Diplomatic setback

THERE are at least five aspects of the stance adopted by the international community in the recent India-Pakistan conflict and its aftermath which represented a diplomatic setback for New Delhi.

One, New Delhi found no takers, except perhaps Israel, for launching military action against Pakistan as a response to the Pahalgam terrorist incident. Two, it elicited international disapproval rather than support for its decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty.

Three, re-hyphenation of the two countries that India long opposed, was evidenced most significantly in President Donald Trump’s statements, as also by others. Four, Trump made repeated claims, to India’s ire, that he secured a ceasefire to end the crisis and also offered to mediate on Kashmir. And five, international focus shifted quickly from terrorism to the danger of the crisis morphing into a nuclear flashpoint.

The diplomatic setback faced by India was widely commented upon in the country’s media. A columnist wrote in The Wire about “India’s disastrous isolation in the world”. According to The Wire’s own analysis, “Modi’s domestic rhetoric masked a reality of India’s diminished diplomatic influence and strategic setbacks”. “All indicators,” it wrote, “suggest that the Modi government’s foreign policy failed to convert India’s military gains into sustained diplomatic advantage over Pakistan.”

Brahma Chellaney told India Today that New Delhi lost the narrative, adding, “India’s sluggish response time [in setting the global narrative] had cost it diplomatic capital”. Several papers saw India’s diplomacy failing to convince the world about its case against Pakistan. Others spoke about “diplomatic distancing by neighbours” with India “isolated in the region”. Pakistan’s appointment to key UN counterterrorism committees was also seen as leaving “many red faces in New Delhi”, according to The Hindu and other newspapers.

India’s hubristic assumption that its influence in the world would automatically translate into diplomatic advantage irrespective of how recklessly it behaved by initiating a military conflict turned out to be a strategic miscalculation. A stunning own goal was the false information and fake news it spread and its unfounded claims that seriously dented its international credibility — as indeed its credibility at home.

The Modi government’s efforts to control the narrative by relying on untruths and flights from reality only made matters worse. Constant denials that the US had helped end the conflict further damaged its credibility. What must have been particularly annoying for New Delhi was to hear Trump’s repeated praise for Pakistan’s leadership and declaring he had good relations with both countries.

That the Modi government had to dispatch seven multiparty delegations to scores of countries to make India’s case was acknowledgment that things had not gone India’s way at the international level. Even Western media coverage, usually sympathetic to India, was sceptical about India’s assertions and critical of its actions. The Washington Post reported on how officially orchestrated “falsehoods filled the airwaves” and “misinformation overtook Indian newsrooms” during the conflict. For their part, several Indian media outlets complained of Western media bias against their country.

Pakistan’s restraint and a series of Indian missteps gave Islamabad a decided diplomatic advantage.

In fact, New Delhi seemed to have set itself unrealistic foreign policy goals and made miscalculations that entailed significant diplomatic costs. Its expectation of unconditional loyalty from its friends and allies, especially the US, was unrealistic if not naïve, and that too from an administration committed to a transactional policy that prioritised America’s interests over all else.

In what was seen as a reprimand to the European Union, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said India “wanted partners not preachers” in response to the EU’s call for restraint during the crisis. Instead of eliciting Europe’s support, he arrogantly advised it to adjust to new geostrategic realities.

He also rebuked the British foreign secretary for equating India and Pakistan. New Delhi’s disingenuous response to Trump taking credit for the ceasefire further undermined its position. India’s effort to block the IMF executive board’s approval of funding for Pakistan was a failure foretold and only made New Delhi look foolish.

By its own acts of commission and omission, the Modi government found itself on the diplomatic backfoot. It misassessed the reality that there is no international appetite for a military confrontation between two nuclear neighbours that could lead to uncontrolled escalation.

Borrowing from the Israeli playbook and applying it to South Asia would not work in a nuclearised environment

And also, borrowing from the Israeli playbook and applying it to South Asia would not work in a nuclearised environment. The diplomatic outreach undertaken by its delegations fared no better. They failed to shift the needle and their clumsy approach, riddled with contradictions, did little to change international perceptions. For that reason, their conduct attracted criticism and even ridicule at home.

A combination of Pakistan’s responsible exercise of restraint and a series of Indian missteps — and the contrast between the two — handed Islamabad a decided diplomatic advantage.

This represented quite a role reversal, as often in the past India had dominated the narrative on the international stage, reinforced, of course, by its strategic and economic importance, with Pakistan placed on the defensive. Not so this time. India’s military overreach and strategic miscalculations left it struggling to achieve its foreign policy aims. Pakistan’s measured but effective military riposte to Indian aggression and its nimble diplomatic moves enabled the country to secure an advantage over India.

That, however, is no reason to be complacent or assume Islamabad can maintain the diplomatic upper hand. Translating a transient advantage into a longer-term gain will require careful planning and an imaginative strategy. Its starting point — and I have argued this before — must be a wide-ranging review of foreign policy.

If new diplomatic opportunities have arisen from the crisis with India, these can only be seized by a well-thought-out strategy crafted after a comprehensive evaluation of the international landscape. Such a review is in any case long overdue given changing global power dynamics and geopolitical shifts.

Pakistan needs to capitalise on this moment of opportunity by resetting its foreign policy goals and evolving a strategy to match a changed international scenario — where India will pose imposing challenges on multiple fronts, but also one in which Pakistan-China strategic relations have been further fortified. It should strive to do that before the diplomatic gains reaped from its adversary’s mistakes begin to fade.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, June 16th, 2025