Flip-flopping Between Deterrence and Appeasement

Pavel Felgenhauer

NATO, Russia

Russian military planning tends to be extremely rational, but its raison d’être seems to constantly elude Western comprehension.

In trying to find a way to stop the bloodshed in Syria and settle the conflict in the breakaway eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, Western foreign ministers have taken to guardedly praising Russia’s constructive role. This week (May 17), in Vienna, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov co-chaired another session of the International Syria Support Group with his counterpart from the United States, Secretary of State John Kerry. And according to Lavrov, Kerry “made additional assurances to put more pressure on the Syrian opposition and its foreign sponsors” to fully comply with an overall ceasefire and return to negotiations in Geneva on a political settlement with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Opposition forces that continue to disobey, “will be excluded from the ceasefire,” apparently giving al-Assad, his allies and the Russian military in Syria the legal right to bomb them unrestrictedly. The future of al-Assad was not mentioned in the Vienna communiqué. It seems Moscow has managed to maneuver Washington into de facto accepting Russia’s main long-term strategic goal—al-Assad must be kept in power in Damascus as the best possible alternative to a jihadist takeover, no matter how much blood has to be spilt to preserve his rule. Lavrov looked pleased: “I agree with Kerry’s assessment of the situation” (Rg.ru, May 17).

(This story originally appeared the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Monitor)