How Israel’s famed intelligence agencies have always relied on help from their friends

When Israel launched its attacks on Iran in the early morning of June 13, many news reports marvelled at the quality and ingenuity of its intelligence agencies in enabling the Israel Defense Forces to strike with such precision. But one element was not talked about in any detail: Israel’s network of relationships with other countries’ intelligence agencies and their contribution to these covert operations.

This cooperation, while critical, can come with a price. It inevitably means a degree of reliance on other countries. Intelligence partners can decide to stop cooperation at any point, which would leave Israel vulnerable to geopolitical shifts that could threaten these relationships and limit its striking capacities.

June’s surgical military interventions against Iran concluded a round of successes against its regional foes. These included the pager attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as assassinations of top Hamas officials, including its political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Iran in July 2024.

All three of Israel’s security agencies were involved: Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency; Shin Bet, its domestic intelligence agency; and Aman, Israel’s military intelligence division.

Media reports from specialist journalists have revealed some impressive technological advancements. These included using artificial intelligence (AI) to sift through and connect millions of data points to determine targets. Israeli intelligence analysts also used spyware to hack into the phones of the bodyguards of Iranian leaders.

Aman and Mossad have also been adept at recruiting commandos from within local opposition groups. It used these to knock out Iranian air defence installations in the early hours of the first day of the attack.

Israel’s intelligence services are also very good at letting people know just how accomplished they are. It all burnishes their reputation. But much of the time those accomplishments are earned with the help of intelligence from friendly services.

This is nothing new, as I discovered while researching my recent book about Operation Wrath of God. This was the campaign of retribution that followed the Black September murder of members of the Israeli Olympics team at the 1972 summer games in Munich.

While searching the Swiss national archives, I found a large cache of encrypted telegrams that had been shared in a network called Kilowatt. This network involved 18 countries and shared information such as the movements of specific Palestinian people identified as terrorists, including the safe houses and vehicles they used.

Mossad was part of Kilowatt and could use the intelligence it received from European partners to plan and carry out its targeted assassinations in Europe. There is also ample evidence in the cables that western governments knew what Mossad was using the intelligence for.

Israel’s global net of spy friends

The US has historically always been one of the closest intelligence partners of Israeli intelligence. According to studies by the Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman and the American journalist Jefferson Morley, an expert on the CIA, this intelligence-sharing liaison dates back to the early 1950s.

There are numerous cases of Israel calling on US assistance in carrying out targeted assassinations. This relationship endures to this day. Most recently, immediately after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, US intelligence dispatched a special unit to assist the IDF in the war in Gaza and established intelligence-sharing channels with Israel to help locate top Hamas commanders.

Mossad has also worked with Arab intelligence agencies over the years. Meir Dagan, the director of Mossad from 2002 to 2011, set up a highly effective regional spy network during his tenure. Bergman has documented how this network enabled Israeli intelligence to significantly extend its operational reach. This enabled Mossad and Aman to identify, track and strike at targets in Lebanon and Syria.

These relationships operate despite Arab countries often outwardly condemning the actions of Israeli governments at the UN. For example, the Washington Post recently reported Arab states actually expanded their security and intelligence cooperation with Israel.

While talking about “genocide” in Gaza, countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were sharing data. This relationship also involved cooperation with the Five Eyes intelligence partnership of the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

According to documents obtained by journalists, the partnership, which was named the “Regional Security Construct” by the US, began in 2022 and continued even after Israel began its military operation in Gaza. But Israel’s strike on Qatar in early September, in an attempt to kill senior Hamas representatives meeting there, threatened to disrupt the partnership.

It is thought that anger from Gulf states after the attack was a key factor in focusing US pressure on Israel to agree to make a deal in Gaza. Cooperating to combat the regional threat from Iran is clearly one thing. Threatening the security of Qatar, an important player and key US ally in the Gulf region, is quite another.

Israel’s much-vaunted intelligence capabilities have always relied on some help from its friends. That is unlikely to change. The critical question is the extent to which it can retain the trust of its covert allies. As the past has shown, even in a climate of condemnation and isolation, intelligence cooperation with Israel has remained unaffected.

Strong intelligence connections have often helped overcome moments of crisis. Informal intelligence-sharing arrangements with regional powers, which are kept entirely secret, plausibly denied, and minimally documented, are thus especially crucial now as the region looks to heal its wounds after two years of bitter conflict.

Aviva Guttmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.