one of the apprehensions shared by both erstwhile Presidents Karzai and Ghani, resulting in severe apprehensions towards Doha. According to one scholar, both the erstwhile President Karzai and Ghani knew very well the extent of Doha’s engagement with the Taliban then. Furthermore, he argues that their apprehensions may have echoed during private conversations with Washington or may even kept it to themselves, knowing fully the consequences of Doha’s intention.

With the Taliban in power for three years, the authors aim to discuss significant factors that could expand Qatar’s engagement with the Taliban, bringing clouds of uncertainty over the fate of Afghanistan:

All roads lead to Washington

It is without a doubt Washington brought Doha into the Afghanistan conflict. Without an entity to mediate with the Taliban, Washington saw a long-term partner in Doha, making it the centre gravity of the conflict. Before 2001, Doha was absent from the political corridors of Kabul. Sharing a strategic alliance in the Middle East, Doha accepted Washington’s request and formulated a makeshift Taliban political office in Doha on a similar framework for Hamas. Using a similar framework for Hamas, it took directions from Washington to open lines of communication with the Taliban political office despite both being officially branded as terrorist organisations. Since Washington favoured to engage with Hamas via Doha, it too engaged with the Taliban political office via Qatari representatives. With Doha still hoping to close a peace deal between Washington, Tel Aviv and Hamas, it aims to foster better negotiations between Washington and the Taliban at the bigger table. In a more likely scenario, if Washington chooses to engage with the Taliban more frequently, Doha will retain its importance as a responsible state capable of fostering peace through complex yet peaceful negotiations, throwing its hat in the competition with Saudi Arabia and the UAE for Afghanistan.

Regional powers’ competition for Afghanistan

Qatar’s competition with the UAE and Saudi Arabia calls for detailed inquiry.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have played a significant hand in crafting the Taliban, radicalising, arming and training their Mujahids, besides formally recognising their first government between 1996 and 2001. As said before, Qatar did not engage in this theatre. Post-2001, these two regional powers appear to have distanced themselves from the Taliban, perhaps under Washington’s direction, putting an end to any/all formal contact with the group. Seizing the opportunity for potential mediation, Doha undertook series of engagements with Washington and the Taliban to foster trust.

Today, the Taliban’s relationship with Riyadh no longer reflects the kingdom’s resentment toward the group; instead, sustained interaction reflects Riyadh’s intention to counter Qatar’s closeness with the group. What was once echoed as terrorists by Saudi Arabia’s then Ambassador to Kabul, Riyadh is a regular destination for Taliban leadership to engage with European political leaders, with one source citing lucrative financial packages being offered in addition to prospects of quick mediation. Although the Saudi Embassy in Kabul may have ceased operations formally, its intention to host the engagement reflects its intention to counter Qatar’s alignment with the group.

On a similar note, the UAE may have put a temporary halt on its engagement with the group (out of sheer apprehensions about Qatar’s presence), both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi seek to limit Doha’s growing alignment, even if it means emptying its purse. Since August 2022, Abu Dhabi continues to bridge engagement between Taliban political leadership and Washington, while Riyadh is leaving no stone unturned to win the hearts and minds of local Afghans.

The future of Qatar’s Taliban diplomacy

Qatar has proved its worth in diplomatic activism, no matter how radical it appears. However, it may have lost the opportunity to bring regional peace and stability by maintaining neutrality in the conflict; however, it has won the hearts and minds of the Taliban leadership, who now explicitly rely on its political office in Doha for conducting diplomatic engagements outside Afghanistan. By proving its credibility as a successful mediator (with allegiance to the group), the Taliban, which resonates a society built on treachery and sheer tendency to play multiple sides at the same time to maximise benefits irrespective of consequences, cannot find a better alternative or to say plainly, make a move to Riyadh or Abu Dhabi irrespective of lucrative opportunities.

That said, Doha’s mediation diplomacy may not have delivered results as anticipated. It has not demonstrated Doha as a potential regional power. It may have at best, demonstrated itself as a power capital of mediation diplomacy, proving its reliability as an ally to its European partners, more prominently Washington. On the contrary, it may have stopped short of achieving the image of a grand/global mediator. Far from pressuring the Taliban (or exercising influence at best), Doha has given in to the requests of the Taliban, putting forth the group’s concessions to a larger platform, limiting its role to a meagre messenger. It remains unclear whether the mediation capital aims to continue as a meagre Taliban messenger in the next Doha accords or play a more significant role at the high table, moving beyond its role as a mediator, perhaps a regional power horse committed to peace and stability in Afghanistan.

About the authors:

• Anant Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
• Dr. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. In addition, he is Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism (www.eucter.net).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.