Getting the Marine Corps back to the future in the South China Sea

Back in the mid-1980s, I did a series of articles for the Marine Corps Gazette and Naval Institute Proceedings suggesting that there was a role for the Marine Corps in supporting the Navy sea control mission in a possible war with the former Soviets Union by using Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) to block the three key choke points that the Soviet Navy would need to use if it was going the break out into the open ocean (the Dardanelles, Tsushima and the Skagerrak straits). The concept would envision deploying the new Maritime Propositioned Force (MPF) ships to those choke points.

Each MPF squadron held all the beans, bullets, band aids, vehicles, and weapons to fully equip an entire MEB. In the event of a crisis where a particular choke point needed to be secured Marines would be flown in nearby to cover down on the prepositioned equipment from the MPF ship. MEB forces would defend against any attempted Soviet amphibious landing while the composite air group armed with anti-ship missiles to assist the Navy in defending the fleet against the Soviet Navy. The Marines could then deploy aboard amphibious ships to conduct offensive amphibious operations and assist U.S. ground force operations ashore.

EABO is not Choke Point Warfare

At the time, the concept was not particularly controversial because it used existing capabilities and aligned with the strategy of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). Apart from training aircrews in the use of anti-ship missiles, this MEB concept required no major modifications to existing readiness or force structure. When I first heard about former commandant Berger’s Expeditionary Advanced Base (EABO) concept, I thought it was merely adapting the choke point concept (A2/AD) along with the Navy and Air Force to deny China full control of the South China Sea (SCS). I was subsequently appalled to find that the Force Design concept envisioned a radical revision of the entire force structure of the Marine Corps and a loss of much of its conventional combat power, including the emasculation of the MPF and MEB capability.

The assumption that small “Stand-in Forces” could inhabit islands, islets, and shoals along the first island chain and all the logistics necessary to support such a plan has already proven nearly impossible.  This plan would also negate the amphibious operations capability inherent in the MEB to allow for the new littoral combat regiments. Shedding the MEB capability in favor of a static force in the first island chain leaves the Marine Corps vulnerable to any other conflict outside the first island chain and most importantly the amphibious operational capability that has become the foundation of modern Marine Corps doctrine and warfighting.

This would not only limit the Marine Corps ability to conduct amphibious operations against China in the SCS, but elsewhere, not to mention potential conflicts around the globe.

A Return to the MEB as a South China Sea Deterrent

Returning the MEB fits into the strategy of A2/AD in the South China Sea. I am one (retired Marine) of many that would like to see EABO scrapped to bring back the Marine Corps’ role as a world-wide combined arms force in readiness.

A revived MPF and MEB would be vital for the Navy to achieve sea control of the SCS and A2/AD strategy to deny China’s ability to exert control over much of Southeast Asia, and currently the Republic of the Philippines.

If one of the MPF Squadrons could be reconstituted with a full combined arms load and placed in Philippine waters, it would give the US Navy a sea base to block the expanding effort to illegally claim sovereignty over the entire region.

Although the Philippines has said it would not allow its territory to be used by U.S. forces in a Taiwan conflict, the sea-based nature of the Maritime Prepositioned Squadron (MPS) would allow it to quickly move into Taiwanese waters and be offloaded if a serious threat to Taiwan was posed by Beijing. The MEB would readily be constituted as a viable combined arms deterrent to China.

Interim Army Augmentation Needed

If the incoming administration decides to reconstitute the combined arms of the MPF and MEB, it will take some time for the Marine Corps to recreate the armored, heavy engineer, and artillery units lost with Force Design and EABO. Army augmentation will be needed to fill the gap even with a fully equipped MPF and MEB as the Army and Marine Corps have a long history of working together, and in a general war, we can expect that Army forces would eventually arrive to reinforce the MEB.

EABO; Good Initiative, Poor Judgement

The EABO concept reminds me of times I spent counseling junior officers with admirable initiative but lacking in judgement. When I was in command positions, I occasionally found myself in the position of counseling an overly exuberant Second Lieutenant on the error of his ways. The session usually started off this way. “Son, you showed a great deal of initiative, but your judgement needs a little work.”  I’ve never been a zero defects guy.

Having received the same advice from senior officers as a lieutenant in the past, I tried to be both sympathetic and empathetic for initiative in subordinates even when it goes bad. Usually, by the time they make flag rank, most officers have evolved past making poor decisions. However, in their race to implement what seemed to be a nifty idea at the time, the last two Marine Corps commandants implemented a plan that was not only not feasible, but logistically impossible and with weapons that have become obsolete even before being fielded.

In doing so, they ignored the advice of experienced retired seniors and Defense Department officials who knew better. They also skewed the wargaming to support their poor decision making. Without realizing it, they have set the Marine Corps back years, if not decades in capability.  Capability desperately needed in an increasingly volatile geopolitical world we now face.

Hopefully, the incoming administration will have officials that can put the Marine Corps back on course…in spite of itself or at least past leaders with good initiative but poor judgement.

Gary Anderson retired as the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.