Tajikistan and the Taliban

Since August 2021, all Central Asian republics have been, in one way or another, contending with Taliban rule in Afghanistan. While treading cautiously, each Central Asian government faces a host of major challenges related to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). 

While no Central Asian state has formally recognized the Taliban, all Central Asian republics have, to varying degrees, engaged the IEA and unofficially recognized Afghanistan’s only de facto government. Tajikistan sits on the far end of this spectrum as the most firmly anti-Taliban Central Asian country.

President Emomali Rahmon’s government believes that the IEA constitutes an illegitimate regime. Tajikistan sees the IEA as a grave threat to its national interests and regional security. There appears to be no reason to expect any thaw in Dushanbe’s relationship with the Taliban.

The former Soviet republic has vowed not to formally recognize the Taliban because it was “formed through oppression.” Tajikistan is the Central Asian republic that has given the greatest support to Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban forces, as was also the case during the Taliban’s first time in power (1996–2001) with the Northern Alliance. Tajikistan has hosted the National Resistance Front (NFR), a military alliance comprised of former Northern Alliance members who remain loyal to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Mohammad Zahir Aghbar, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s ambassador to Tajikistan, still runs the Afghan embassy in Dushanbe. This diplomatic mission in Tajikistan has been a focal point of anti-Taliban activity.

Ethnicity is an important factor. While the Taliban is mostly Pashtun-dominated, Afghan Tajiks played a leading role in the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Its past leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was a Tajik. His son, Ahmad Massoud Jr., and the former vice president in the Ashraf Ghani government, Amrullah Saleh, who is also an ethnic Tajik, reportedly spent much of their time in Dushanbe working against the IEA. For political purposes, the government in Dushanbe feels the need to show sympathy for ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan, at least to some degree.

Ideological dynamics are also relevant. While all Central Asian states are staunchly secular, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have taken a mostly pragmatic approach to relations with the IEA. In contrast, Tajikistan sees any political engagement with the Taliban as a threat to its rigidly implemented secularism.

“With most of the regional countries including the Central Asian countries preferring to do business with the Taliban, Tajikistan finds itself as the odd man out in pursuing such a policy. However, at the same time, it has possibly emerged as the lone theater for keeping the anti-Taliban resistance forces alive. Many of the unknown sources of support for these groups could have been routed through Tajikistan,” according to Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, a Fulbright-Nehru Visiting Chair at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst School of Public Policy.

“Thus, Tajikistan’s policies may have been useful for countries and actors who still hope for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan or even pressurizing the Taliban to change its policies in some ways,” she added.

Border Security and Violent Extremism

Of all Central Asian countries, Tajikistan has the longest border with Afghanistan, and the government in Dushanbe has long perceived grave security threats from Afghanistan. This brings us to Jamaat Ansarullah (JA).

Founded in 2010, JA is a group made up of Tajik extremists who seek to oust Tajikistan’s ultra-secular government. The organization recruits its members from within Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Banned in Tajikistan, JA has a record of waging attacks inside the Central Asian country. Shortly before the collapse of Ghani’s government, the Taliban put JA “partially in charge” of securing Afghanistan’s 843-mile border with Tajikistan. Although the IEA denies harboring any armed group that threatens the security of any Central Asian country, authorities in Dushanbe reject that claim.

Beyond questions surrounding JA, there are other ways in which Dushanbe sees the Taliban regime as a direct threat to peace and stability in Tajikistan. “Pro-Taliban social media channels are also highly critical of the Tajikistan government and operate Tajik-language social media channels,” explained Adam Rousselle, an editor and contributor at Militant Wire.

“There are also concerns over cross-border narcotics trafficking into Tajikistan, which has risen despite Taliban efforts to stamp out the trade elsewhere in the country. It is possible that JA is engaged in drug trafficking into Tajikistan as well,” he added.

Within this context, it was understandable why Tajikistan beefed up security along its border with Afghanistan in the period just before the Taliban retook power in August 2021.

Mutual Lack of Inclusivity

The Taliban’s exclusion of Tajiks from governance is problematic from the perspective of Dushanbe. This is both for nationalist and security reasons. Authorities in Tajikistan believe that the Taliban’s marginalization of ethnic Tajiks risks pushing more of them toward violent extremist groups, chiefly Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP), which would pose a security threat to Dushanbe.

“The reason why Tajikistan is taking the matter of the seclusion and discrimination of ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan seriously, is because Tajikistan fears that if discriminated ethnic Tajiks of Afghanistan do not find sympathy and support from Tajikistan or from NRF inside Tajikistan, then these ethnic Tajiks of Afghanistan may increasingly join ISKP to settle their score with Taliban,” Ahmad Sayer Daudzai, the former Afghan ambassador to the UAE, told these authors.

“There is plenty of evidence that ISKP has been recruiting non-Pashtun fighters from ethnic minorities of Afghanistan, especially from urban areas, as these non-Pashtun youth have ethnic grievances with the Pashtun Taliban movement and can find a platform with the non-ethnic ISKP,” added the former Afghan diplomat.

However, calls for inclusivity coming from Dushanbe clash with the reality of Rahmon’s authoritarian government, which tolerates no opposition, even of a moderate Islamist hue. This stance violates the terms of the 1997 UN-brokered Tajik Peace Accord that ended the country’s vicious five-year civil war. The government cracks down harshly on outward signs of Islamic piety. Authorities recently imposed new restrictions on the wearing of hijabs in public. Such measures fuel violent extremism and push Tajik citizens toward ISKP—a significant concern not only for the Taliban but also for many other countries that have suffered from its terrorism, including Russia and Turkey.

Pragmatic Engagement

Although Tajikistan’s formal position is that the IEA is illegitimate, and Dushanbe opposes the idea of countries recognizing the Taliban, the Central Asian state has had no choice but pragmatic accommodation when it comes to the realities of post-U.S. Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s government has made efforts to work with the Taliban in cross-border economic relations and the struggle against ISKP.

“Tajikistan never stopped providing electricity to Afghanistan, even after the Taliban retook power, despite the non-recognition of their regime, and the fact that Afghanistan was in debt to pay for this electricity supply. Last February though, Afghanistan finally cleared the debt. Quite paradoxically, the representatives of the two national electricity companies met a few times since the summer of 2021 to renew partnerships and even agree on an additional supply of electricity and potentially extend transmission lines,” said Mélanie Sadozaï, postdoctoral research associate at the University of Regensburg.

“In addition to these meetings and agreements, the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which was closed [in] February 2020, reopened in September 2023 to allow some cross-border markets to operate. Officials in Tajikistan have not denied these activities and have declared publicly that while their political position towards the Taliban [hasn’t] changed, they would support economic and trade relations for the benefits of both countries,” she told these authors.

Intelligence services of the government of Tajikistan and the IEA have also had meetings to discuss the ISKP threat, even if little information is publicly available about such engagement. Whether the shared threat perception of ISKP is enough to bring about a better relationship between Dushanbe and the Islamist rulers in Kabul is unclear, but experts have their doubts. This is primarily due to the lingering JA issue that appears set to ensure that Tajikistan-Taliban relations remain extremely negative.

“The threat posed by the ISKP could provoke security cooperation between the Dushanbe and the Taliban, but for this to happen, there would need to be a dramatic reduction in the threat JA poses to Tajikistan. Whether the Taliban exerts enough authority over JA to achieve this is unclear and until this happens, meaningful cooperation between the two countries seems unlikely,” commented Rousselle.

Throughout the foreseeable future, Tajikistan-Taliban relations will probably remain largely frosty. Pragmatic engagement on trade and the growing acceptance of the reality of IEA rule in Afghanistan by Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors, as well as important external partners, such as Russia, China, and Iran, may ease some friction. But the vexing questions about security, ideology, and nationalism will continue to bedevil the Tajikistan-Taliban relationship.

Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert. He has degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington and Madrid. Since 2009, Mamedov has served as a political advisor for the social-democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the EP delegations for inter-parliamentary relations with Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Find him on X: @EldarMamedov4

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project. He is a frequent contributor to Al Jazeera, Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, Responsible Statecraft, Stimson Center, and Amwaj.Media. Throughout Mr. Cafiero’s career, he has consulted many public and private sector entities, briefed diplomats of various countries on Gulf affairs, and worked as a subject matter expert for multinational law firms. Mr. Cafiero holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of San Diego. Find him on X: @GiorgioCafiero.

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