China’s Strategic Concerns Amid Bangladesh’s Political Turmoil – Analysis

By Antara Ghosal Singh

China closely observed the high-level courtesies extended to Muhammad Yunus, head of the interim government of Bangladesh, by the United States (US), during the former’s visit to the United Nations General Assembly from 24–27 September. There was considerable resentment in Beijing as a high-level US official delegation visited Bangladesh from 14–15 September and pledged to provide US$200 million in aid.

Speculations have been rife on the Chinese internet questioning whether Bangladesh, under the “pro-American” interim government, will now choose to side with the US camp, threatening China's interests. What is the “US support” being exchanged for—is it the sovereignty of St. Martin island or the overall close China-Bangladesh ties?

Suspicion of American intervention in Bangladesh affairs

Although China has officially spoken little about it, in the Chinese assessment, the sudden change in Bangladesh's political situation is not only a reflection of the country's domestic political struggle but also a microcosm of the changes taking place in the global geopolitical landscape. Despite the White House categorically denying it, the Chinese strategic community sees some truth in the controversy over the interference of foreign forces behind the unrest in Bangladesh.

Former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s statement, claiming that she could have continued to govern Bangladesh if she had handed over the sovereignty of St. Martin island and let the US control the Bay of Bengal, has resonated within China’s strategic circles. For example, Zhang Sheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of American Studies points out three key factors behind the US’ involvement in the unrest in Bangladesh:

• “Killing the chicken to scare the monkey" style of establishing authority

With the intensification of “great power competition”, the US wants to unite with its allies and partners to counter China. However, with the rising trend of “isolationism” in American politics, and the US’ declining global prestige, even its own allies are standing against it on certain global issues. For example, Spain, Norway, Sweden and others publicly deviated from the US’ stance in the current round of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Hasina, too, expressed dissatisfaction with the US’ role in the conflict. However, as a country with relatively weak economic and military strength, Bangladesh may have been targeted byAmerican leaders as an example to warnother countries and leaders who might be inclined to challenge the US.

• Biden administration's “opportunistic” gamble

In an election year, when the ruling party is eager to gain voter favour, opportunistically taking advantage of civil unrest in other countries, guiding regime changes, and negotiating unequal high-yield treaties can be framed as a major accomplishment by the incumbent administration seeking re-election. The power vacuum in Bangladesh caused by domestic turmoil provided the Biden administration withan opportunityto bring in a leader who can better cooperate with the current US government, to reach agreements that are beneficial to the United States and use these as diplomatic achievements of the outgoing Democrat government, to support Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris' ongoing election campaign.

• Bangladesh’s geopolitical value to US Indo-Pacific Strategy

Chinesescholarsunderstand that Bangladesh, a country connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia and guarding the Bay of Bengal, is of particular geopolitical value to the US’ interest, particularly with respect to its Indo-Pacific vision. If the US actually manages to strengthen its political influence over Bangladesh, this can be a gamechanger in South Asian geopolitics.

China’s key concerns

Chinese observers are deeply concerned that the US may take the first mover advantage in actively, “reshaping” Bangladesh's political orientation, economic order, and social consciousness to create a more “obedient” partner, that is more in line with Western values. This, China fears, may adversely impact its key strategic interests in the region.

First, it may impact Bangladesh’sbilateral trade with China, leading to reduced trade volume, obstructed cargo transportation, and increased logistics cost”; secondly, China has a large amount of investment in Bangladesh, especially in the field of infrastructure construction.The current changes, it is feared, may lead to project delays, interruptions or even cancellations, causing economic losses to China; Finally, from a geopolitical perspective, China seems to be expecting a certain negative impact on China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative. If BRI gets stalled in Bangladesh, there is concern, it may trigger a chain reaction in other countries in the region as well. No wonder, China is reaching out to Bangladesh’s interim government throughmultiple channels, reminding it of Bangladesh’s prior commitment to China’sBRI. Meanwhile, the Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh,Yao Wenhas been surveying Chinese-funded enterprises in Bangladesh and making preparations for future uncertainties.

On the other hand, militarily, China fears that a greater US presence in Bangladesh can pose a direct threat to China's energy security and national security. The US can not only exert greater control over theStrait of Malaccabut also intervene in complex Myanmar politics to negatively impact China’s transportation line from southwest China toMyanmar's Kyaukpyu Port, putting a big obstacle to China’s Indian Ocean vision. Some Chineseobserversalso believe that any US military presence in Bangladesh can also break the original balance of power at the China-India border.

India: A key variable

Although China’s South Asia strategy is often targeted against India, however, under current circumstances, China seems to be banking upon India to deal with its own Bangladesh conundrum. Various Chinese analyses highlight India as thekey variableand its response as thekey factordetermining the regional power restructuring in the backdrop of the Bangladesh crisis.

“If it were just a game between China and the US , the latter would most likely succeed in turning Bangladesh into “a vassal”, establishing a military base in Bangladesh and then controlling the Bay of Bengal region. However, given India’s deep influence on Bangladesh, if India opposes it, it would be difficult for the United States to accomplish its goals,” read a piece onthe QQ. As per some Chinese observers, the fact that India allowed former Bangladesh Prime Minister Hasina to expose the US conspiracy is indicative that India will not acquiesce to the US plans in the region.

Accordingly, there have been debates and discussions in the Chinese media aboutChina-Indiaforming atacit understandingon the issue of the Bay of Bengal. Possibly to attain this “understanding”, but from a position of strength, the Chinese media has been amplifying theUS-India differencesover Bangladesh, while strategically playing down China’s weariness over the issue.

The great power politics playing out in the backdrop of the Bangladesh crisis is getting increasingly complicated. India’s response must factor in the calculations of all stakeholders.

• About the author: Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation.