Sham Election By The Myanmar Military Junta – Analysis
1. Introduction
Rejecting the results of the 2020 General Election over allegations of electoral fraud, the Myanmar military, also known as Tatmadaw, seized power on February 1, 2021. One day after the military coup, the State Administration Council (SAC) was created under the leadership of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. They claimed that, after implementing measures under the state of emergency, they would hold a free and fair general election per the 2008 Constitution and transfer power to the winning party.
After the coup, the junta filed numerous charges and handed down long-term prison sentences to several people who opposed them, including Union, State, and Regional government officials, civilian political leaders, and responsible personnel from various levels of the Election Commission. Although some were later released under amnesty, most remain in long-term imprisonment. Over nearly five years since the military coup, the junta has declared amnesty 18 times, releasing 112,926 prisoners. Of these, 15,444 were political prisoners, accounting for just 13.7% of all releases.
Despite nationwide resistance against the military junta during the coup period, they repeatedly promised to hold a new election. Only after extending the state of emergency six times did they announce that an election would take place in 2025. To limit the participation of political parties with strong public support, the junta introduced a new law, the “Political Parties Registration Law” on January 26, 2023. This law was subsequently amended multiple times.
The junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) announced that the first phase of the election would be held in 102 townships on December 28, 2025. They further stated on October 28 that the second phase would take place in 100 townships on January 11, 2026. According to Major General Zaw Min Tun, the junta’s spokesperson of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), the third phase is scheduled for January 25, 2026.
According to Article 421 of the 2008 Constitution on the state of emergency, it can normally be extended twice, each time for six months. However, citing various reasons, the junta extended it up to seven times. After the NDSC meeting on July 31, 2025, the SAC was abolished and replaced by the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC). In that commission, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing took on joint responsibility as Acting President and Chair of the Commission. Some army generals were reclassified as civilians and appointed to lead the government.
From the perspective of the public and the international community, the junta’s 2025 election appears to be an attempt to avoid accountability for the inhumane actions taken during the coup. According to the Institute for Strategy and Policy- Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), there have been at least 92 incidents of massacres, each killing at least 10 people, over the past four years. Overall, at least 1,800 civilians have been killed. Of these cases, 88 were carried out by the SSPC, and more than half reportedly involved aerial attacks.
Therefore, due to the lack of security in the areas where the election is scheduled to take place and the low public trust caused by the ongoing military and political crisis, the following points show that the junta’s 2025 election is merely a sham.
2. Political prisoners after the 2020 election
In the 2020 election, voting occurred in 1,117 constituencies, covering 95.38% of the total 1,171. A total of 5,379 candidates from 91 political parties and 260 independents ran. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won 82.36% of the constituencies, electing 920 MPs. However, the military did not accept the election results, citing claims of election fraud. They then took control, detaining several party leaders and members. The junta also confiscated their property and handed down long-term prison sentences.
According to the Human Rights Documentation Team of the NLD (HRDT-NLD), the junta has unlawfully detained 19,167 political prisoners. Among them are 260 minors, 2,565 women, 140 NLD members of parliament, and 2,836 party members. The military junta has unlawfully seized the property of 459 party members, including 199 MPs elected in the 2020 election. They have also sealed the homes of 386 civilians, including government workers involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the military coup.
Since the coup on February 1, 2021, the State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained by the military regime. She has been sentenced to 33 years in prison on 19 charges. Likewise, President U Win Myint received a 12-year prison sentence on 8 charges.
From the coup on February 1, 2021, to November 27, 2025, 7,499 people, including democracy activists, have lost their lives due to the military junta and their associates. In connection with the coup, 30,039 people have been arrested, with 22,702 still in detention. Among those detained, 11,424 have been sentenced to imprisonment. According to confirmed sources, 86 people were arrested under the junta’s election law, and the identities of 54 of them are still being verified, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP-Burma).
3. The adoption of a new law on the registration of political parties
In Myanmar’s political scene, after the adoption of the 2008 Constitution, the Political Parties Registration Law was enacted on March 8, 2010. This law imposed strict restrictions on political parties. Notably, it created major hurdles for parties like the NLD, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Before the 2012 by-election, the Law Amending the Political Parties Registration Law was passed on November 4, 2011, to enable parties like the NLD to participate. The amended law changed three provisions in the original registration law. First, it removed the rule stating that “party members must not be prisoners.” Second, it revised the requirement that “a political party must contest at least three seats in elections,” clarifying that this rule does not apply to parties formed after an election. Third, it changed the wording “must preserve and protect the constitution” to “must respect and follow the constitution.” Thanks to these amendments, the NLD took part in the 2012 by-election and won 43 out of 44 parliamentary seats, allowing the party to enter parliament.
On January 26, 2023, the junta revoked the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law and introduced a new one. According to this law, political parties registering at the union level must gather at least 100,000 members within 90 days of approval. They must also establish party offices in half of the country’s 330 townships within 180 days. Parties registering at the state or regional level must recruit at least 1,000 members within 90 days and open at least five party offices in their respective state or region. Union-level parties are required to deposit 1,000 lakh MMK at the state-owned Myanma Economic Bank, while state or regional parties must deposit 100 lakh MMK.
After the new law was passed, some parties chose not to re-register, while others were automatically canceled. According to Article (25), any political party that fails to register within 60 days of the law’s enactment must be canceled. This acts as a legal restriction on the NLD, which had already been dissolved since the coup. Political observers also see this as shaping the election landscape without the NLD’s participation. It can be viewed as an effort by the military junta to prevent a repeat of the situation under former President U Thein Sein, when the NLD was allowed to participate in the by-election.
In this way, the UEC eliminated many parties by claiming they failed to re-register or did not meet the required criteria. On March 28, 2023, they announced the removal of 40 parties, including the NLD. As a result, the junta’s Political Parties Registration Law has greatly limited parties’ ability to participate in future elections and has affected their existence. They amended it on January 30, 2024, again on July 28, 2025, and once more on September 21, 2025, totaling three amendments. However, none of these changes supported national reconciliation. Instead, they only created more difficulties for political parties.
The first amendment required that if a party’s registration is canceled, all party property must be transferred to the state. The second amendment stated that if the UEC finds a party guilty of electoral fraud or unlawful conduct, that party must be dissolved. These changes shape the future political landscape by preventing the NLD from participating in upcoming elections. Additionally, one day before candidate lists must be submitted, parties contesting nationwide in the 2025 Election are now required to compete in only one-quarter of all constituencies, instead of the previous requirement to contest in more than half, according to the amendment issued on September 25, 2025. Considering all this, these amendments only slightly relaxed the strict rules, mainly to avoid the impression that only the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is allowed to participate in the election.
After the junta passed the Political Parties Registration Law, the NLD’s decision not to re-register became a widely discussed issue among the public. However, some special cases had already occurred before the law was introduced. For example, the Union Betterment Party, led by ex-General Thura U Shwe Man, dissolved itself before the law took effect, helping them avoid the political crisis caused by the new law. Among the parties that chose not to re-register, some refused to acknowledge the military junta, others opposed the law itself, and a few dissolved to merge or cooperate with other parties to create new ones.
Overall, the strategic goal behind implementing the Political Parties Registration Law is to ensure the continued survival of the USDP in future elections. By restricting major parties with broad public support, such as the NLD and key ethnic parties, the junta’s law prevents the emergence of strong political rivals and allows only weaker parties to persist.
4. Union Election Commission (UEC)
A day after the coup, on February 2, 2021, the military junta established a new Union Election Commission and appointed Ex-General Thein Soe as its chair. He had a questionable reputation because of alleged fraud in the 2010 Election. He also played a key role in the systematic setup of the former State Peace and Development Council for the army-backed USDP's landslide win. During the previous military regime, he served as Military Judge Advocate-General and Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He is also a graduate of the Defence Service Academy (Intake-16). In a meeting with political parties on May 21, 2021, he expressed their intentions, telling reporters they needed to revoke the NLD's registration for its “unlawful plans” and to take legal action against those involved, calling them traitors.
On June 21, 2021, the junta’s UEC announced that the 2020 Election did not comply with the Election Law and by-laws, based on their investigations, and the election was neither free nor fair. On July 26, citing previous reasons, they annulled the results of the 2020 Election.
In response, the NLD claimed that the announcement to cancel the election results insulted the public. According to U Aung Kyi Nyunt, the Chair of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) formed based on the 2020 election results, the junta’s UEC action was questionable as international organizations, observers, and voters already provided evidence of the landslide victory.
Also, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which won 42 seats in various parliaments during the 2020 election, stated on July 28 that the UEC’s cancellation of the election results went beyond what the 2008 Constitution allows. They argued that the decision was unfair, strayed from democratic standards, and was therefore unacceptable. Although there may have been errors in the voter lists or illegal activities during the 2020 election, the SNLD maintained that the overall results still reflected the true will of the majority of the people. Even if electoral disputes or irregularities occurred, they should have been resolved in court, following the law. However, the junta’s UEC did not provide candidates with the chance to make legal statements or appeals and simply canceled the entire results. For these reasons, the SNLD described this as an act of bullying against candidates who ran honestly and against the voters.
This raised the question of whether the UEC has the authority to cancel an election result. According to Article 399 of the 2008 Constitution, the UEC’s responsibilities include conducting and supervising elections, forming and overseeing sub-commissions, managing constituencies, updating voter lists, postponing elections in areas where voting cannot take place, instructing political parties, and forming election tribunals to address electoral disputes. The article does not mention any authority to investigate and annul an entire election result or to hold a new election. Similarly, Article 10 of the Union Election Commission Law, which outlines the UEC’s rights and responsibilities, does not grant the commission the power to investigate the national results, cancel them in full, or organize a new election.
According to Article 5 of the Law on Various Parliaments, only rival candidates from the same constituency or voters from that area can file a complaint against an elected MP. Organizations such as political parties or the military are not allowed to submit such objections. Under Article 5, these complaints must be reviewed by a tribunal court. Only if it is proven that an elected MP achieved victory through illegal actions, the UEC will annul that MP’s election victory.
According to the above provisions, the UEC may only form a tribunal when a complaint is filed in a specific constituency and may cancel the winning status of MPs on an individual basis. Therefore, their annulment of the entire election result clearly violates the Constitution, the Union Election Law, and the relevant parliamentary election laws.
At a press conference held by the junta’s Information Team on August 17, 2022, U Khin Maung Oo, a member of the UEC, stated that they are preparing to take legal action against 505 individuals involved in alleged violations of election procedures, electoral fraud, and unlawful acts in the 2020 election. The list includes the former President, former State Counsellor, former UEC Chair and members, Minister U Min Thu, former Chair of Naypyitaw Territory, former Chief Ministers of states and regions, election candidates, winning party teams, and members of sub-commissions. He also claimed that legal action is being prepared against 2,449 chairs and members of former commissions at various levels who failed to systematically oversee the election process.
Once again, on August 11, the UEC issued an instruction to political parties stating that they must notify the UEC in advance and obtain permission before meeting with any foreign organization or individual. The instruction warned that failing to do so could result in the party being dissolved. This indicates that even meetings with international media organizations based abroad could threaten the political parties' existence.
UEC Chairman Major General Thein Soe was replaced by former Lieutenant General Ko Ko in January 2024. However, he was also dismissed after serving just one year. The military then appointed the current chair, former Major General Than Soe. He had already served as a member and vice-chair of the UEC during the military coup period. In the new UEC formed after the abolition of the SAC and the establishment of the SSPC, he became the Chair. Since then, he has been on the sanctions list of many Western countries, including the European Union. During the NLD government, he was appointed head of the military MPs’ group. He is known for his hardline stance. He was the only military MP on the team reviewing Presidential qualifications. He neither supported nor opposed the NLD’s nomination of U Htin Kyaw as a candidate for President. He commented that U Htin Kyaw was not an elected MP. He also submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal, requesting a review of Vice President Henry Van Thio, who had lived abroad for six years.
Overall, the primary role of the UEC is to oversee the right to vote and run for office in accordance with the Union Election Law and to supervise political parties. However, the military has imposed restrictions on the freedoms of all parties except for the USDP. The UEC has also gone far beyond its mandated responsibilities, seemingly to appease the military junta. After all, it is clear that instead of supervising, the UEC has issued various orders and suppressed political parties.
5. The electoral system
On July 29, 2025, the junta adopted the sixth amendment to the parliamentary election laws for the three parliaments: Pyithu Hluttaw, Amyotha Hluttaw, and State/Regional Hluttaw. With several amendments, these laws were designed to align with the electoral system across all levels of parliament. The latest amendment introduced additional eligibility requirements for candidates. A candidate must be at least 25 years old, born to two citizen parents, listed on the voter roll of the constituency where they plan to run, and must have completed basic high school education. They must also be free from any inappropriate debts to the state or private individuals, which was the basis for removing Daw Thet Thet Khine from the PPP candidate list. Only those who meet these criteria are eligible to run for office.
5.1 The constituencies
In the 2025 elections, the First Past the Post (FPTP) system will be used for 274 constituencies in the Pyithu Hluttaw. For the Amyotha Hluttaw, both FPTP and Proportional Representation (PR) systems will be applied across 101 constituencies, including six self-administered zones. For the State/Regional Hluttaw, FPTP will be used in 266 constituencies, while PR will be used in 42 constituencies, totaling 308. Additionally, for the State/Regional Hluttaw, FPTP will be used in 29 ethnic constituencies.
The Pyithu Hluttaw election will use only the FPTP system. For the other two bodies, a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system will be used, combining FPTP and PR. When forming the Amyotha Hluttaw, each state or region will elect 12 MPs: 6 through FPTP and 6 through PR. For the FPTP seats, each state or region will be divided into six constituencies, with one MP elected from each. For the six PR seats, the votes received by political parties in those FPTP constituencies will be counted and allocated based on proportional representation. In the self-administered regions and zones represented in the Amyotha Hluttaw, as well as in the ethnic constituencies represented in the State/Regional Hluttaw, only one MP will be elected per area; therefore, the FPTP system will apply.
Similarly, to form the State/Regional Hluttaw, each township will elect two MPs: one through FPTP and one through PR. For the FPTP seat, the entire township will serve as a single FPTP constituency. For the PR seat, several neighboring townships will be grouped into a PR constituency, and the votes received by political parties in each township will be combined and allocated proportionally.
5.2. Electronic Voting Machine (EVM)
In the 2025 election, the military introduced a voting system that had never been used before in the country’s history. They replaced the traditional ballot-paper stamping method with Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), which they claimed were developed by local experts.
Including EVMs, 34 countries worldwide extensively use electronic voting systems. These countries include Argentina, Brazil, France, the United States, India, Belgium, and Venezuela. Therefore, by observing EVM use in other countries, the system was reportedly designed to match Myanmar people’s literacy levels and comprehension skills.
The screen is connected to the ballot box and printer. When a voter presses the “Vote” button, a paper slip about two inches long displays the selected candidate’s number, name, and symbol for three seconds before automatically dropping into the ballot box below. The ballot box and printer are secured with a security cable and closed. Unlike a computer, the machine does not contain an operating system like Windows, nor does it have internet access or wireless features such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Therefore, it cannot be interfered with through online or wireless means. All components are connected directly with specialized cables. According to the junta’s media, voters can immediately view the paper slip on the screen to verify their choice.
During a coordination meeting on electoral procedures, the former Chair of the UEC, U Ko Ko, advised state and regional governments to assist with the secure transportation of EVMs between townships within the designated timeframe, as the election will be conducted in phases. This indicates that EVMs will not be assigned to each polling station individually but will instead be reused across multiple stations. It is reported that at least 50,000 EVMs will be deployed nationwide.
The junta’s propaganda newspapers also highlighted several weaknesses of e-voting. These include the need for non-experts to understand the system, potential risks of manipulation by insiders or external hackers, higher initial purchase and maintenance costs compared to previous methods, increased infrastructural and environmental requirements such as power supply and communication systems, the need for voter education, and the necessity to amend existing legal frameworks.
5.3. Voter list errors
The military used voter list errors as an excuse to annul the results of the 2020 Election. However, such errors appeared when they issued the first voter list for the planned 2025 Election. The UEC urged the public to review the lists through state-owned media and social media platforms. However, very few people did so during the two-week display period from September 30 to October 13. Some political parties also pointed out errors in the voter lists.
Through social media, U Hla Swe, known as Bullet Hla Swe, the Chair of the USDP for Naypyitaw Union Territory, criticized serious errors in the voter list within his constituency. It quickly went viral and drew widespread public attention. He is a candidate for the Pyithu Hluttaw and will contest the election in Pobba Thiri Township, a constituency in Naypyitaw Union Territory. He stated that the voter lists contained major mistakes: even in Zayar Thiri Township Constituency, where USDP Chair U Khin Yi will run, only his name appeared on the list while his family members were left out. Additionally, in one village in Pobba Thiri constituency, over 700 residents were missing from the list; some listed voters had already died; some families were not included at all; the names of people who had moved away were still on the list; and even some candidates’ names were absent. He also discussed these issues with BBC. Subsequently, he was summoned for investigation.
In fact, such voter list errors occurred not only in Naypyitaw Territory. According to several contesting parties, similar problems were found in Yangon Region, Myitgyina Township in Kachin State, Thayet Township in Magway Region, and many townships in Sagaing Region. After the criticisms surfaced, the UEC extended the voter list display period by one more week. They also stated that door-to-door checks and data collection are underway to ensure the accuracy of the voter lists and to prevent anyone from being left out.
In particular, because of the Law on the Protection of the Multiparty Democratic General Election from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction adopted by the military on July 29, there was little criticism or discussion on social media. Most people did not review the voter lists because they were not interested in the election. Although some eligible voters were not included, they did not request to have their names added. These factors contributed to errors in the voter lists.
6. The situation of political parties
Among the 330 townships nationwide, the 2020 election could not be held in 15 townships in Rakhine State and Shan State. However, in all the remaining 315 districts, the NLD secured the majority of seats in every parliament. When the new parliament was scheduled to reconvene on February 1, 2021, the military took power and canceled the 2020 election results. They then passed a new law on political party registration and enforced strict restrictions on political parties.
Using the excuse that parties failed to apply for registration within the specified period, the junta’s UEC also disbanded 41 parties, including the NLD and the SNLD, both of which had won the majority of seats in the 2020 election. As a result, the situation of political parties during the military coup period has become the worst in Myanmar’s electoral history.
Despite some parties attempting to re-register, the UEC rejected several applications. They denied the registration application of the Arakan National Party (ANP), which had won most constituencies in Rakhine State in the 2015 and 2020 elections, claiming that the party violated Article 7 of the Political Parties Registration Law. According to this article, no organization may register if it has direct or indirect contact with, or provides support to, any group labeled as blacklisted or terrorist, any armed group fighting against the state, or any member belonging to such groups. However, the UEC did not clearly specify which organization the ANP was connected to. They merely rejected the application without providing sufficient justification.
The UEC also rejected the registration of several other parties, including the Democratic Party, Chin People’s Party, Union Development Party, New Society Party (NSP), and Zomi Congress for Democracy. A month after he became the Chair, on September 9, 2025, U Than Soe revoked the registration of four parties: the National Democratic Force Party (NDF), the Democratic Party of National Politics (DNP), the Women’s Party (Mon), and the Union Farmer-Labour Force Party, and dissolved them. Additionally, he removed Daw Thet Thet Khine, Chair of the Women’s Pioneer Party, who was expected to contest in No. (2) Yangon Regional Constituency, from the candidate list, and also rejected her subsequent appeal. Currently, only 57 parties remain officially registered.
Under the previous law, parties aiming to run campaigns nationwide had to have at least 1,000 members. However, the new law raised this requirement 100 times, now requiring up to 100,000 members. Additionally, parties must recruit this number of members within the 90-day campaign period starting from the day they register. Out of 330 townships nationwide, they must open offices in at least half within six months and contest in at least half of the constituencies. If they fail to submit the required number of recruited members within 90 days of their registration approval to the UEC, they will be removed from the registry.
According to these provisions, the time frame is too short for parties wishing to contest nationwide. Although some requirements were later relaxed through amendments, many parties had to abandon their plans to run at the union level due to ongoing nationwide fighting against the military junta, local insecurity, rising displacement, and increased migration across borders. They now struggle even to contest in their own states and regions. Currently, 3.6 million people have been displaced. Overall, it is unlikely that many parties will be able to compete nationwide. Except for six major parties, the remaining parties can only contest at the state or regional level.
There have also been ongoing armed conflicts in the states and regions, including Northern Shan, Chin, Karen, Kayar, Kachin, Mon, Sagaing, and Magway. Additionally, the junta has declared martial law in 63 townships across nine states and regions. Under these conditions, political parties face significant challenges in conducting free campaigning and opening offices.
The six parties that will run nationwide are the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the National Unity Party (NUP), the People’s Pioneer Party (PPP), the Myanmar Farmers Development Party (MFDP), the Shan & Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), and the People’s Party (PP). Among them, except for the USDP, the others did not win any seats in the 2020 election. Some are also unable to open offices in Kayar State, Chin State, and Rakhine State due to ongoing local armed conflicts.
Reportedly, 4,963 candidates from 57 parties and independents have registered with the UEC. A total of 6 parties will campaign nationwide, while 51 will compete only within their respective states and regions. Among them, USDP, the party backed by the military junta, will field the highest number of candidates (1,018), followed by the NUP (694), the PPP (672), the SNDP (584), the MFDF (428), and the PP (512), according to the UEC.
6.1 The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
The USDP was the first party to register under the new Political Parties Registration Law. The UEC approved its registration as Registration No. 1 on April 20, 2023. The USDP will run the highest number of candidates (1,018) in the 2025 election.
The military has already secured 25% of seats in various parliaments. Therefore, they plan to form a government in cooperation with the USDP. To achieve this, they deployed a total of 489 military personnel of different ranks from the Military Office and Ministry of Defense to the USDP starting in early September 2025. The list included a major general, six lieutenant generals, twelve generals, 300 brigadier generals, colonels and lieutenant colonels, 110 captains and majors, and 60 personnel ranging from officers to sergeant clerks.
The election campaign officially started on October 28, 2025. During the first week, only the candidates from the USDP were able to hold activities in the field. On the first day, they organized campaign events nationwide, including at their Naypyitaw headquarters. Supported by strong financial backing and the military, the USDP has managed to conduct more activities than any other competing party.
To maintain power after the election, the junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing placed his key supporters in constituencies with strong military influence. The current prime minister, U Nyo Saw, will run for Pyithu Hluttaw in Cocogyun Township Constituency, which has only a small number of civilians but many military regiments and departments. U Khin Yi, chair of the USDP, will contest for Pyithu Hluttaw in Zayar Thiri Constituency of Naypyitaw Territory, where the Military Office is located. U Aung Linn Dway, CEO of the SSPC, will run for Amyotha Hluttaw through proportional representation from No. (3) Constituency in Naypyitaw Territory. Based on the candidates proposed by the military, it is projected that after the 2025 election, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing will become President, while ex-Major General U Nyo Saw and USDP Chair U Khin Yi will serve as Vice Presidents. Additionally, ex-General Mya Tun Oo is expected to be the Speaker of Pyithu Hluttaw, and U Aung Linn Dway will be the Speaker of Amyotha Hluttaw.
On the other hand, many USDP candidates have been sanctioned by Western countries. Twenty of them have been sanctioned by the United States, Britain, Canada, the European Union (EU), New Zealand, and Australia. Others have not yet undergone full review. Most were sanctioned for their involvement in violence against civilians following the 2021 military coup, while a few have been under sanctions since 2018 on allegations of genocide against Rohingyas in Northern Rakhine.
According to the latest pre-election updates, some USDP candidates face no competition in 28 constituencies for the first phase of the election scheduled for December 28, 2025. As a result, they are assured victory even before voting takes place. These uncontested seats include 13 for Pyithu Hluttaw, 13 for State/Regional Hluttaw, and 2 for Ethnic MPs. Under Chapter 9, Article 41-a of the election law concerning various parliaments, if a constituency has only one candidate, no election will be held there, and the respective state/regional sub-commission must declare that candidate as the MP.
Similarly, Shan and the Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP) will automatically win Moene Township in Namsam District of Southern Shan State. For the Akha Ethnic Constituency in Shan State, there is only one candidate, resulting in an uncontested victory for the Akha National Development Party (ANDP). The Wa National Party (WNP) also secures an Amyotha Hluttaw seat in advance for the Wa Self-Administered Division. Therefore, a total of 31 constituencies currently have uncontested winners.
6.2. The National Unity Party (NUP)
The National Unity Party (NUP), formerly known as the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which governed Myanmar from 1974 to 1988, won 12 seats in the 1990 election and 46 seats in the 2010 election. Although it contested nearly every constituency in the 2015 election, it only secured one seat in the Amyotha Hluttaw in Kachin State. In the 2020 election, they fielded over 400 candidates across 177 townships but did not win any seats. Under the junta’s new law, they were re-registered, and their registration was approved on April 25, 2023. For the 2025 election, they plan to contest with 694 candidates.
6.3 The People’s Pioneer Party (PPP)
The PPP was founded in 2019. Their Chair, Daw Thet Thet Khine, was removed from her position as an EC member of Dagon Township-NLD in November 2018 for publicly criticizing the NLD. In late 2019, she officially resigned from the NLD and founded the PPP. Of the 19 founders, more than half are business owners. Additionally, economists such as Dr. Oo Myint, an economic advisor to former President U Thein Sein, and Dr. Zaw Oo serve as the party’s economic and policy advisors.
With more than 240 candidates, the PPP contested the 2020 election, but they did not win any seats. Daw Thet Thet Khine became the Union Minister for Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement in the government formed after the 2021 coup. In mid-2023, she was appointed as Union Minister for Hotels and Tourism. In early 2025, she retired from this position.
The PPP was re-registered with the UEC following the military coup. With 672 candidates, they have the third-largest number of candidates contesting nationwide in the 2025 election. These candidates represent 70% of the Pyithu Hluttaw, 91% of the Amyotha Hluttaw, 57% of the State/Regional Hluttaw, and 40% of the Ethnic Constituency.
In the 2025 election, Party Chair Daw Thet Thet Khine sought to run for a seat in the Amyotha Hluttaw representing No. 2 Yangon Regional Constituency. Although she had already received the candidate recognition card issued by the Yangon Regional Sub-Commission, the UEC announced the removal of her name from the candidate list on October 25.
The UEC excused Daw Thet Thet Khine for not meeting the requirements in Article 8c of the parliamentary election law. This provision states that candidates must be free of inappropriate debts or liabilities to the government or private entities. The rule is controversial because it lacks a clear definition. Reportedly, she took out a loan of over one billion MMK from KBZ Bank for a housing project at 68 Residence, located at the crossroads of Gabar Aye Road and Sayar San Road in Yangon. Although she appealed to the UEC, her appeal was rejected. For the 2025 election, the PPP has put up many campaign signs in various locations. However, many people believe their chances of winning are very slim.
6.4 Shan & Nationalities Democratic Party (The White Tiger Party)
Shan & Nationalities Democratic Party (the SNDP), also known as the White Tiger Party, is a union-level party. Established in 2010, it was originally named Shan Nationalities Democratic Party. After changing its name to Shan & Nationalities Democratic Party, it was re-registered as a party competing at the union level. The party is chaired by Sai Ai Pao. In the 2010 election, they secured the third-highest number of seats, but in the 2015 election, they faced a significant loss, winning only one seat in the Shan State Hluttaw. The same outcome occurred in the 2020 election. For the 2025 election, they will contest with the fourth-largest number of candidates, totaling 584.
6.5 People’s Party (PP)
The People’s Party is led by U Ko Ko Gyi, a leader of the 88 Generation Students. They registered as a political party in 2018. In 2020, they fielded 144 candidates but did not win any seats. In early 2023, they cooperated with an abolished party called the National Unity Democratic Party, led by former Pyithu Hluttaw MP U Sein Win, and re-registered. They plan to compete in the 2025 election with 512 candidates. Within the democratic community, their policies have faced criticism. Despite running nationwide, they have only a slim chance of entering parliament. Among the parties re-registered under the junta’s Political Parties Registration Law, they have received the most criticism.
6.6. Myanmar Farmers Development Party (MFDP)
Established in 2012, the MFDP is chaired by U Kyaw Swar Soe. Although they contested the 2015 election with over 280 candidates, they did not win any seats. In the 2017 by-election and the 2020 election, they experienced the same outcome. They were re-registered in 2023. They have formed an alliance with the USDP. For the 2025 election, they will participate with 428 candidates.
7. Legal Preventions against Disturbances to the Election
On July 31, 2025, the military junta disbanded the State Administration Council (SAC) and reformed it as the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC). One day earlier, they announced that the Cybersecurity Law, adopted on January 1, 2025, had gone into effect. This law bans the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) without official approval. It also reinforces existing internet-repression laws such as the Telecommunications Law, passed in 2013, and the Electronic Transactions Law.
Furthermore, they suspended the provisions outlined in Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the Law on the Protection of Personal Liberty and Personal Security of Citizens, which was adopted by the NLD government on March 8, 2017. According to Article 5 of the law, at least two members of the local administration must accompany any search or arrest carried out in a citizen’s home. Under Article 7, a citizen cannot be detained for more than 24 hours without court approval. Article 8 prohibits searches, confiscations, and arrests without a warrant under existing laws. Suspending these provisions is a legal step aimed at preventing disruptions to their 2025 Election.
However, the junta remains unsatisfied with this situation. Unable to tolerate criticism of their electoral procedures, they passed the Law on Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction, along with strict penalties, on July 29, 2025.
Under that law, even ordinary criticism of the election results can lead to a heavy prison sentence or a fine. If a crime results in a person's death, all those involved face the death penalty. Statements meant to disrupt electoral procedures, campaigns, protests, or the sharing of writings carry a prison sentence of at least 3 years and up to 7 years. If committed by a group or gathering, the sentence ranges from 5 to 10 years. Acts that threaten, obstruct, or harm the duties and activities of voters, polling station supervisors, commission members, or candidates are punishable by imprisonment ranging from 3 to 20 years. If committed by a group or gathering, the penalty ranges from 5 years to life imprisonment. Destroying ballot papers, ballot boxes, voting machines, election commission offices, or polling stations results in a sentence of at least 5 years and up to 10 years, in addition to fines.
Under that law, a “Central Committee Responsible for Overseeing Security During the Period of the Multiparty Democratic General Elections” was established, chaired by the Union Minister for Home Affairs and vice-chaired by the Deputy Minister for Defense. The committee was authorized to monitor activities of local and international organizations that could threaten security during the election period, gather information, and take legal action.
The revolutionary organizations and forces have protested the junta’s elections scheduled for December 28 and January 11, 2026. They have also repeatedly warned the public not to participate in the electoral process. It was during this time that the military junta issued this law.
Throughout previous elections in Myanmar, some degree of freedom of expression was allowed to promote a free and fair process. There had never been a situation involving laws with such strict restrictions. Even a simple reaction to a social media post related to the election by a local resident has led to arrest, lawsuit, and imprisonment.
There was also a case where a man was arrested under this law for threatening to kill his wife if she contested the election. Daw Lay Lay Myint, a NUP candidate for Amyotha Hluttaw in an FPTP constituency, was beaten by her husband, who also threatened to kill her. As a result, responsible personnel from the township party reported the case to the police. In another incident, an assistant from a sub-commission, while riding an office motorbike, nearly collided with another motorcyclist, leading to an argument. Legal action was also taken against that case under the same law.
According to the junta’s announcement on October 30, 85 men and 3 women, totaling 88 people, were detained under the law to protect the election. A follow-up announcement on November 3 reported an additional 7 detainees, bringing the total to 95. During an electoral meeting on October 31, the junta’s Minister for Home Affairs stated that the SSPC would continue to investigate and take action against any campaigns or propaganda targeting the election. Such actions are still ongoing.
In all previously enacted election laws in Myanmar, electoral offenses and penalties have already been outlined. The current laws regarding various parliamentary elections also extensively detail these matters. However, the junta’s new law on election protection states that, regardless of existing legislation, any offense under this law must be prosecuted only under its specific provisions.
8. Conclusions
A truly democratic election must meet international standards, including freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, access to information, and freedom from fear for voters. It also requires a political environment that guarantees the freedom of political parties, impartial and competent election commissions, proper management, integrity, transparency, inclusiveness, and full adherence to the rule of law. Only under these conditions can an election be considered free and fair.
The junta’s 2025 election has completely diverged from all the norms mentioned earlier. After seizing power, the military junta arrested and detained senior NLD government leaders, including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, MPs, officials from state and regional governments, and leaders of the NLD who have strong public support, and handed down long prison sentences. They also enacted numerous restrictive laws and amendments that severely limit the public's basic rights.
At a SAC meeting on May 19, 2025, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stated that the provisions for convening a parliament are already detailed in Articles 85, 128, and 155 of the 2008 Constitution. He also mentioned that legal reviews concluded an election could still take place. In other words, he indicated that forming a Union Parliament would only require 56 MPs and 166 military representatives. This statement implied that an election would be held by any means necessary to secure the required number of MPs to convene a Union parliamentary assembly.
In mid-September, 489 military personnel from various ranks, from major generals to sergeant clerks, transitioned to civilian status and were transferred to the USDP to run in the 2025 Election. This move resembled the earlier effort to shape the political landscape before the 2010 Election, when many military officers were sent to the USDP to create favorable conditions for the elected government led by Ex-General Thein Sein as President. At that time, over 100 military officers, including many close aides of then-military ruler Senior General Than Shwe, contested the 2010 Election.
No matter what, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has been shaping the political landscape during the pre-election period to position himself as President after the 2025 Election. According to the presidential selection system outlined in the 2008 Constitution, the Pyithu Hluttaw must nominate a candidate for vice president to the Pyitaungsu Hluttaw. The Amyotha Hluttaw and the group of military representatives must also nominate their candidates for vice president. From these three nominees, the President is chosen. Therefore, he selected the candidates for the MPs from the Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw who would definitely vote for him to become President. After all, he is simply pursuing his long-held dream of becoming President.
Before stepping down, the junta leader of the 1988 coup, Senior General Than Shwe, added some provisions to Article 432 of the 2008 Constitution. According to this article, during a state of emergency, the Commander in Chief of Defence Services may take any necessary action, and such actions are considered lawful. Once these actions are deemed legitimate, no one has the right to file a lawsuit against them. Similarly, Min Aung Hlaing, the 2021 coup leader, may later claim after the 2025 election that all their activities or violations were carried out in accordance with the 2008 Constitution. It is also expected that he may pass a law to further protect himself and his colleagues from any legal action arising from their actions during the coup period.
The junta’s 2025 election will be held under strict laws and political arrangements designed to preserve the military's influence on Myanmar’s future politics and sustain the military dictatorship. It completely fails to meet international standards and norms for elections. Compared to the situation before the 2020 election, the current landscape is entirely different. This contrast shows that the military junta, which oppressed the people during the coup period, is now trying to evade accountability through a sham election.
Overall, such a sham election is not a significant step toward resolving the country’s major conflicts. It violates domestic laws, including the 2008 Constitution. Therefore, it is purely a sham in terms of legitimacy and political significance. It is simply designed to reinforce the junta’s illegitimate hold on power. For these reasons, it is clear that the 2025 Election will not resolve Myanmar's ongoing conflicts; instead, it could further fuel the civil war that has persisted for decades.