What makes a successful MLB leadoff hitter in 2024 (and why the Royals care)

Get. On. Base.

One of the oldest adages in baseball is that it’s a game of failure at the plate. Take shortstop Bobby Witt Jr., who won the batting crown this year with a .332 average. Even that means he “failed” more often than not. Yet no one would call Witt’s 2024 campaign a failure—in fact, he just succeeded more than most of his peers.

Witt is just one of thousands of batters from this past season, each with a single goal: keep the line moving and help their team win. How that happens varies, but for Kansas City, one role proved especially tough to fill in 2024: the leadoff spot. Witt, first baseman Vinnie Pasquantino, and catcher Salvador Perez anchored the lineup in the 2-3-4 spots. While options behind Perez were shaky, the real gap was in front of Witt.

Maikel Garcia didn’t solve the problem. Neither did Adam Frazier or Michael Massey. Nick Loftin? Not the answer. Manager Matt Quatraro tried his best to find a reliable leadoff hitter who could set the table for Witt and company, but the revolving door at the top of the order left Kansas City lacking consistency.

Today, the qualities of a successful leadoff hitter have shifted with modern baseball trends. A top-notch leadoff batter in today’s game isn’t just a speedster or a bunting machine—teams are looking for a hitter with on-base skills, plate discipline, power potential, and situational awareness. As Peter Brand in Moneyball (okay, Jonah Hill) famously said:

Before the MLB offseason hits its stride, the Royals need to solve the leadoff puzzle once and for all.

Historically, leadoff hitters were valued for their speed and ability to disrupt pitchers’ rhythms through base-stealing threats. Players like Rickey Henderson epitomized this archetype, combining elite stolen base totals with the ability to consistently get on base. For the Royals, outfielder Willie Wilson best exemplified this classic mold. The Alabama native logged nearly 1,500 games as the Royals’ leadoff man, amassing a .331 OBP and swiping 540 bases in that role—a testament to his impact at the top of the order.

In recent years, however, the role of the leadoff hitter has evolved, emphasizing on-base skills and overall run production over raw speed. Royals legend Alex Gordon embodies this modern archetype. While not a premier baserunning threat (though he tallied 113 stolen bases in his career), Gordon was one of the league’s top leadoff men during his prime. In 2011, arguably his best season, the Nebraska native slashed .305/.383/.532 from the top spot in the lineup. Notably, Gordon posted double-digit walk rates in seven of nine seasons from 2008–2016, before age began to affect his performance.

Advanced metrics have driven this shift in evaluation. Statistics like on-base percentage (OBP), slugging percentage (SLG), and weighted on-base average (wOBA) offer a deeper understanding of offensive value. A leadoff hitter with a high OBP boosts scoring opportunities for the middle of the lineup, significantly enhancing the team’s run-scoring potential.

The Royals’ history of leadoff hitters illustrates the transition from speed-first players like Wilson to versatile, disciplined hitters like Gordon, highlighting the evolution of this vital role in modern baseball. However, that blend did not materialize much in the Royals leadoff spot last season.

Kansas City had only four different players log 30 or more plate appearances as the leadoff man last season: third baseman Maikel Garcia, outfielder Tommy Pham, second baseman Michael Massey, and utilityman Adam Frazier. That group carried the lion’s share in what was the league’s worst leadoff group, with their paltry 66 wRC+ coming in dead last by an eight-point margin.

Here is how each player performed at the top of the order.

All in all, it’s not great.

That’s not to say these players lacked talent or didn’t excel in other roles for the Royals last year. For instance, Frazier was one of the league’s best pinch hitters, posting a 164 wRC+ in that role—the fifth-best among players with at least 20 pinch-hit plate appearances. Meanwhile, Massey’s bat thrived in the middle of the lineup, where he spent most of the 2024 season. His 137 wRC+ in the five-hole renewed optimism about his long-term value to the Royals. However, Frazier, Massey, Garcia, and Pham struggled to translate those bright spots into consistent production as the team’s leadoff hitter.

That lack of production hurt the Royals more than it might appear. According to Pitcher List’s updated Run Expectancy Matrix after the 2022 season, the importance of the first batter in any inning reaching base cannot be overstated. When the leadoff batter reaches base, teams average 1.087 runs that inning, compared to just 0.476 runs when the leadoff man is retired—a massive 0.611 run swing.

Over the course of a season, the difference between the leadoff hitter reaching base versus being out to start the game can account for nearly 99 runs, an enormous impact on a team’s offensive output. For reference, the Royals had a +91 run differential across the past season, tied with the Houston Astros for seventh-best in all of MLB.

That is not to say Kansas City’s leadoff options were an automatic out every single game, but that does show the difference between having the league’s worst performance at the position and even an average leadoff man. Witt can only do so much. The question of how much further Kansas City could have gone in the postseason with a respectable leadoff man is a big what-if from 2024. But, there is no point in dwelling upon what was when it is entirely avoidable in 2025.

Royals fans may have differing opinions on how the team should address the leadoff spot ahead of the upcoming Opening Day, but they all share the same goal: to have a better hitter at the top of the order. The question remains: what makes a good leadoff batter in 2024?

Shohei Ohtani. Francisco Lindor. Gunnar Henderson. Some of MLB’s very best hitters reside at the top of their respective batting orders. All three of those players top the leadoff pack at the plate, according to wRC+, and had career-defining All-Star seasons. Yet their success, and that of many of their above-average peers, could not have come more differently. For example, Betts walked more often (14.2%) than he struck out (10.3%), just one of two qualified leadoff hitters to do so. Meanwhile, his teammate Ohtani led the group’s slugging percentage by a wide margin, topping out at .680. The NL MVP’s 23.4% strikeout rate was among the worst for leadoff batters but still allowed him to do substantial damage at the plate.

Ohtani, Betts, and other top-tier batters are paid accordingly because that caliber of player is not especially common. These players get the job done no matter where they are in the lineup, but being a leadoff man offers them more opportunities to help their team. Moving on from the outliers, what qualities does a “normal” solid leadoff option possess? Examining the field, these are the parameters fans should consider and why.

First, let’s examine weighted On-Base Average, or wOBA. This metric measures a player’s overall offensive contributions by assigning specific run values to different events—singles, doubles, home runs, and walks. Unlike traditional stats like batting average or OBP, wOBA recognizes that not all outcomes carry the same weight. For example, while a walk advances a runner, a double or home run has a much greater impact on run production. By incorporating these weighted values, wOBA provides a clearer picture of a hitter’s ability to generate runs—an essential trait for a leadoff hitter tasked with setting the table.

Royals decision-makers understand that consistent competitiveness, particularly in tight games, requires a leadoff hitter whose offensive output aligns with wOBA’s principles of efficiency and impact.

The league-average wOBA for leadoff batters in 2024 was .322, a mark none of Kansas City’s leadoff options came close to reaching. The leadoff average understandably outpaces the overall MLB average of .310, while the second and third batters in the lineup typically exceed the leadoff mark. wOBA also strongly correlates with winning percentage—seemingly common sense, but it remains one of the more projectable statistics for overall team success.

Second, the leadoff man isn’t usually of any use if he records the most unproductive out of all: a strikeout. MLB leadoff batters struck out at a 19.8% rate last season, a slight increase from the previous season’s 19.4%. But, that isn’t to say the Philadelphia Phillies', whose leadoff batters struck out 27.4% of the time for the league’s worst mark, are the league’s worst. In fact, their .352 wOBA ranked fifth in baseball, a very valuable mark. What offset those strikeouts were the group’s walks, whose 14.6% rate conversely led the league.

That Moneyball line still rings true. Nearly any batter can have value, as long as they get on base. One of the most reliable ways to get on base outside of any hit is that walk. Some players are hit by more pitches than their peers, but that is (usually) by chance. I believe that any player can strike out a ton, as long as they still walk plenty. The smaller the margin is between the walk and strikeout rate, that also translates well to not just a few good batters but a better overall team performance.

Lastly, Kansas City could be watching a player’s chase rate when scouting a leadoff man. Both of the teams in the World Series had the lowest chase rates in baseball last season, with the Yankees’ 24.6% chase rate as a team-leading MLB. New York and the Los Angeles Dodgers had lineups that fanbases rightfully envied, and their plate discipline was a major component of their success.

Garcia and Pham were largely ineffective in the leadoff role, especially compared to their peers. However, one thing they both did well was laying off bad pitches. Pham, who spent time with seven different teams across the past three seasons, likely keeps finding opportunities because of his plate discipline. His 18.7% chase rate ranked in the 97th percentile last year, good for ninth-best among qualified hitters. Scroll down the leaderboard a bit, and you’ll see Garcia ranking 21st, posting a 21.2% chase rate. Scroll back up, even above Pham, and you’ll find Kansas City’s newest leadoff option: Jonathan India’s 18.4% chase rate, sixth-best in MLB.

Once is by chance. Twice is a coincidence. Three times is a pattern.

Maybe the Royals are on to something? The correlation between chase rates isn’t as obvious as the previous two statistics. Teams like the Cleveland Guardians, Philadelphia Phillies, and even the Royals all rank well below the league average 28.5% chase rate. However, there is still a correlation that says the teams with better plate discipline tend to win more. Who would have thought?

Full transparency: when this article’s writing began, the Royals hadn’t yet traded for India. There were a few free agents in the class who might have fit the bill for Kansas City’s needs. Maybe it could have been outfielder Jurickson Profar, arguably the most volatile high-profile free agent in this class. Or perhaps outfielder Jesse Winker, a budget option with solid on-base skills. As you go down the list, looking at these three metrics, the options become fewer and fewer. After all, above-average players in these areas with competent defensive skills are highly valuable—and therefore rarely available.

That is why the India trade is so, so good.

India was the Cincinnati Reds primary leadoff man last season, accruing the following metrics:

Not an All-Star. Not a top-tier free-agent profile. Just marginally above average in many aspects. But frankly, that is exactly what Kansas City needs in the leadoff role: average.

Consider the improvements for this team if they were 40% better in the leadoff role. If Witt came to the plate with a runner on base ahead of him 40% more often. Imagine the late-inning rallies running through the lineup’s lower half and seamlessly bridging to Kansas City’s most potent bats, thanks to a walk or a single from the leadoff spot. That is a lot of imagining, but the offseason is long and the days are short. Consider.

If India had joined the Royals a year earlier and posted the same statistics, here is how he would have ranked among his teammates in key categories:

It is hard to disagree with that value. Kansas City was not the perfect model at the plate last season, but India would have still significantly improved their leadoff performance. The Royals seem to be banking on his combination of consistency and discipline to finally stabilize the top of the order. It can’t get much worse, right?