The Case For Deepening India-Comoros Relations – Analysis

By Samir Bhattacharya and Shrestha Medhi

Situated at the northern tip of the Mozambique Channel, the small archipelago of the Union of the Comoros has emerged as an unexpected strategic void in India’s Indian Ocean strategy. Despite India’s robust engagement framework under SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and its recent evolution into MAHASAGAR, New Delhi’s diplomatic footprint in Comoros remains modest.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs, in its August 2025 report on India’s Indian Ocean Strategy, explicitly identified Comoros as one of the only three littoral states where India lacks substantive diplomatic relationships among all 35 Indian Ocean coastal nations. This gap represents both a strategic vulnerability and an untapped opportunity that warrants immediate attention.

The rationale for prioritising Comoros is anchored on two mutually reinforcing dimensions: geoeconomic considerations and geopolitical imperatives. Economically, Comoros offers access to substantial maritime resources through its 160,000 square kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a marine territory approximately 100 times larger than its land area.

Geopolitically, Chinese infrastructure investments have positioned Beijing to potentially replicate its Djibouti model in the southwestern Indian Ocean, creating strategic implications that directly affect Indian interests in the Mozambique Channel, a waterway that carries approximately 30 percent of global tanker traffic.

The Geoeconomic Dimension

The Union of Comoros consists of a tri-island archipelago comprising Grande Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli. Its long-standing sovereignty dispute with France concerns Mayotte (Maore) and the Glorioso Islands, territories that remain under French administration despite Comorian claims. Economically, the Comoros ranks among Africa’s least developed countries, with an estimated per capita GDP of roughly US$700.

Meanwhile, Comoros’ EEZ straddles some of the world’s most productive tuna fishing grounds at the mouth of the Mozambique Channel. The fisheries sector contributes approximately 24 percent of agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) and 7.5 percent to the overall economy, with roughly 140,000 Comorians, 16 percent of the population, depending on fishing for their livelihoods. Currently, European and Asian distant-water fishing nations dominate access to these resources through licensing arrangements, with the European Union historically securing access for 40 freezer tuna seiners and 25 surface longliners under periodic protocols. India, despite being the second-largest export destination for Comorian products in 2021, has not leveraged this commercial relationship to secure comparable fisheries access agreements.

Beyond fisheries, Comoros’ offshore hydrocarbon potential remains largely unexplored, but it is geologically promising. The Comorian basin shares sedimentary characteristics with Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin, where approximately 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas have been discovered, among the largest gas finds globally in recent decades. Independent assessments estimate that the Comoros offshore blocks contain prospective resources of approximately 7.1 billion barrels of oil and 49 trillion cubic feet of non-associated gas. Therefore, the potential for future resource development presents strategic partnership opportunities that India may like to pursue.

As global competition for critical minerals intensifies, particularly rare earth elements, cobalt, manganese, and nickel, which are essential for renewable energy technologies, small island states with extensive EEZs are acquiring new strategic value. China has already marked its substantial presence in exploring deep-sea mineral deposits in the Indian Ocean. India’s engagement with Comoros on marine resource governance, scientific surveys, and sustainable blue economy development would position New Delhi favourably, while also helping it counter China’s influence in the region.

The Geopolitical Dimension: Chinese Infrastructure and Strategic Competition

China’s infrastructure investments in Comoros follow a pattern strikingly similar to its engagement in Djibouti, where innocuous commercial development steadily metamorphosed into Beijing’s first overseas military facility. Since 2015, Chinese state-owned enterprises have constructed the Port of Mohéli (at US$149 million, completed in 2017), signed contracts for the redevelopment of the Port of Moroni (US$165 million), and planned a greenfield deepwater port at Sereheni capable of accommodating 30,000-tonne vessels. Additionally, China has financed road construction across all three islands, installed undersea fibre optic networks connecting Comoros to East Africa, rehabilitated Moroni’s international airport, and undertaken multiple housing projects.

The elevation of Sino-Comorian relations to a “strategic partnership” in September 2024 formalised this deepening engagement. China maintains a resident Ambassador with a permanent diplomatic mission in Comoros, a commitment India has not matched, operating instead through its Embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar. This diplomatic asymmetry enables Beijing to cultivate relationships at multiple levels while India remains a distant partner.

The strategic implications are also substantial. Comoros’ proximity to Diego Garcia, the US-UK military facility central to Western power projection in the Indian Ocean, adds another dimension to its geopolitical significance. The question of whether this proximity enhances Comoros’ leverage or vulnerability in great power competition yields an ambiguous answer.

China’s expanding footprint in Comoros risks recalibrating the islands’ strategic orientation in ways detrimental to India’s maritime security. The dual-use potential of upgraded ports at Moroni, Mutsamudu, and Fomboni could, over time, enable PLA Navy access and surveillance capabilities in waters critical to global shipping. Djibouti’s evolution from a ‘logistics hub’ to a full-scale Chinese military base demonstrates an example of how an ostensibly commercial project can assume strategic functions. If left unaddressed, Comoros could emerge as the next node in this pattern, with adverse implications for India’s strategic interests.

The Case for Indian Engagement

India possesses established frameworks and credible partnership offerings that could meaningfully engage Comoros. The 2019 Vice Presidential visit, the highest-ranking Indian dignitary to visit the island, resulted in six Memoranda of Understanding(MoU) covering defence cooperation, health and medicine, tele-education, and tele-medicine. Comoros conferred its highest civilian honour, the Order of the Green Crescent, upon Vice President Venkaiah Naidu, signalling genuine receptivity to enhanced relations. Comoros supports India’s candidature for permanent UN Security Council membership and has joined both the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the International Solar Alliance.

Building upon these foundations, India may consider pursuing several concrete initiatives. First, establishing a resident diplomatic mission in Moroni would signal a sustained commitment and enable continuous engagement at multiple levels of government. Second, negotiating fisheries access agreements that combine licensing fees with capacity-building for Comorian artisanal fishing communities would deliver immediate economic benefits while strengthening bilateral ties. Third, extending India’s maritime capacity-building programme, including coastal surveillance equipment, patrol vessels, and training for coast guard personnel, would enhance Comoros’ ability to monitor its vast EEZ while creating operational linkages with Indian naval forces. Fourth, participating in multilateral port development financing through institutions like the African Development Bank would provide alternatives to exclusive Chinese dependence on infrastructure.

The Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram already facilitates maritime information sharing among regional partners; integrating Comoros into this network would enhance collective maritime domain awareness while demonstrating India’s value as a security partner. Similarly, initiatives like MAITRI (Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific), announced under the Quad framework in 2024, could extend to the Comoros, enabling the archipelago to monitor and secure its waters, enforce its laws, and deter unlawful behaviour.

Conclusion

The rationale for advancing India–Comoros relations is increasingly compelling. Comoros provides access to significant fisheries resources, prospective hydrocarbon deposits, and an expansive EEZ whose relevance is set to grow amid intensifying competition over marine resources. Further, expanding Chinese infrastructure investments risks establishing a durable strategic presence in waters central to Indian Ocean shipping routes, thereby generating vulnerabilities for India. The Standing Committee on External Affairs’ recommendation to develop comprehensive engagement frameworks for all Indian Ocean littoral states, which highlights existing gaps in countries such as the Comoros, adds institutional momentum. Ultimately, India’s engagement with Comoros is no longer a strategic option but a strategic necessity.

About the authors:

• Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Shrestha Medhi is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation.