America’s Security Dilemma: Do We Need a New Nuclear-tipped Stealth Cruise Missile?

Richard Purcell

Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, Defense, National Security, Strategic Forces, Cruise Missiles, Russia, Uniterd States, China

The debate about the LRSO centers on the question of whether or not such a capability is necessary or appropriate. 

There is a growing controversy in Washington over the Pentagon’s plans to develop a new nuclear-armed cruise missile.  The new missile, termed the Long Range Stand Off weapon (LRSO), is intended to replace the Air Force’s existing air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) that currently equips its B-52 strategic bombers.  The initiative is part of the Obama administration’s broader plans to recapitalize the nation’s triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems consisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and manned bombers over the next three decades.

The ALCMs first entered service in the early 1980s as part of an effort to prolong the life of the 1960s-era B-52s, which were no longer survivable in contested air space.  With a range of 1,500 miles, the ALCMs could be launched by the ageing bombers from well outside the reach of Soviet air defenses.  While the service life of these missiles has been extended through refurbishment programs over the last twenty-five years, the Air Force has stated that they will have to be retired by 2030.  The LRSO will then be needed as a replacement if the U.S. is to maintain its nuclear stand-off capability.