Why Turkey Went Into Syria

Bülent Aras

Security, Middle East

Ankara’s goals have evolved.

The Turkish military operation symbolizes a new phase in the Syrian Civil War. Turkey has resisted calls for “boots on the ground” since the early phases of the Syrian crisis, which eventually led Ankara to face the twin threats of the PKK’s territorial enlargement in northern Syria and growing ISIS attacks, particularly in Turkish-Syrian border regions. Thus, Ankara has been waiting for an opportune moment to wage a multifunctional operation to stem these twin threats, ensure its border security and empower its position in the Syrian crisis. These basically sum up Turkey’s evolving goals in Syria, which currently prioritize restoring highly fragile domestic security and aspire to an active role at the negotiation table for any post-conflict resettlement in Syria, rather than its initial aspirations to remove Assad and prevail in its geostrategic rivalry with Iran and Russia.

Turkey and coalition forces’ negotiations to establish a ninety-eight-by-forty-five-kilometer “safe zone” between Azaz and Jarabulus, reaching into Syria, have been on the table for a couple of years. But those have failed to bear fruit due to both shifting balances on the ground (i.e., Russian and Iranian interventionism and the United States’ retrenchment) and disagreements about who would deploy land forces, with possible political repercussions in case of casualties.

The Turkish army is known for its caution, and it is no secret that before the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey had major reservations about a cross-border operation in what the secularist establishment calls “the Middle East swamp.” In Syria, the establishment’s first preference was reconciliation with the Assad regime and its allies to avert the risk of an autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Syria, which methodically contradicted government policy. Pro-Western elements in the bureaucracy, on the other hand, seemed ready to approve a joint operation with U.S. forces whereby the Free Syrian Army (FSA) could possibly be equipped to take the lead as land forces, which would in turn require minimal Turkish involvement.