The Lebanese government may never have a better opportunity to demilitarize Hezbollah than now.

Now that the US-brokered ceasefire in Gaza appears to be holding, does it signify that an Israeli war against Hezbollah is imminent? Recent developments along the Israel-Lebanon border increasingly suggest that a major confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah is possible. Israel has been carrying out airstrikes, including assassinations and strikes against Hezbollah sites, largely in southern Lebanon, since the November ceasefire that ended the war between the two in 2024. Jerusalem is now intensifying its escalation as a possible preparation for a major offensive against Hezbollah. Many analyses point out that should the Lebanese authorities fail to disarm the militia, Israel will begin a confrontation.

The escalation against Hezbollah comes amid the group’s ongoing efforts to block its disarmament and disrupt any diplomatic initiative toward broader Israeli-Lebanese peace talks. President Trump, in his speech before the Knesset, celebrated the US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and praised Lebanese president Joseph Aoun for his stance on disarmament. Aoun soon called for negotiations with Israel, signaling a potential breakthrough. He even expressed openness to direct talks, a historic shift in Lebanon’s posture.

A week later, US special envoy Tom Barrack echoed this call, urging Lebanon to engage in peace talks to address border and security issues while warning that Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm risks triggering a major Israeli offensive. Barrack reiterated his message lately, while calling Lebanon a “failed state” amid the stalemate that is preventing Hezbollah’s disarmament. 

Hezbollah and its ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri—who often mediates between Hezbollah and foreign powers—moved quickly to block the initiative, knowing that direct negotiations would sideline the group and hasten its disarmament. In fact, in the months and weeks since the Lebanese government approved a US plan in August to disarm Hezbollah and tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to develop a plan to do so by the end of 2025, implementation efforts to disarm the group have stalled. 

While this is primarily due to Hezbollah’s opposition to disarmament, the delays also stem from factors such as political passivity, a slow decisionmaking process, and, particularly, the army’s failure to set a clear deadline in its plan. While the LAF has reportedly dismantled most of Hezbollah’s military positions in the south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon, the group rejects its disarmament throughout the country. 

Broadly, the format of potential talks between Lebanon and Israel remains disputed. Historically, Israeli-Lebanese negotiations have been indirect, limited in scope, and mediated by the United States and the United Nations. Based on Barrack’s remarks, however, the Trump administration seems now to favor direct talks to diminish Hezbollah’s influence and expedite disarmament. 

The alternative remains the “indirect negotiations” framework of the November 2024 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement—the US-brokered ceasefire that ended 13 months of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The agreement commits Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and other militias while requiring Israel to halt offensive operations. A US-chaired “Tripartite Mechanism,” hosted by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with French participation, monitors compliance.

Hezbollah, backed by Berri, is fighting to preserve indirect negotiations under this mechanism, using the process to buy time, reconstitute, and maintain political influence alongside Iran. While accusing Israel of ceasefire violations—which Israel denies—Hezbollah demands an Israeli cessation of operations in Lebanon, an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, and reconstruction aid for southern Lebanon, offering in return only continued discussion of a so-called “national defense strategy” for its disarmament.

If the past is a precedent, Hezbollah is replicating what it did almost 19 years ago in the wake of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, a ceasefire agreement which ended a war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 and whose terms largely serve as a basis for those of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. Then, too, Hezbollah tactically accepted the ceasefire, only to reconstitute and expand its weapons arsenal while accusing Israel of violating parts of the truce. 

Hezbollah is not only refusing to give up its arms but also indicating that it has reconstituted its forces and arsenal in defiance of the terms of its ceasefire with Israel. This was announced by the group’s secretary-general, Naim Qassem, and reasserted by several Hezbollah officials. While the extent of Hezbollah’s reconstitution is no doubt exaggerated—given that its operations are under constant Israeli surveillance and its supply lines ruptured by the fall of the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad—a report by The Jerusalem Post indicated that the militia is rearming and recruiting new fighters faster than the Lebanese army has been dismantling its positions, particularly north of the Litani river. Another report by The Wall Street Journal specified that Hezbollah is rebuilding capabilities in three areas—rockets, anti-tank missiles, and artillery.

Hezbollah’s Recovery After the War with Israel

At this point, Hezbollah’s leadership appears to be revising its military doctrine in response to the cumulative losses it underwent in the wake of its war with Israel. The group has been facing a leadership vacuum after the loss of most of its leaders and commanders with decades of battlefield experience, a diminished arsenal (particularly of strategic weapons), disrupted supply routes through Syria, a weakened Iran after its 12-day war with Israel, and financial strain due to sanctions and constraints on Iran’s resources. 

Despite such losses, Hezbollah is recalibrating its warfare strategy away from the “Unity of Fronts” campaign that it elevated during its war against Israel in 2023 and 2024. It instead emphasizes jihadism, framed as the defense of the homeland and resistance to global injustice. Appeals to jihad and martyrdom as necessary responsibilities in such a struggle marked Hezbollah parliamentarian Ali Ammar’s speech during a recent interview. 

Yet, remarkably, threats to destroy Israel and liberate Jerusalem have been largely absent from Hezbollah’s secretary-general Naim Qassem’s speeches, compared to belligerent rhetoric made by his predecessor, the late Hassan Nasrallah. 

Still, the group is acutely aware that it cannot afford to lose the information conflict against Israel. While falling short of the kind of combativeness and the bombastic propaganda that marked Hezbollah’s rhetoric before its open war with Israel, its information warfare persists, now claiming that the group has rearmed and reconstituted. 

Qassem, in a recent speech, attempted to justify Hezbollah’s war losses as proof of endurance against not only Israel but also its powerful allies. He argued that while Hezbollah endured heavy losses at the onset of the battle, it was Hezbollah that regained the upper hand in the lead-up to the ceasefire. Emphasis on the ideology of resistance also prevails with common references to Hezbollah’s pride of bearing arms and rhetorical expressions such as saying “Hezbollah’s jihadist doctrine of militancy is more lethal than its arms.” 

Recognizing that Israel’s intelligence and technological superiority proved detrimental to its irregular warfare strategy, Hezbollah is reportedly restructuring its military. According to a Le Figaro report, the paramilitary is regrouping under a new generation of young commanders proficient in high technology, reassigning military responsibilities, and curtailing communications to maintain operational secrecy. Similarly, as Hezbollah’s centralized decision-making structure ultimately crippled the organization’s ability to recover after the wartime decapitation of its leadership, the group—with Iranian support—has reorganized into smaller and more autonomous local fighting units.

Reports indicate that it is shifting toward a smaller arsenal largely consisting of lighter arms and anti-tank missiles, while expanding its use of domestically manufactured intermediate-range drones. Since Israel decimated much of its missile stockpile, Hezbollah now views large strategic weaponry as a liability. Yet the group’s reconstruction now appears to emphasize defensive rather than offensive warfare.

As in its early days, Hezbollah will once again rely heavily on its jihadist ideology and the “will to fight” of its members. In this light, Qasem and pro-Hezbollah commentators have made references to potential suicide attacks in a future conflict with Israel. Known to utilize Shia villages as shields, Hezbollah is now restoring its network of underground tunnels in southern Lebanon, irrespective of what Israel has yet destroyed.

Thanks to the US pursuit of Hezbollah’s global illicit financial activities, Israel’s targeting of the group’s financial institution Al-Qard Al-Hasan, weakened Iranian support, Lebanese authorities’ interception of cash smuggling, and loss of Syria’s supply routes of arms and drugs, the group is financially crippled. 

However, it reportedly continues to get funds from Iran—primarily through Syria—while reprioritizing expenditures to focus on its military apparatus, the wounded, and the families of those killed on the battlefield. According to a report, Hezbollah’s local drone-manufacturing enterprise relies on front companies and global supply lines and is financed by illicit proceeds. According to a Lebanese commentator, Hezbollah still boasts a tremendous cash fortune that no other Lebanese faction possesses.

Israel May Take Matters into Its Own Hands

Repeated calls for direct negotiations with Israel have continued since Barack’s warning message. In a recent visit to Lebanon, senior US envoy to the Middle East, Mogan Ortagus, called for broader direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel and pressed the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah completely by the end of this year. 

According to reports, Ortagus, in an effort to broaden the Tripartite Mechanism’s scope, proposed including civilians on the mechanism’s committee and emphasized security cooperation between Lebanon and Israel. Following Ortagus’s visit, Aoun, on November 3, stated that Lebanon “has no choice but to negotiate with Israel.”

Yet, in a latest and defiant development a few days ago, ahead of a new Cabinet meeting at Lebanon’s Presidential Palace to review the LAF’s report over Hezbollah’s disarmament, Hezbollah issued an open letter to the Lebanese leadership rejecting any Lebanese state’s monopoly over arms and refusing to engage in direct talks with Israel. 

Not surprisingly, Israel has since ramped up its strikes on Hezbollah targets as well as ordered several villages in southern Lebanon to be evacuated. In a sign that the United States is unequivocal in its efforts to disarm Hezbollah, the US embassy in Lebanon issued a comment on its X account a day after Hezbollah’s letter, emphasizing that the United States won’t allow the group to continue to remain a threat to Lebanon.

The Lebanese state is attempting to reassert its authority over Hezbollah through its disarmament. While major concerns remain—particularly Hezbollah’s opposition to disarmament and the risk of civil conflict given Lebanon’s sectarian structure—the current regional climate, which prioritizes peace in the wake of the Gaza ceasefire, presents an opportune moment for Lebanon to act. The Lebanese state still holds the initiative to pursue Hezbollah’s disarmament, but it must proceed decisively and according to a clear timetable. Otherwise, Israel will likely take action on its own terms.

About the Author: Rany Ballout

Rany Ballout is a New York-based political risk and due diligence analyst with extensive experience in the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Montreal in Canada and a bachelor’s degree in Linguistics from Uppsala University in Sweden. His views are his own.

Image: Matej Sulc / Shutterstock.com.

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