The illusion of ‘unprecedented’

“You, more than any other man, have saved Western civilization.” – Winston Churchill

On the eve of the 1952 Presidential election, it had be six years and 244 days had passed since the British Bulldog spoke those words to the 33rd President of the United States at Westminster College’s Iron Curtain summit. If Churchill’s praise had been an indicator of smoother seas ahead for Truman to navigate, it could not have been more wrong. Truman’s troubles were only just beginning. In rapid succession, the administration found itself subject to a proven maxim of leadership that Abraham Lincoln once lamented:

“I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me.”

Globally, Truman’s tenure as president carried the weight of containing communism, launching the Marshall Plan, and reorganizing the nation’s defense apparatus under the National Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA and NSC. By 1949, the administration saw the Soviets become an atomic power, and the hydrogen age loomed. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 shifted the Cold War from a contest of ideology to a kinetic fight resulting in over 30,000 American service members killed by the election of 1952.

Domestically, Truman arguably faced even greater challenges. Executive Order 9981 in 1948 desegregated the armed forces and prompted a Dixiecrat revolt, while FDR’s former Vice President, Henry Wallace, broke away to create a national Progressive Party. By 1950, McCarthyism dominated politics, compounded by Truman’s loyalty program, which obligated federal employees to undergo loyalty tests. The Korean War spurred the creation of the Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board in 1951, while 1952 brought a constitutional crisis when Truman attempted to seize management of the nation’s steel mills. The Supreme Court struck down the action in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, a landmark decision limiting presidential power.

As the election approached, the country’s polarization was unmistakable. As America prepared to test the hydrogen bomb, General Dwight D. Eisenhower stood before 22,000 supporters at Madison Square Garden, warning that the opposition was fighting him “as the Nazis fought.” On election night, as Truman reviewed the secret memorandum that would lay the foundation for the National Security Agency, his approval rating had sunk below 30 percent. November 4, 1952, brought the highest voter turnout in American history up to that point, as Americans elected Eisenhower with 55 percent of the vote.

Truly, these were unprecedented times. Every institution of American life was seemingly under threat… foreign policy, civil rights, the economy, and even constitutional boundaries. Against this backdrop and navigating the storm from the helm of the Pentagon, stood Robert A. Lovett, the Secretary of Defense. A Yale-educated financier who had overseen Army Air Forces planning in World War II and later served as Under Secretary of State, Lovett was an exceptionally qualified statesman. In an administration plagued by controversy, he was regarded by historian Walter Isaacson as “devoid of partisanship,” a sentiment later validated by President John F. Kennedy, who routinely sought his counsel and, when facing his own challenges surrounding the civil–military divide, quoted Lovett directly: “This flag looks redder to the bulls outside than it does inside.” Signaling to the country and the world that, in foreign policy, reality is perception. Perhaps no greater example of Lovett’s nonpartisanship exists than the fact that he was a registered Republican who nonetheless served and counseled several Democratic presidents. It was surely in this spirit that President Truman asked his Secretary of Defense to prepare a candid memorandum outlining his concerns for the nation’s defense apparatus. The memo was meant to highlight the department’s weaknesses, the dangers Lovett saw in the ongoing transition, and viable solutions.

On November 18, 1952, Lovett sat down with President Truman for a 12:30 p.m. briefing. Later that same day, Truman, and his cabinet would meet with President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower to begin the formal transition of power. Lovett’s “transition” memo was remarkably candid… and, arguably, seventy-three years later, prophetic. In a 15-page memorandum to Truman, dated the same day as their meeting with Eisenhower, Lovett addressed the following points:

• Lovett was adamant that civilian control must be preserved and warned that the existing structure blurred authority.
• He warned that budget and manpower controls would prove inadequate during wartime.
• He highlighted that the National Security Act was contradictory, and that the design of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was flawed, encouraging service rivalries as the Chiefs wore “two hats.”
• He argued that the Munitions Board and Research and Development Board were too rigid, leaving members in effect “as judges on their own requests”
• He noted significant inefficiencies from the services duplicating efforts and insisted there needed to be a “drastic reorganization.”
• On headquarters and committees, Lovett lamented that there were too many layers of HQs and committees, comparing them to “a very contagious virus” which created waste and delays and would not withstand the test of war.
• He was adamant that placing domestic non-defense functions on the Pentagon was ill-advised, as it was already too large and overtasked.
• He proposed cutting non-combat personnel during peacetime and reducing the overall cost of a standing military by implementing Universal Military Training and Service.

Adept commanders often remind planners that danger lies in the transitions, both when they begin and when they end. If that is the case, then it becomes an incumbent responsibility to study those transitions, so that when appropriate, we can challenge the notion that this moment is unprecedented and that we therefore have no roadmap. Furthermore, when evaluating a leader’s decisions, their actions must be understood in context. President Truman, for example, presided over a deeply polarized nation confronting global challenges that were arguably as daunting as those we face today. In light of that history, can we in good faith claim that our own moment is truly unprecedented and uncharted?

Admirably, Lovett’s memo reminds us of the strength of our civil service, that a leader respected across party lines could call for universal military training and a complete reorganization of the Department of Defense and not be admonished. He cautioned that “since unification is necessarily evolutionary, improvements should be made as experience is gained,” warning that duplication, inefficiency, and blurred civilian control posed lasting dangers. Yet the problems he identified were never truly resolved. Decades later, the Goldwater–Nichols Act sought reform but arguably entrenched some of the very issues Lovett had warned about, particularly the growth of headquarters across the services. Today, as the Pentagon confronts emerging challenges like cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and near-peer competition, Lovett’s insights remain strikingly relevant.

We should take heed.

Tanner Port is a retired paratrooper and CW3 field artillery targeting officer. He is currently pursuing his PhD in history at Liberty University, where he continues to focus on the evolution of warfare. Tanner is a member of the Military Writers Guild and holds a Master of Arts in history from Southern New Hampshire University.