In Malaysia, expressing support for Hamas has long been a means to secure political power – but that’s starting to change
Since Hamas launched its unprecedented October 7 attack on Israel, international links to the militant group have been placed under scrutiny. Some nations have tried to lessen or hide their previous relationships, or have acted to leverage their links to assist with diplomacy. Malaysia’s prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, on the other hand, quickly phoned Hamas leaders and expressed his unwavering support.
This response was not entirely unexpected. Malaysia is a multicultural country, and my research there demonstrates that pro-Palestinian, antisemitic and anti-Israel beliefs all operate as a symbolic rejection of secularism and the west. For many Malay nationalists, Israel, Jews and Zionism have come to represent the pinnacle of this threat, which then functions as an affirmation of political Islam and Malay supremacy.
I argue this ethnoreligious nationalism is a form of social control. It enables the authorities to retain support by appealing directly to ethnic Malay Muslims, who make up around 60% of the population.
One way in which the Malaysian authorities try to unify ethnic Malays is by constructing an outside and imagined enemy that is threatening Malay Islam and its supremacy in the nation.
Such unity manifests in Ketuanan Melayu, which translates as “Malay overlordship” in English. This state-promoted concept is socially amalgamated to a general anti-western discourse that, appropriate for a formerly colonised nation, places emphasis on post-colonial and developing-world nationalism.
It involves expressing solidarity with Muslims who have been victimised by non-Muslims, an action that melds well with a simplistic construction of the Palestinian cause.
Support for Palestine has been an integral part of Malaysia’s foreign policy since its independence in 1957. The country was the second in the world and the first south-east Asian nation to award full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The former PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, paid tribute to Malaysia’s support when he visited in the 1980s and early 90s, ranking it as superior to that from Arab nations.
Malaysia has also lobbied actively at the UN for Palestine, continually donated money to aid organisations, and regularly awards scholarships to Palestinian students. When Hamas gained prominence in the late 1990s, Malaysia was quick to build links with the group. This relationship became particularly close under the former prime minister Najib Razak, who even visited Hamas-controlled Gaza in 2013.
Malaysian rhetoric around the Israel-Palestine conflict accelerated in the late 2010s, when Malay political parties began to lose popularity. Barisan Nasional, the coalition that had for decades dominated the country’s politics, lost Malaysia’s general election in 2018.
As part of the new ruling coalition, Ibrahim has also struggled to garner support from Malay Muslims. According to a 2023 poll by Malaysian thinktank Ilham Centre, he had only a 24% approval rating among ethnic Malays. So the authorities have sought to bolster support from this group through increasingly hardline forms of performative religion.
This is often realised through a construction of Hamas as Islamic freedom fighters. Such beliefs are also supplemented by strong anti-Israel and antisemitic sentiment, including politicians attempting to discredit each other with accusations of being a “Jewish agent”.
Questioning Hamas links
The Malaysian authorities affirmed their commitment to Hamas in 2019 by hosting a succession of high-ranking delegations from the group. This came at a time when Hamas’s popularity and rule within Gaza had diminished, and when its international standing was made more precarious by Israel’s growing international relations as part of the Abraham accords, which normalised relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain.
But once the full details of the atrocities committed on October 7 were uncovered, Malaysian citizens, civil society groups and opposition political forces all expressed discomfort with the government’s position.
Malaysian news reports openly suggest that Ibrahim’s stance is designed to “shore up his Islamist credentials”, rather than show concern for the Palestinian people. And shortly after October 7, there were calls to revoke the visas of Hamas officials.
Opposition politicians challenged Ibrahim’s claims of “threats” and “intimidation” by the US, after it summoned the Malaysian ambassador in Washington to express concerns around the country’s engagement with the terrorist group. And the government was forced to backtrack after photos emerged of schoolchildren being handed toy guns and balaclavas during a “Solidarity with Palestine” week. Seventeen civil society organisations released a joint statement raising concern over the long-term damage of such an event.
Worries were also expressed over the possibility of sanctions being imposed on Malaysia by the west, related to funding provided to Hamas through pro-Palestinian Malaysian organisations. Ten days after October 7, Malaysia’s anti-corruption agency suspended the Malaysian charity group Aman Palestin Berhad and froze its bank accounts in a reflection of these fears.
The questioning and outright rejection of Hamas links by Malaysian society after October 7 should be understood as part of a trend towards dismissing the divisive ideology of religious nationalism and pushing for a more inclusive Malaysia.
My book, Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Malaysia (2019), pointed to an increased awareness among the Malaysian public of the role such rhetoric plays as part of a racially and religiously divisive agenda. In particular, there is strong dissatisfaction from the growing population of secular-leaning and middle-class urban Malays, as well as ethnic minorities.
This has been building for some time. It was evident in the dissatisfaction expressed by Malaysian citizens online when the country was banned from hosting the 2019 Paralympics after refusing to grant visas to Israeli athletes.
Similar dissatisfaction is evident on Malaysian social media pages, such as those of the left-leaning news portal Malaysiakini and the Malay Mail, Malaysia’s oldest daily newspaper. Many commentators point out the hypocrisy of Malaysia’s support for Palestine in light of the poor treatment of minorities at home.
There is also growing interest in Malaysia’s small historical Jewish community and its cemetery on the island of Penang. This is more evidence of Malaysians seeking an alternative narrative of history to that promoted by the state.
The Israel-Palestine situation is complex, dangerous and tragic. Over 45,000 people have been killed since the October 7 attack, 97 Israeli hostages are still missing, and the devastation in Gaza is estimated at over US$18 billion (£14.3 billion).
The Malaysian context shows how the various international positions and responses to the conflict are often completely disconnected from the needs and experiences of the Palestinian and Israeli people.
Mary Jane Ainslie has previously received funding from the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is a research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism & Policy (ISGAP).