In Syria, Bashar al-Assad Chose Barrel Bombs Over Ballots

Daniel R. DePetris

Security, Middle East

To the Syrian dictator, catering to the opposition’s demands or even negotiating with his enemies in good faith was a slippery slope to loosening his regime’s hold on Syria’s power structure.

As soon as the first bullets were fired at Syrians demonstrating for freedom and dignity in March 2011, the international community has been repeating two specific talking points almost every month of every year. One, Syria’s civil war would only end when the Assad regime and the opposition found the courage to sit around the same table in search of a political agreement. And two, there was no legitimate scenario whereby Bashar al-Assad could continue living in the presidential palace. If Syria’s wounds were to heal, then Assad would have to go.

U.S. and UN officials bought into their own narrative. In 2012, when the war was still at a relatively manageable level, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told a news conference that “I think military means will not bring an answer. That should be resolved through political dialogue.” In 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry—who spent much of his tenure trying to goad Syria’s warring parties into talks—passionately argued that diplomacy was literally the only option because “ultimately there is not a military solution.” Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin agreed (at least on paper), releasing a joint statement after their November 2017 meeting all but calling a military solution a prelude to more killing.

Assad, of course, had another idea entirely. To the Syrian dictator, catering to the opposition’s demands or even negotiating with his enemies in good faith was a slippery slope to loosening his regime’s hold on Syria’s power structure. While the world continued to insist that politics was the only way out, Assad viewed politics as an unworthy concession to an enemy seeking to destroy him. Devolving power to the local level, tinkering with the powers of the Syrian presidency, or signing on to his own departure date—all of which Washington, Europe, the opposition, and much of the Arab world were demanding—was in Assad’s eyes a ridiculous proposition unworthy of consideration.