The United States needs more disagreement on national security policy

In this time of deep partisan divisions, it is tempting to celebrate rare areas of bipartisan consensus. U.S. policy on countering China is the most significant example.

But policies born of too much agreement, and too little dissent, bring their own risks. These moments of overwhelming unanimity can escalate conflict, prompt foreign governments to undercut U.S. national security, and result in unlawful targeting of domestic groups seen as linked to foreign adversaries. U.S. officials setting China policy must be careful to avoid this path.

Our constitutional system assumes some amount of friction in policymaking. Usually, disagreements between Congress and the president, between members of opposing political parties, between government departments with different mandates, and among constituencies within government agencies naturally produce friction. But when everyone agrees, these structural and political checks break down, resulting in what we call “frictionless government.”

Frictionless government is especially likely to arise when the United States is attacked or otherwise finds itself confronting external adversaries. The perception of an external threat quiets internal divisions, per the adage that politics stops at the water’s edge.

The conditions that lead to frictionless government can also make executive officials — both individually and in groups — more susceptible to cognitive biases that result in worse decisions. The lack of friction can make officials more likely to overestimate a policy’s chance of success. And it can foster groupthink, making officials less likely to challenge flawed assumptions about U.S. adversaries’ intent.

Historical examples show how policy can go off the rails without friction. Consider the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the conduct of the Vietnam War and the use of extraordinary renditions and torture after the Sept. 11 attacks. All were based on or supported by statutes that Congress passed with wide, bipartisan margins and White House support. And yet, they are now considered among the most serious foreign policy mistakes of the past century.

U.S. policy on China is displaying worrisome elements of frictionlessness, especially with respect to the so-called tech Cold War. The need to be “tough” on China was a rare point of continuity between the first Trump administration and the Biden administration and seems set to continue into the second Trump presidency, given the appointments of “China hawks” to senior roles, including Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) as secretary of State and Rep. Michael Waltz (R-Fla.) as national security advisor. On issues from semiconductor export controls to investment screening to Chinese-owned apps, Congress isn’t restraining the executive branch but instead is pushing it to do more and faster.

To be sure, China poses serious security risks for the United States. China has hacked U.S. critical infrastructure, collected vast troves of information on U.S. persons, and undertaken aggressive operations near U.S. military assets. The federal government is trying both to avoid a hot war with China and to ensure victory if war does break out, perhaps over Taiwan.

But the rush to counter China must be done in ways that don’t inadvertently provoke the very outcomes the United States hopes to avoid or sacrifice constitutional rights in the name of security.

The United States has a better chance of striking the right balance if there is some friction in the policymaking process. Friction generally produces better decisions, and Congress and the executive can and should deliberately create friction when necessary.

For example, executive agencies can appoint “devil’s advocates” or designate “red teams” to challenge assumptions and pressure-test possible policies to understand how they might backfire or otherwise go awry. Officials can also foster dissent through mechanisms like the State Department’s long-standing Dissent Channel, which allows employees to communicate contrary views to leadership without fear of retaliation.

Another way to add useful friction is to require decision-makers to explain their choices. Reason-giving requirements test an official’s commitment to a policy, her rationales and her willingness to be held accountable for her choices. Or Congress could build in policy off-ramps — like sunset clauses — that require it to periodically revisit its decisions after high-pressure situations have calmed.

Friction can also come from sources outside the government, including companies, state and local governments, and even foreign allies. Companies regulated by or effectively deputized to enforce particular policies may throw sand in the gears by suing to challenge the legality of government programs. State and local governments and companies from whom the U.S. government needs assistance to implement policies can challenge the federal government by slow-walking implementation, and foreign allies can push back on U.S. government requests to implement parallel policies on things like investment screening, export controls and sanctions.

This kind of friction would not be an insurmountable roadblock to national security decisions. Instead, it should serve as a series of speed bumps to ensure that the United States achieves the goals that its national security policymakers seek.

Ashley Deeks is the Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and the director of its National Security Law Center. Kristen E. Eichensehr is the David H. Ibbeken ’71 Research Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and the Samuel Williston Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School (2024–2025).