Row over damage to Iran’s nuclear programme raises questions about intelligence

The ongoing debate over whether Iranian nuclear sites were “obliterated”, as the US president and his team insist, or merely “damaged”, as much of the intelligence suggest, should make us pause and think about the nature and purpose of intelligence.

As Donald Rumsfeld famously said “if it was a fact it wouldn’t be called intelligence”.

The recorded fate of the Iranian nuclear sites will be decided by the collection and assessment of difficult to reach raw intelligence feeds. These will include imagery, technical, communications and human intelligence, among many secret techniques.

The classified conclusions of these efforts are unlikely to make their way into the public realm, unless there is Congressional or Senate inquiry, like the one held after 9/11.

So, why does it matter?

There has been strong public interest in intelligence assessments since 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Intelligence is often only seen in public when something has gone wrong – either that something was missed or the public has been misled. Inquiries into 9/11 criticised intelligence agencies for not putting together single strands of intelligence into a whole picture, revealing the plot and the attack.

Inquiries into the approach to the 2003 Iraq war suggested intelligence agencies had allowed their assessments to become shaped by political need, or had failed to adequately caution about what they did not know.

Successful intelligence operations nearly always mean that something damaging to the country or the public has been prevented. If agencies celebrated these successes loudly they might reveal something about their techniques and reach that is useful to our adversaries. So, our understanding of intelligence tends to be framed by popular culture – or by the inquiries around intelligence failures.

From these two sources, intelligence is simultaneously all-seeing and deeply flawed. Add in narratives around the “deep state” – a shorthand that accuses unnamed and publicly unaccountable government officials of frustrating the will of the people – and it should be no surprise that the public and politicians are sometimes confused about security intelligence and published assessmements.

In the case of the Iranian nuclear facilities, the importance of the intelligence picture is focused around politics, diplomacy and security. Donald Trump would obviously prefer an official narrative that his decision and orders have put back the Iranian nuclear programme by years. This is why he talks about the sites being obliterated. And it’s why his director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, has affirmed that her intelligence-led assessment agrees. That said, she has opted not to give testimony to the Senate.

When it comes diplomacy, the judgement of intelligence officials could do one of two things. It could either place Iran in a poorer negotiating position with no nuclear programme to provide it with the ultimate security. Or it could allow Tehran to present the country as an emerging nuclear power, with the added muscle that implies. This judgement will have an impact on Israel’s need to preemptively contain Iran. And in security terms, the classified judgement will also help to shape the next steps of the US president, his diplomats and his armed forces.

The assessment given to the public may well be different from the one held within the administration. While uncomfortable for us outside of government circles, this is often a perfectly reasonable choice for a government to make. Security diplomacy is best done behind closed doors. Or at least, this used to be the case. Now Trump appears to be remaking the art of statecraft in public with his TruthSocial posts and his earthy and authentic language in press conferences.

Misinformation and public mistrust

Having a large gap between the secret intelligence assessment and the publicly acknowledged position can have stark consequences for a government. The 1971 Pentagon Papers are a good example of this.

These were prepared for the government about the progress of the Vietnam war and leaked to the press. The leaks highlighted the inaccuracy in government reporting to the American public about the progress of the war. The fallout included a number of official inquiries that shone a negative light on intelligence agencies. They also resulted in a strengthening of media freedoms.

Similarly, the 2003 Iraq war damaged the credibility of the US intelligence community. It became clear to that the unequivocal statements about Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction turned out to be overstated and under-evidenced. The loss of trust, limitations on the executive use of intelligence and the losses to the US in blood and treasure in the Iraq campaign are still being felt in American politics.

Last, the Snowden leaks of 2013 highlighted the mismatch between what was understood about intelligence intrusion into private communications data, including internet browsing activities, and what was happening in the National Security Agency through programmes such as Prism.

The Snowden leaks had an impact on America’s standing with its allies and resulted in the USA Freedom Act in 2015. This imposed some limits on the data that US intelligence agencies can collect on American citizens and also clarified the use of wiretaps and tracking “lone wolf” terrorists.

The Snowden affair also fuelled a growing narrative about unaccountable deep state activity that has foregrounded online phenomena such as the conspiracy site QAnon. It has also boosted some populist politics that point to, and feed off the public suspicion on, mass surveillance and hidden government activities.

The lessons for the current debate are clear. The first is that using intelligence assessments to justify military actions contain enduring hazards for governments, given the propensity among public servants for leaking.

From that, it naturally follows that when published intelligence is shown to be incorrect, the unintended consequence for governments is a loss of trust and having fewer freedoms to make use of intelligence to protect the nation state.

Robert Dover has previously received research funding from the AHRC to examine lessons that can be drawn from intelligence and he and Michael Goodman published an edited collection from this project.