Afghanistan ANA : Wasted Funds, Wasted Time, Wasted Lives? Yes Says U.S. Watchdog.

U.S. Watchdog Says Lack Of Oversight Hampers Development Of Afghan Forces RFE

A U.S. government watchdog says a lack of coordinated oversight of U.S. spending in Afghanistan has led to a waste of funds and hampered the training and development of Afghan security forces.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said in a report to Congress late on June 20 that the United States spent nearly $84 billion on Afghan forces. But SIGAR said Afghan forces continue to suffer heavy casualties, high levels of desertion, and face problems with organization and logistics.

“Security-sector assistance efforts in Afghanistan have been hindered by the lack of clear command-and-control relationships between the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy, as well as between ministerial and tactical advising efforts,” the report said.

“This has resulted in disjointed efforts to develop” the capabilities of Afghan forces’ capabilities, it said.

The report also said that, from the start, the “security-sector assistance mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring and comprehensive plan.” from the start.

Afghan security forces have struggled to fend off the Taliban insurgency since NATO’s combat mission ended in December 2014.

The United States has about 14,000 troops in Afghanistan. Most are serving in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission to train and advise Afghan government forces. Some U.S. troops are taking part in separate combat operations against the Taliban and other militants.

At the same time, the United States has intensified its efforts to negotiate an end to its nearly 18-year war in Afghanistan.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy seeking a peace deal with the Taliban, has held several rounds of talks in Qatar with senior members of the militant group.

The sides have made progress. But the Taliban has so far rejected direct negotiations with the Western-backed Afghan government.

Report:

After 17 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and security-related U.S. appropriations totaling $83.3 billion (approximately 63 percent of the nearly $133 billion of U.S. reconstruction funding), there is not one person, agency, country, or military service that has had sole responsibility for overseeing security sector assistance (SSA).1 Instead, the responsibility for security sector assistance was divided among multiple U.S. and international entities. This report examines how these divides had unintended consequences and created challenges to the effectiveness of the mission, as well as some benefits.
While the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander is largely responsible for reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), the Ministry of
Defense (MOD), and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the commander has no direct authority over civilian actors operating within embassies, the European Union, and other international organizations. Moreover, the commander does not have absolute authority to dictate the exact methods and activities NATO countries use to train and advise the ANDSF in different parts of Afghanistan. Rather the commander provides overarching guidance and coordinates the countries’ various activities. This has created asymmetries in ANDSF development and has impeded the standardization of security sector assistance programs.
This report also highlights how the unity of command and effort was strained because no U.S. executive branch department or military service had full ownership of key components of the mission, responsibility for assessing progress toward meeting
U.S. strategic objectives, or accountability for vetting and deploying experts to accomplish mission tasks. Within the NATO-led coalition, the United States implemented a patchwork of SSA activities and programs involving dozens of U.S. government entities and international partner nations.
In addition, the lack of institutional focus on developing a cadre of SSA professionals and the short-term nature of deployments created serious staffing challenges. For most of the conflict, the United States and NATO have deployed individual advisors or pickup training teams and assigned them to frequently shifting and temporary military command structures in Afghanistan. Most of these advisors came from backgrounds unrelated to advising foreign security forces and were often underprepared for their tours of duty. In addition, since these advisors and ad hoc training teams typically deployed for only six to 12 months, they had little opportunity to establish long-term rapport with their Afghan counterparts or take ownership of multi-year SSA programs. Following their deployments, most returned to unrelated careers. Read full report here