How Will Iran Attack Israel?

Speculation abounds regarding where Iran or its proxies will strike as retaliation for Israel’s recent assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah deputy Fuad Shukr. While numerous scenarios are being discussed, all remain conjectural. However, one particular possibility warrants extended consideration.

This time, Iran’s interest in hitting Israel is not just about showing force but about exercising power and inflicting significant pain and damage upon the Israelis. Yet, Iran faces a major problem: while they can inflict damage in a first strike, they lack the military means and capability to protect themselves from retaliatory strikes by either Israel, the United States, or a combination of both and their allies. Therefore, the best scenario for Iran would entail a strike that creates a chain reaction that preoccupies Israel so that it can’t mount an immediate or effective counterattack.

One specific target could be the narrow strip of land between the West Bank and Gaza. This Israeli territory, approximately fifty-eight miles long, separates about 2.7 million Arabs in the West Bank from about 1.8 million Arabs in Gaza. The Israelis have numerous military bases in this area to ensure their protection. In a strike, Iran could aim to damage these military bases, hoping that the built-up resentment and anger in the West Bank over the last eight months would lead to a revolt against the Israelis. An indicator that Iran might target this area is that in the list of targets published by Iranian media, four out of the seven targeted military bases are located in this strip.

Iran is also counting on the possibility that outrage in the West Bank, combined with the ongoing conflict in Gaza and tensions with Hezbollah to the north, will cross-fertilize into an unmanageable situation for Jerusalem. In this context, Iran might consider this strip of land as Israel’s Achilles Heel. By applying military pressure to this region, Iran might hope to create an opening for Hamas militia in Gaza and factions in the West Bank to connect or at least cause more problems for an overstretched IDF. An attack like this could also jeopardize transportation and land communication between the north and south of Israel, creating major logistical obstacles.

It’s also crucial to note that Iran has been trying to arm the West Bank. They have attempted to smuggle weapons through Jordanian smugglers or via drones, often with the help of Hezbollah and their Syrian proxy, the Imam Hussein Brigade. There is a chance that Iran has already succeeded in smuggling some weapons into the West Bank. Following an attack, Iran would hope this situation triggers widespread violence.

In this scenario, Iran’s next step could be to leave the ensuing chaos to Hezbollah, keeping Israel occupied while Iran regroups or seeks to initiate negotiations.

However, the dilemma that Iranians still face is that there is no guarantee that, in such a scenario, there would be a division of labor between the United States and Israel. In this division, Israel would counter the unrest in the West Bank, Gaza, and its own territory, while the United States would directly confront Iran. This uncertainty is a significant challenge for Iran, especially given the upcoming U.S. elections. A lack of response or a weak response in protecting a major U.S. ally in the Middle East could be costly for President Biden’s party and his party’s nominee, Kamala Harris.

Iran’s solution to such a scenario could be to unleash Shia proxies to launch attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Arguably, this part of the retaliation has already commenced. Still, when it comes to attacking U.S. troops, Iran’s proxies in Syria might emerge as key players, as U.S. troops in al-Tanf in Syria’s Homs province are much more vulnerable compared to those in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Houthis could continue their attacks against Israel, striking the Eilat port and escalating their harassment of international maritime traffic in the Red Sea, causing a surge in shipping costs and financial pressure on the West.

However, while all these actions can exert pressure on the United States and Israel, the use of proxies still does not resolve Iran’s main problem: the power asymmetry between itself and the Israeli-American partnership. In this context, Iran must be cautious. Any reckless employment of proxies could lead to a severe response that jeopardizes the proxy network it has spent four decades building. This would not only harm Iran but also its main international partners, China and Russia. Continued conflict in the Red Sea would increase the cost of trade for China, which has already been complaining to Iran. Additionally, the use of proxies in Syria could provoke a major strike against the Assad regime, endangering Russia’s efforts and gains in Syria. This may be one of the reasons behind Russian National Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu’s sudden visit to Tehran.

In this context, it is safe to say that whether or not the fifty-eight-mile strip between the West Bank and Gaza is Israel’s Achilles heel, a reckless strike could expose Iran’s soft underbelly.

Arman Mahmoudian is an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida’s Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security. He is also a research assistant at the USF Global and National Security Institute, focusing on Russia and the Middle East. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @MahmoudianArman.

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