Assessing a new nuclear theater architecture for the Indo-Pacific
Two anniversaries just passed with little notice: the release of the Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the one year anniversary of the congressionally-mandated, bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) report. Unlike these anniversaries, the global security environment has been noticeably noisy lately. Both the NPR and the SPC report highlight China, Russia, and North Korea’s threats to the U.S.-led international order, and the growing role of these countries’ nuclear arsenals to advance their ambitions and coerce the United States and its allies.
These concerns are particularly evident in the Indo-Pacific region. China continues its fast-paced nuclear expansion and is expected to reach parity with the U.S. strategic deterrent in the next decade. North Korea has invested in intercontinental ballistic missiles with the potential to threaten the U.S. homeland, and equipped frontline units with low-yield nuclear weapons. These threats necessitate thoughtful consideration of a more concrete U.S. architecture of nuclear options in the Indo-Pacific to counter these adversaries’ advances.
Policymakers must, then, address a key challenge from these adversaries’ nuclear expansion – the threats of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes at the regional level against U.S. and allied forces. China and North Korea could exploit such threats to coerce and blackmail U.S. allies—Japan and South Korea come to mind—which would in turn sow divisions within U.S.-led alliances and force Washington and its allies to back down in a conflict on terms favorable to these adversaries. Ultimately, such a move would test the very credibility of Washington’s defense commitments.
Unfortunately, the current U.S. nuclear theater posture in the Indo-Pacific is practically non-existent, and stands in stark contrast to Chinese and North Korean buildup of regional nuclear capabilities. The incoming second Trump administration, building upon the recommendations of the SPC and taking into account the threat environment presented in both the 2018 and 2022 NPRs, could assess potential options for a future nuclear theater architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
The United States has long neglected its global nuclear theater posture. After the Cold War, Washington withdrew some of its forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Asia, and retired systems such as the nuclear-armed Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile. The current nuclear theater portfolio, concentrated around dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) and bombers based in the continental United States (CONUS), is insufficient to address regional nuclear threats from adversaries. The air leg of the nuclear triad has not been on alert for over three decades, minimizing preparedness for potential nuclear crises. Adversary integrated air defense systems and the long transit times required for the air leg to reach the Indo-Pacific from CONUS also strain the status-quo posture.
The incoming Trump administration could consider the following near to medium-term options for establishing a nuclear theater architecture in the region. First, it could direct the Department of Defense (DoD) to examine the fiscal and programmatic implications of re-alerting a portion of the air leg. DoD could also examine the feasibility of forward-deploying a small number of DCA and bombers in the Indo-Pacific, including the potential sites that could host these assets and the required infrastructure and logistics to support a forward nuclear posture.
Second, the administration could continue to assess and shepherd DoD’s progress towards a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), which the first Trump administration endorsed in the 2018 NPR to deter adversary regional nuclear aggression. Congress has authorized initial funding for this capability and the Navy has established a program office, but more work is required for SLCM-N to reach operational status in the 2030s.
Third, the Trump administration could continue to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence towards allies in the region through assurances backed by credible military options and robust diplomatic engagement. These could include building on the U.S.-Republic of Korea nuclear consultative group, established in the previous administration by codifying operational divisions of labor between both allies as part of a “playbook” on approaching a nuclear crisis with North Korea.
The administration could also explore establishing similar consultative groups with Japan and Australia, and possibly even pursue a multilateral forum where Washington could convene Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra to discuss extended deterrence issues collectively. Washington could pursue bomber task force exercises that integrate these allies’ military forces and rehearse responses to a nuclear crisis, enhancing interoperability. The United States and its Indo-Pacific allies could also discuss the possibility of nuclear-sharing arrangements akin to those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which Washington maintains custody of nuclear weapons but designates allied aircraft to deliver these capabilities to the target.
A nuclear theater architecture would not materialize overnight and would take some time to implement. These options, however, would act as stopgap measures to set the foundation for this critical architecture and buy time for the United States to reassure allies and deter increasingly bold adversaries in the Indo-Pacific. The incoming administration has an opportunity address this critical strategic gap that has been ignored for too long.
Josh Chang is a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on nuclear deterrence and force planning. He was a former policy advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a nuclear scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.