One factor may be stopping ISIS and al Qaeda from uniting — and the US should encourage it

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Ask any person off the street about what the difference between al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (ISIS) is, and chances are they’ll be hard-pressed to find an answer.

Pose the same question to an AQ or ISIS militant, and you’ll most likely receive a plethora of ideological distinctions that can drive a wedge between the two extremist groups.

Earlier this month, AQ's Ayman al-Zawahiri even accused ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his followers as "officers ... of Saddam" and that anyone who "pledges allegiance to Baghdadi must know that he's a partner in all his crimes".

According to former CIA counterterrorism analyst Aki Peritz, this animosity between the two terrorist networks can be exacerbated by a major overlooked factor.

“There have been numerous rationales advanced over the years … but it probably just boils down to this: everyone’s ego,” writes Peritz in a commentary from The Cipher Brief. “No one really wants to play second fiddle to the other because all parties believe they are personally leading the worldwide jihad.”

Peritz explains how the division, between what appears to be ideologically symmetrical groups, can be traced even before the attacks on 9/11.

“In 2000, the man who would come to lead ISIS’ predecessor groups, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, visited Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. At the time, Bin Laden asked Zarqawi to pledge [allegiance]. Always the impetuous hothead, Zarqawi … refused to do so.”

At first glance, it would make sense for these organizations to unite under the same banner, let alone a common cause. But ISIS’ leadership have attempted to do what AQ would not have even dared to imagine.

“It takes a special kind of moxie to unilaterally declare a ‘caliphate’ and one’s chief to be the leader of the world’s Muslims,” explains Peritz. “Al Qaeda certainly never had the nerve to do so. Yet Zarqawi’s group has done it—twice.”

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It remains to be seen whether or not this lack of unity will be the downfall of one or both organizations. Even now, AQ has been on the back burner in media attention compared to their counterparts — whether it’s because of the recent successes of ISIS’ campaigns or the fact that many other terrorist groups, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram, have switched their loyalty from AQ to ISIS.

But according to Bennett Seftel of The Cipher Brief, the gradual failure of AQ and the rivalry between the organizations can be explained simply.

“The ... rivalry can be likened to a competition between the old school and the new,” explains Seftel. “ISIS has used its robust social media campaign and technological advances, along with its lust for blood, to attract a significant number of followers, while, al Qaeda is considered by many to be a relic of the past, still transmitting announcements via VHS videos and audio recordings.”

Although Peritz contends that these differences may be a nuanced one that’s reserved for the upper echelons of the radical Islamist’s leadership, it could still be a factor that the US can use to their advantage.

“The US should keep making sure the terrorist groups remain divided, and murderously suspicious of each other,” claims Peritz. “Causing … internal discord among 'the brothers' is a great way to keep these groups paranoid and distrustful.”

ISIS, which in its past incarnations was a part of the AQ umbrella organization, was ultimately kicked out of the group in February 2014. It was the first time that AQ formally cancelled ties with a subordinate terror group. 

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