Why the U.S. Military Should Worry If the Philippines Says Goodbye (And It Involves China)

James Hasik

Security, Asia

Today, actual Philippine neutrality might finally stick a fork in the Navy’s fascination with closing the Chinese coast for a tight blockade.

Back in March, as Military Times optimistically reported, the US military was planning to place “permanent logistics facilities” at five bases in the Philippines. In May, the Philippine presidential election put a quick end to that. Since then, new President Rodrigo Duterte's bluster on multiple matters has seemed to rival even the bombast coming from this year’s presidential election in the United States. His approval ratings are high, however, and even transcend demographic distinctions. So let’s consider the issue from a hard-nosed American perspective, drawing on some lessons of history. How did the nature of the Philippines affect American strategy prior to the Second World War, and how might a changing relationship with the Philippines affect materiel planning now?

Signals from the Philippines on this issue of the alliance have been mixed, but mostly bad. On 11 October, Duterte announced that he would not actually abrogate the Philippines’ mutual defense treaty with the United States. At the same time, he asked his own officials, in a speech at the Malacañan Palace, “do you really think we need it?” After all, he noted, the United States did nothing about the Russian invasion of Crimea—though he was brushing past the peninsula’s inaccessibility and Ukraine's lack of an alliance with anyone. On 20 October, things got worse. In a press conference in Beijing, Duterte announced his “separation” from the United States, telling the assembled forum that now “there are three of us against the world—China, Philippines and Russia.” That’s an aspiring-but-horrifying statement, though as John McBeth wrote on 25 October for the ASPI Strategist, “the president has modified his position since returning to Manila, saying he didn’t intend to sever relations.”