The Hanoi Summit – We Asked John Van Oudenaren What Happens Next in U.S.-North Korea Relations

John S. Van Oudenaren

Security, Asia

The recriminations will be bad. Hawks in Washington, Pyongyang, Seoul and Tokyo will be emboldened and argue that engagement is fruitless.

In the weeks leading up to the Hanoi summit, National Security Advisor John Bolton’s Twitter feed contained virtually no mention of North Korea. The only Tweet was a perfunctory note on the eve of the summit, which dryly said: “Good to be in Hanoi with @realdonaldtrump to meet with Vietnamese and DPRK officials. Much to discuss over the following two days.” This contrasts starkly to the rest of his Tweets, which are filled with passionate, often downright angry calls for Venezuela and Iran to submit to U.S. demands. Not incidentally, Iran and Venezuela are the top two current candidates for U.S. military action, which is Bolton’s preferred modus operandi.

As hints about what caused talks to break down have emerged since the summit, it is abundantly clear that Bolton was, at very least, never on board with a gradualist, phased approach to negotiations. He likely also sought to quietly undermine any diplomatic measures that did not amount to issuing North Korea a de facto ultimatum. As my colleague Harry Kazianis observes, even Special Representative Steve Biegun, who many saw as the driver (along with the President himself) of a more sensible step-by-step approach to negotiations, has started using language reminiscent of Bolton’s “Libya Model” (wherein concessions are contingent on total denuclearization): “We are not going to do denuclearization incrementally.” Why a de facto nuclear state would sacrifice its security, and acquiesce to such demands, especially given America’s poor track record of abiding by past international agreements, defies history, logic and virtually the entire canon of security studies literature.