Dealing With Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program

William Luers, Thomas Pickering, Greg Thielmann

Security,

A diplomatic effort to cap missile development is the next necessary step.

Building on the momentum from the successful pursuit of the nuclear deal with Iran, the P5+1 should now combine pressure and diplomacy to deal with Iran’s missile program.

Missiles became an essential component of Iran’s military posture during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, in which Iran received intensive Iraqi missile and air bombardments. Tehran started to build a missile arsenal because it could not get technical support for its largely U.S.-made modern aircraft. Over the years, Iran acquired Soviet-made or copied missiles from North Korea, Libya and Syria.

Although Iran today has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Israel have substantial missile programs and had deployed longer-range missiles before Iran. Moreover, Israel is believed to arm its longer-range missiles with nuclear warheads.

The low accuracy of Iran’s missiles has limited their military utility. More recently Iran appears to be placing a priority on accuracy over range—most logical if Iran’s paths to nuclear warheads are blocked by its agreement to last July’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and if it has no intention to engage in long-distance nuclear terrorism.

The scope of Iran’s missile program is worrisome. The most capable weapon under development is the Sejjil-2 medium-range solid fuel ballistic missile which has a somewhat greater range (2,000-2,500 km) and a significantly improved survivability over Iran’s operational liquid fuel ballistic missiles. The intelligence community has provided no evidence that Iran is actively developing an intermediate range or intercontinental ballistic missile.