Court vs. Country: France, Britain, and Canada

The spectacle of recent electoral shifts in Britain and France, together with looming ones in the United States and elsewhere, raises the question of whether there is any common pattern here. The Left seems to be winning in some cases and losing in others. Clearly, incumbents are unpopular, regardless of ideology. Is there anything more to it than that?

One way to understand all these cases is to refer to the old English idea of a Court Party versus a Country Party. As described by Viscount Bolingbroke in the early eighteenth century, England’s Court Party was led by a Whig elite of the wealthiest aristocrats in alliance with the City of London. This party dominated the king’s ministry and used the resulting patronage to its own benefit. Bolingbroke argued for the legitimacy of an alternate faction, called the Country Party, with its base of support among the lesser nobles, yeomanry, and older faith of rural England. This party, he hoped, could rule in the interest of the whole nation rather than simply in the interest of its metropolitan establishment.

Over the past decade, electoral politics in nearly every Western nation has been upended by a new axis of division closely resembling Bolingbroke’s pairing of Court versus Country. Since this division cuts across the familiar one of Left versus Right, it confuses and frightens observers who misunderstand it. Most working-class, rural, and small-town voters feel that traditional party elites have stopped protecting the people’s interests—or even granting heartland voters a minimal degree of respect. This has encouraged the growth of Country Party insurgencies against besieged Court Party elites among conservatives as well as progressives.

The resulting political dynamic is best understood by picturing four political factions in competition with one another: Court Progressives, Court Conservatives, Country Progressives, and Country Conservatives. This competition is more complex than the simple dichotomy of Left versus Right, allowing for cross-cutting tensions and tactical alliances in different directions. Its exact outcomes vary greatly from one Western nation to the next, depending on local circumstances, including national leaders and the strategies they pursue.

France

Let’s start with the most recent electoral shift involving the case of France. President Emmanuel Macron created Ensemble, a socially progressive, pro-business coalition devoted to liberal technocratic governance. Further left, the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) emerged this year as an anti-establishment coalition featuring the Gallic version of a Country Progressive platform.

Les Republicains, a traditional center-right establishment party, represents Court Conservatives in France. Meanwhile, Country Conservatives have rallied to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally or Rassemblement National (RN), a movement opposed to continued mass migration from the Muslim world. While often described as far-right—including by the supposedly neutral Ministry of Interior—Le Pen has taken pains to distance herself from her father’s noxious anti-Semitism. In fact, she critiques Macron’s economic policies from the Left and supports liberal abortion laws while defending a distinctly French national identity.

In the first round of French parliamentary elections, held on June 30, Marine Le Pen’s coalition won a clear plurality of the vote. This triggered the creation of an alliance between Macronists and the NFP, whereby hundreds of candidates from both coalitions stepped down to allow for the strongest possible competitor versus the RN in each district. The tactic worked. Even though Le Pen’s coalition won an even bigger plurality in the second and final round of voting on July 7, Ensemble and the NFP each won more seats. Meanwhile, Les Republicains ran a distant fourth.

Most striking were the demographics of these results. According to Ipsos France, Le Pen’s RN-led alliance won a whopping 57 percent of blue-collar workers, far outpacing any other coalition. Meanwhile, the NFP found its greatest strength among big cities, younger voters, managers and professionals, those with postgraduate degrees, the non-religious, and those describing themselves as “upper class.” Ensemble dominated the vote only among septuagenarians.

The French case illustrates findings that ring true throughout much of the Western world. Objectively, the RN’s overall policy combination is now center-right. But it’s a version of center-right unacceptable to some traditional establishment conservatives. The RN-led alliance is therefore defined as “far right.” Furthermore, the self-imposed difficulties in getting Court Conservatives and Country Conservatives to cooperate against the Left are immense.

Meanwhile, French progressives have no such qualms. Working on the premise of no enemies to the Left, Court Progressives work tactically with Country Progressives to collectively achieve power. This leaves the Left in control despite overwhelming working-class support for Country Conservatives.

The United Kingdom

The UK’s general election held on July 4 suggests a similar pattern despite all the obvious differences with France. Britain’s Conservative or Tory Party worked under the disadvantage of having governed for too long in a way that alienated voters in nearly every direction. Their leader, Rishi Sunak, was a Court Conservative down to his fingertips. He was also unable to bring mass migration, high taxes, political correctness, a sluggish economy, or regulatory overkill under control. Under such conditions, why vote Tory? Nigel Farage, the cigarette-smoking English populist, therefore led Country Conservatives into his newborn creation, Reform UK. Reform did very well for a novel third party, winning 14 percent of the popular vote. Sunak’s Tories were left with a little less than 24 percent. However, the distribution of seats was such that Reform only won five seats in the House of the Commons, while the Tories won 121.

On the Left, Labour’s Keir Starmer was able to build and maintain a working alliance between Court Progressives and Country Progressives that was more than sufficient to win the election. However, this was not because Labour’s ideology was beloved by most Britons. Polling at less than 34 percent nationwide, it did not do especially well for a governing party in terms of the popular vote. Rather, the key—at least in England—was division among the Conservatives, along with the sheer unpopularity of Sunak’s government. Given the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system, Labor won a colossal 412 seats, while the Tory coalition splintered and collapsed. In truth, this was among the least exciting and most unrepresentative landslides in British history.

Looking ahead, small-c conservatives in Britain face four possible futures in the coming decade. First, the Tories may find a new leader who can win back Country Conservatives and sail to victory, as Boris Johnson did only a few years ago. Second, Reform UK and the Tory Party may continue to split center-right voters, Court versus Country, allowing indefinite rule by Labor. Third, Nigel Farage may succeed in absorbing most Court Conservatives into Reform UK, leaving the Tories as a minor remnant. Fourth, Farage and the Tories may agree to merge into a new party acceptable to all British conservatives. And while this last scenario may seem most unlikely, it has happened in the past. For an example of that, we turn to Canada.

Canada

In Canada—unlike Britain or the United States—the great split between Court and Country Conservatives occurred more than thirty years ago. The leading issues driving that split were not immigration, trade, or foreign policy but regional and constitutional. Canada’s Liberal Party ruled for thirteen years as a result. Once center-right political activists finally reunited in a newly formed Conservative Party, its leader, Stephen Harper, won the federal election of 2006. This helped to set the pattern for subsequent Tory leaders. Ever since Harper, Canada’s Court Conservatives have responded to Country Conservatives not by denouncing them but by staying closely in touch with their concerns. This process—also known as “politics”—has helped to maintain Tory unity through thick and thin.

Canada’s Liberals are the party of that nation’s Court Progressives, based in the downtown districts of Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal. In 2015, the Liberals won back power under Justin Trudeau. Initially hailed as a fresh face, he turned out to be a disaster, presiding over a period of inflation, scandal, dysfunction, and woke revolution. Most Canadians are thoroughly fed up with him. He maintains a working majority in the House of Commons only through the tactical forbearance of Canada’s New Democratic Party (NDP)—a coalition of democratic socialists or Country Progressives. 

Trudeau must hold an election by October 2025 at the latest. The most recent polls have him winning 24 percent of the vote nationwide, reduced to something like 70 seats out of 338 in the Commons. Further to the Left, the NDP holds steady at around 20 percent in these polls, leaving them approximately twenty seats. The Conservatives, meanwhile, polled around 40 percent, winning them over 200 seats under current projections. A Quebec separatist party, the Bloc Quebecois, secured a plurality of seats in La Belle Province under current projections, as they usually have over the past generation.

The current Tory leader, Pierre Poilievre, is a fluently bilingual Albertan skilled at making his party’s case in a plucky, common-sense manner persuasive to ordinary people. He’s also on track to defeat Trudeau’s Liberals in a landslide next year. As a result, the media denounces him as “a conspiracy theorist.” Of course, he is nothing of the sort. Poilievre is a conservative pragmatist with populist, libertarian, and politically incorrect sensibilities. Or, to put it another way—take my word for it—he’s a typical Canadian prairie boy.

In the second part of this series, the author applies the framework of Court versus Country to the United States, with implications for the November election.

Colin Dueck is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com.