Sri Lanka’s Political Elite Fails To Gatekeep Change – Analysis

By Roshni Kapur

The victory of Anura Kumara Dissanayake in Sri Lanka’s 21 September 2024 presidential elections signals more than a domestic shift towards anti-incumbency and popular discontent with mainstream politics. It also reflects a global trend where non-elite actors are disrupting established institutions by assuming power and promising to bring deep structural change. In Sri Lanka’s case, traditional political gatekeepers were unable to prevent the National People’s Power (NPP) party’s rise to power. 

Dissanayake’s victory marks a fundamental shift in Sri Lankan politics. In an unprecedented move, neither of the two main parties — the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, or their alliances or political offshoots — managed to regain power. Previously on the fringes of mainstream politics, the NPP has promised to change the political culture by ending patronage, corruption, authoritarianism, public sector waste and poor decision-making.

Dissanayake is the leader of both the NPP and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a former insurgent group that attempted to capture state power through rebellion in the 1970s and 1980s. The JVP transformed into a mainstream political party under new leadership in the 1990s and its decision to establish the NPP in 2019 represents a strategic rebranding to distance itself from its turbulent past. As head of the party, Dissanayake exemplifies this new generation of reformist young leaders committed to democratic processes, with his assumption of power marking the start of a new political culture that promises to be inclusive, representative and democratic.

The NPP’s electoral transformation is noteworthy. After securing little more than three per cent of votes in the 2019 presidential elections, Dissanayake won the competitive contest of the 2024 elections. This turnaround stems from several factors. Although democratic backsliding has been taking place for years in Sri Lanka, the militarisation and further centralisation of power during COVID-19 has greatly eroded civil liberties and democratic freedoms, leading to further deterioration of social, political and economic crises.

The Aragalaya protest movement in 2022 triggered a fundamental shift, managing to compel former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa to step down. But it lacked the political power to bring institutionalised change and enabled Rajapaksa’s successor, Ranil Wickremesinghe, to use repressive measures and revive the old order. Yet the movement’s momentum continued, enabling the NPP to advance demands for political change through democratic processes. Repeated postponements of local government polls gave the NPP time to strengthen its presidential campaign and ascend as a formidable electoral contender. 

The NPP’s strong anti-corruption campaign also allowed the party to effectively position itself as the champion of a principled political order. Leveraging strong anti-incumbency sentiment and public mistrust of the dominant elite and state institutions that are seen as corrupt, self-serving and deeply politicised, the NPP promised to transform state institutions and reverse decades of institutional decay. 

The rise of a political contender from a non-traditional party is not unique to Sri Lanka but part of a wider pattern occurring in many democratic states which has seen power shifting from mainstream actors to newcomers outside of elite politics. These newcomers challenge the legitimacy of traditional elites by accusing them of corruption, nepotism and patronage, convincing their support base that the current order lacks democratic and inclusive values. 

Political elites usually employ two strategies to prevent a loss of power and relevance. They might attempt to harness the newcomer’s potential and outmanoeuvre political rivals through co-option, though this type of devil’s bargain usually benefits the outsider by providing them with sufficient support to become legitimate actors in a bid to govern. 

Alternatively, political elites gatekeep by spreading false or exaggerated narratives to marginalise a political outsider, including by forging alliances with rivals to prevent the novice from entering mainstream politics. This tactic was used in Sri Lanka — false narratives were spread that the NPP had instigated violence during the Aragalaya and that it intends to monopolise all sectors. But these propaganda tools were unsuccessful in socially and politically marginalising the NPP. 

The JVP’s transformation from an insurgent group into a political party and the subsequent formation of the NPP not only showcases its resilience to survive as a social entity but also its ability to adapt to changing domestic and global shifts. The NPP understands that it needs to go beyond its core voter base to gain broader support, including by adopting a more inclusive approach to overcome decades of deep mistrust within minority groups. Despite the inter-ethnic and inter-religious solidarity during the 2022 protest movement, the country continues to be divided along ethnic and linguistic lines. 

Dissanayake’s government is currently enjoying a honeymoon period that could bring a marginal victory at the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for 14 November 2024. But there are doubts on whether the NPP can secure a two-thirds parliamentary majority and more broadly, whether the government will continue the path of constitutional and political reforms or lose momentum as elite actors seek to delegitimise it. These actors will likely stress the NPP’s lack of political experience and the JVP’s violent past as the party attempts to lead the country to full economic recovery, navigate great power relations and strengthen engagement with minority groups. 

• About the author: Roshni Kapur is a PhD student at the University of Ghent specialising in caste and land conflicts.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum